Within the complex of problems which make up what is known as the Jewish question in Poland, and amidst the modes proposed for its settlement, or at least for an alleviation of its intensity, pride of place is occupied by the concept of Jewish emigration to Palestine and/or to those lands where possibilities of immigration should exist.
The financing of such a plan must from the nature of things embrace an enormous range of economic interests if it is to cope with this important and large-scale task. There is not the slightest hope of effecting it upon a satisfactory scale - even the most modestly conceived - by such means as utilizing the balances left to Poland as an outcome of clearing arangements in Polish-Palestine trade.
As far as Palestine1 is concerned, disregarding the political influences of Great Britain and of inimical Arab opposition, immigration to the Jewish National Home is primarily conditioned by the volume of capital flowing into the country and by the degree and tempo of the investment works effected there. These are the only factors which can in the last resort increase the absorptive power of the labour market in Palestine and afford more chances of employment to a greater number of wage-earners or of the pauperized petty shopkeepers and traders of the Jewish urban population. It is in the emigration of these most poverty-stricken classes of the Jewish population - misfits in the economic structure of the country - that Poland is most interested.
Exports of finished goods to Palestine are most desirable from Poland's standpoint as they offer better chances of a favourable balance of trade. But they naturally reduce the profitableness of the Palestinian industrial plants and hinder (even if they do not totally inhibit) the investment of further capital in new branches of production whose competitive struggle with barter-trade or capital transfer prices becomes more and more onerous with time. Even if priority be given to raw materials or semi-manufacturers in the clearing agreement, this will be evaded under the pressure of prospective emigrants seeking at all costs to transfer their capital; even the most efficient system of clearing will be unable fully to stop or control the export of finished goods elbowing out the less transformed commodities. Such an export will certainly cause perturbations in the immature industrial system of Palestine, although to a lesser degree than export under the Palestinian-German capital-transfer system.
The Jews of Palestine might possibly gradually cope with the over-liberal nature of the customs tariff typical of a mandate country; in spite of all, the Palestinian government from time to time and under pressure of the Jewish Agency raises the Customs duties on various commodities. This increases the competitive ability of the country and at the same time strengthens and extends the range of production of Palestinian industry, besides encouraging the rise of new plants.
The under-cut prices of commodities shipped to Palestine in order to implement capital-transfer undoubtedly exercise a most deleterious influence on production in that country. Such prices often stand in little relation to actual costs and are marked by lack of coordination. This is in fact not surprising; they only too often express a spontaneous, feverish haste to secure ready money for the goods exported, and are always subject to the vagaries of emigratory pressure.
It will therefore be necessary to revise the plans so far accepted in this connection; they offer no guarantee or even hope that they will help to increase Jewish emigration from Poland since they tend to contract the scale of production in Palestine and so to reduce the absorptive power of that country for immigration. Jewish emigration from Poland is, after all, the cardinal element of the problem under examination.
The problem of emigration in general, and of a large-scale emigration of the pauperized Jewish masses in particular, revolves around the question of pecuniary means. Until such means are found - until very large sums are mobilized for this purpose - even the best-laid plans have no real significance.
No plan, whether based on transfers or clearing-trade balances, on intervention by means of diplomatic suggestions, or on hazy projects of establishing financial institutions in Poland, has any real significance if it does not concretely indicate the sources of the necessary capital and effective means of inducing it to engage in the scheme. This is, of course, no easy matter; the pecuniary resources required are so great that it will be possible to mobilize them only by coordinating a large number of elements: political, financial, credit, raw-material, investment, productive and export-distributive, etc.
The dynamic force of such an undertaking, conceived upon so large a scale, is and can be solely that represented by the mobilization of the capital, and also of the economic and political influences of U.S. and English Jewry. Probably no less important a factor is the existence of good-will and a due understanding of the great importance of the matter to all the decisive circles in those countries which succeed in attracting the collaboration of other, directly or indirectly interested, lands.
The above are the basic postulates accepted in the following plan for the financing of Jewish emigration.
It is proposed to establish an institution in Poland bearing the character of a public-utility body in which representatives of the Government, the business life of the country, and of Polish Jewry will participate. This institution shall work under the strict control of the authorities and regulate the question of Jewish emigration as a whole, with particular reference to its financial and economic aspects.
The procedure shall be as follows. Prospective emigrants notify the institution of their intention to leave the country; these would be primarily persons possessing property in the form of bonds or other securities, urban and rural estate, industrial establishments, etc. All this property shall remain at the disposal of the trustworthy institution in question and serve as security for the future transfer of the capital thus registered. The institution shall be unconditionally empowered to dispose of such property once the transfer is effected.
Bond issues will then be floated for public subscription and shall bear a double guarantee: that of the Polish Treasury and a guarantee extended by the institution on the strength of the property amassed by voluntary registration as above.
The bond issues shall be launched upon several foreign money markets but, in all probability, chiefly in the United States, where an understanding should first be attained with the Jewish and other banking circles there. The credits obtained in this manner will initially serve two purposes: l. to extend the bases of Poland's export by developing existing and constructing new establishments for the production of various commodities; 2. to provide the floating capital necessary to finance this outgoing trade.
These investment and export activities shall be preceded by the attainment of an understanding which should lead to the conclusion of binding agreements with the various quarters interested in the regulation of Jewish affairs. Such agreements will be of importance as they should assure the sale of the above-mentioned output, which shall be strictly determined in point of quality, type and quantity.
The bond credits mentioned above shall be long-term ones, and bear a relatively low rate of interest, so that the service (interest and redemption) shall find cover in the difference between the appraised value of the property registered for transfer and the sum actually placed at the disposal of the prospective emigrant. This difference may be about 20-30% of the value and shall be the donation made by the emigrant in order legally to transfer the money-value of his property and to settle in a land of his own. The foreign exchange necessary for the service of this credit shall be drawn from the profit yielded by this export, but not necessarily all of it. The capital funds yielded by this export trade shall be free of foreign exchange holdings of Poland, and it can be done all the more easily as the monies utilized for this purpose will have been compensated for in advance by the influx of foreign exchanges, yielded by the realization of the bond-issues and deposited with the Bank of Poland.
There are of course other, additional possibilities offered by the planned organization outlined herein, the friendly cooperation of the interested quarters, and by the undoubted profitableness of the various export transactions. Thus, it will certainly be possible to obtain important advances on convenient terms from buyers; this will be advantageous as it will, by accelerating pecuniary turnovers and the influx of foreign exchange, speed up transfer operations and hence the emigration traffic itself.
The sequence in which the transfers of the various emigrants will be effected shall be determined by the supervisory institution. Endowed with a broad scope of competence, this body shall take into careful consideration the most effective and economically justified utilization of the given funds in the country of settlement, where it shall, moreover, collaborate with a corresponding institution endowed with similar prerogatives, and authoritative by reason of its special knowledge of local conditions and needs.
The various investment propositions in the settlement areas shall be studied from the standpoint of their utility under local conditions, their chances of profitable operation, and of affording employment to the greatest number of workers recruited from the ranks of those emigrants who possess no capital funds. In connection with this, every 'capitalist-emigrant' shall be obliged to employ a stated number of workers, who will emigrate immediately when the given undertaking to which they have been ascribed is ready for operation.
Simultaneously, the property left behind by the emigrants shall be liquidated in planned fashion and without undue haste, so that its money-value shall be fully realized without unduly depressing price levels. This liquidation shall also be adapted to and made contingent on the degree of preparation attained by Polish companies and individuals willing to acquire, and able efficiently to conduct, the given business organizations.
In this connection, it may confidently be expected that Poles resident abroad, particularly in the United States, will in many cases decide to return to Poland with their capital and acquire some of the Jewish undertakings put up for sale. An appropriate publicity campaign could do much to arouse their interest in the scheme. In such wise, too, a new source of foreign exchange could be tapped in order to facilitate the transfer of Jewish capital, thus accelerating the rate at which transfers could be affected and increasing their volume. Polish-American capital would offer other, supplementary advantages to Poland: the national economy would be enriched by a new element, financially strong compared to Polish conditions, often expert, usually skilled in the up-to-date methods of American production and imbued with energy and enterprise.
Facilities could be arranged to help such Polish-Americans to liquidate their property in America and secure ready money. Credit, possibly organized under the aegis of the Central Institution could be extended to buyers - most probably American Jews who would desire to participate in this planned movement to help their Polish co-religionists. This would relate to industrial and other productive establishments. With regard to trading houses and retail stores, some special form of organization could be built up with the collaboration of the relevant Jewish wholesalers, cooperatives, etc. The purchaser could redeem the credit from the profits yielded by the business thus acquired. Such action will help those American Poles who would otherwise find it difficult to return to their mother country. It will, at the same time, mobilize considerable stocks of foreign exchange for the transfer of the value of the Jewish business in Poland taken over by such Poles. This is only one of the factors envisaged in order to increase and accelerate Jewish emigration from Poland, but it has the added advantage that it provides for simultaneous liquidation and speedy taking over of Jewish property in Poland by a valuable Polish element.
It can be expected that the numerous possibilities and prospects of profitable investment will induce Polish capital kept in other countries to participate in the scheme outlined herein.
Conceived upon such a broad basis, the Plan will affect a large number of establishments and enterprises, a considerable executive personnel and a large number of workers. This will serve to counterbalance the process of liquidation and will help to realize the Plan without seriously disrupting the economic and business life of Poland.
The planned Central Institution in Poland shall manage the entirety of the action. It will be necessary in addition to have organizations in the United States and elsewhere which will, in collaboration with the Jewish wholesale associations and the Polish distributive apparatus there, organize the regional and local wholesale, and even the retail, trade. Finally, it will be highly advisable to establish a mixed Supervisory Council, composed of delegates representing the Bank of Poland, the State-owned banks, foreign bankers financially interested in the Plan, leading political leaders, merchants, manufacturers, newspapermen, etc., not necessarily all Jews.
There can be no doubt that many supporters and well-wishers will be found who will be glad to assist in this attempt to rationalize and concentrate the practical efforts made to save the means of existence of the many Jews in certain European countries. Many Jews, those who are more discerning and look farther ahead, have seen the signs of the times; they no longer delude themselves with the optimistic hope that the German example will not be followed in other countries. These Jews will help to realize the present Plan, and so will those quarters which approach the matter from the opposite standpoint. The broad masses of Jewry must find new social levels and be conditioned for independent economic and political life within their National Home, as also upon other territories.
While on the subject, it may be mentioned that connections will be established in rational manner with tens of millions of the population in the Near East who will be drawn into the world economic system - a matter of no mean significance.
There is nothing fantastic in this Plan. It lies fully within the bounds of possibility, provided, of course, that the ground is properly prepared and the field adequately organized. After all, considering the matter more deeply, although the English, American and French Jews feel reasonably safe at present, they cannot but ponder on the vagaries of fate; they must interest themselves more and more in the problems of Jewish emigration and in the fates of those Jews who are already now forced to emigrate from certain countries. This interest is therefore something more than an expression of solidarity among the various Jewish communities of the world.
Work on Jewish colonization in the past as also that now under way in Palestine has the character of a pioneering operation; it is preparing the way for the next waves of emigration, and as such is beginning to concern virtually the whole of world Jewry more and more closely and directly. It is therefore most probable that the relevant Jewish quarters will agree to lend their fortunes and influence in order to further this Plan in spite of the serious obstacles encumbering the way to such collaboration. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that the Plan contains no element of philanthropy; it is, in fact, rather a proposition based upon business principles.
It is fully realized that the accomplishment of the whole Plan will be no easy matter; it may even seem at first sight unsurmountably difficult. The initial step must be to secure the goodwill of the Jewish and gentile financial world in Great Britain and America. The foundations of the movement will be laid when the approval and interest of even only a few of the leading bankers will have been gained for this in effect large-scale business proposition (thus assuring its financial basis), coupled with the collaboration of the relevant political circles. The overcoming of other difficulties will be facilitated by this preliminary progress, and ultimate success will then be more than probable in spite of the fundamentally exceedingly complicated nature of the problem.
The undersigned regards the economic future of the Jews (not only in Poland) in a most pessimistic vein. A tangle of many social, national, political, economic and demographic factors has involved the Jews in such wise that the only radical and humane issue is to cut the knot by a broadly conceived and organized emigration along the above lines. It is sought at the same time to elaborate such methods and to utilize every possibility of transferring the maximum amount of Jewish liquid capital for sound, constructive colonization, in order to erect an independent Jewish national economic and ipso facto political structure.
Palestine is of course too small a country for the territorial requirements of the problem as a whole. But it can, with the succesful working of the present Plan, provide a convincing precedent for Jewish colonization in other parts of the world. There can be no doubt that the successful application of this Plan in Palestine during the initial stages will furnish sufficient evidence to skeptics that an independent Jewish economic system can arise and flourish even under the complicated conditions in that far from rich land. Once this conviction gains force, there will appear hitherto unrevealed Jewish and gentile forces well-disposed to this wandering and unhappy Nation; they will then, in its own interest and in that of universal appeasement and tranquility find and offer not only the requisite funds but also appropriate areas for settlement.
The present writer considers that Great Britain cannot expect any larger influx of capital into Palestine within the near future in view of the system of foreign exchange restrictions finding more and more application in the world. Apart from political considerations, this must have induced the English so to frame their Palestinian policy of recent years that it, as it were, forces them to reduce the number of immigration certificates issued. Great Britain does not wish to increase the number of Jewish wage-earners there or of any other indigent elements in Palestine and hence desires to exclude the potentially uncertain and troublesome element represented by such immigrants.
On the other hand, with the possibility that large capital funds will be transferred to Palestine for a prolonged, fixed period of time and in conjuction with constructive plans for a more rational and purposeful utilization of these important monetary resources than hithertofore, it can be expected that the Palestinian government will substantially increase the immigration quotas. The general attitude of the Jews will naturally favour such a change of policy. It is quite true that England's attitude towards Jewish Palestine has been a negative one in many respects; apart from the above factors, it has necessarily been influenced by other considerations such as the difficult and highly involved components of Britain's imperial policy in the Near East. But the undersigned believes that this attitude is, in spite of appearances to the contrary, fundamentally friendly, and will finally, after a longer or shorter deadlock, most probably become a positive one - a consummation in which the strengthening of British imperial defence will doubtless likewise play some part. In such event it is not out of the question that the Jewish settlement area in Palestine will even be extended (naturally under conditions and at a time suitable for Great Britain).
It would not be amiss at this juncture to dwell on the general background of the Jewish problem in order to demonstrate that a solution can be yielded solely along the lines suggested therein.
The undersigned considers that the Jews will only be able to make the necessary effort to realize large-scale colonization plans when they realize the irreversible nature of the forces against them. The anti-Jewish movement is in fact still increasing in force, and no process of persuasion - even the most convincing or cleverly thought out - no attempts at Popular Front intervention, can hope to provide an adequate remedy.
The eternal truth that charity begins at home is decisive here. The economic situation of the world and the political constellations dependent on it force nations and governments - driven by the instinct of self-preservation - in ever sharper and more absolute manner to seek new, rapid and effective ways of solving the steadily more difficult problem of finding stable employment for the rising generations. From the nature of things, too, there is a trend to remove the superfluous consumers of a loaf which cannot suffice for all. Coupled with these motives there arises the useful and enticing complex of scapegoats, responsible for all these economic catastrophes and crises.
It is not sufficiently realized that virtually all the transformations in the world of today - profound political and social ferments, the seeking of new paths and programmes - all these derive from a single source: the impossibility of providing employment and subsistence to everybody.
There are so many misconceptions current amongst the Jews on this point that it will be useful to give a general review of the origins of the economic depression. Such an approach lends conviction that the present acute stage of the Jewish problem is chiefly due to the depression. There are many Jews and others who consider that the tension on the anti-Jewish front will weaken when the depression comes to an end. This is unfortunately taking the line of least resistance: do nothing and wait for business to improve. The exponents of this idea close their eyes to the possibility that the depression may outlast the present generation.
The destruction of capital during the World War was so great that merely the interest at the rate of 3% per annum upon the aggregate sum would afford steady employment to close on twenty million workers.
Communism, undermining confidence and the feeling of social and political stability, inhibits the international circulation of money and commodities; this in turn evokes financial hyper-saturation in some countries (with the attendant evils of over-capitalization, speculation, etc.) and dearth of money and under-investment in others.
All this happens in conjunction with a growth in the autarky of the various countries which strive to be self-contained and bar access to themselves as strictly as possible. Before the World War, the European countries found relief by the emigration of millions of surplus population to overseas lands; today this safety-valve no longer functions owing to immigration restrictions, and the situation in many countries is, as a result, quite a desperate one.
Following this line of approach to the transformations taking place in the world, we attain a new understanding of many later-day problems, such as fascism, Hitlerism and the present form of anti-Semitism - so different from the pre-War type. We find that all these movements are in effect nothing but the jettisoning of unwanted passengers from the ship; since the number of Jews in Germany was insufficient for the purpose in view, their number was tripled... by reaching back to the third generation.
As it has been postulated that the elimination of the Jews, and hence their further fate, is preponderantly contingent on the future course of the economic depression, it is necessary to ascertain whether there are any chances of a permanent recovery and how probable these are.
The present writer considers these chances are exceedingly frail; in fact it seems more likely that the disintegration of world economy will make still greater progress. 'Induced' prosperity bolstered up by artificial expedients and the most diverse methods of foreign exchange manipulation for intervention purposes are so far removed from the basic tenets of sound economy that a still greater deterioration of conditions can be expected rather than any measure of ultimate recovery., To make matters worse, we have still to face the culminating point of a furious race for armaments, one deprived even of the only logical solution - that of war. For the Great Powers wish to avoid actual war at all costs and this, with the internal changes likely in the Soviet Union, indicates that hostilities may not break out during our life-time. In fact the threat of war and the menace of armaments appear to have supplanted actual fighting as a means of enforcing politico-economic claims.
This line of development will even affect the United States, probably the richest country in the world, where an excellent imitation of prosperity has been wound up and made to function with life-like animation and swing. A close analysis of business conditions in that country yields the conviction that the improvement cannot be long maintained in the face of its artificial character and the lack of support afforded by the eternal and immutable law of supply and demand. For, it is highly artificial and in the long run most uncertain to bolster up consumption by enormous extension of sales on the deferred-payment or installment system. In addition, there is the gloomy outlook of public intervention funds running dry, rich though the United States is as a country. This is all the more likely because the rate of production does not keep pace with the influx of financial means, normally yielded by new capital issues; at present the latter are even below the pre-War level. All this may have adverse repercussions on the future national income, hence, too, on the budget and entirety of economic life in the United States. In addition, the danger exists that government intervention will, after exhausting its present sources, i.e., consumptive capital, be obliged to raid productive capital upon an even larger scale. These considerations are pregnant with warning that regression in U.S. economic conditions is more probable than anything else.
The fear exists that such a turn for the worse may be turned to account by anti-Jewish spheres in America, incited and goaded on by external influences, which are conducting an ever more unscrupulous campaign. Should the economic experiments in the United States fail, the Jews will be probably blamed - an enticing prospect, and one which unfortunately can find some measure of justification owing to the perhaps over-great part taken by Jews in the moves of American economy.
This pessimistic outlook persists when the matter is examined from a broader aspect. A time must come when artificial means of animating business conditions will be abandoned; when the race for armaments will stop; when the manipulation of currencies and credit, and a number of other questionable methods of economic intervention will have to be given up. Directly some measure of political appeasement is attained, the world will have to discuss some general form of reforming economic conditions and wage a great battle for the division of sales markets. The latter problem of course implies fixing the future output of each of the countries. In this process of reform, the various countries will not benefit in equal measure (causing a restriction of production) and this will apply with special force to the poorer ones, which under natural conditions could constitute capacious economic reservoirs. Those lands which neighbour with the Soviet Union or are less distant from it geographically, remain within the sphere of the influences (even if only unofficial) emanating from that country; proceeding by underground channels these influences make themselves felt amongst the various social groups, national minorities, the unemployed and the dissatisfied. The countries thus affected are subject to the real or assumed centripetal, dynamic forces of class warfare and their economic development is hence in greater or lesser measure deprived of the beneficial action of sound and creative forms of credit and commodity exchange. As long as there is no uniform economic system in the whole world, there can be no hope for a durable reform and stabilization of economic and financial life - possible only under the conditions presented by uninhibited financial, commodity and migratory circulation.
Returning to the question of a planned Jewish migration, based inter alia on export trade from Poland, it is possible to make the interesting observation (favorable in the movement outlined herein) that the United States is more and more inclined to liberalize her import policies. There are many factors behind this change: the desire to reduce the disproportion between the capital held by the United States and by Europe, to equalize and reciprocally adapt the balances of payments and of trade to each other; to remove some of the many undesirable excrescences which have accumulated under the stress of the artificially wrought and maintained economic animation in the United States, etc. It is not out of the question, too, that America has entered this path as a contribution for restoring a sound basis to world economy.
This indicates that new possibilities are arising for expanding Poland's import to the United States. The present Plan for financing Jewish emigration is based on increasing commodity export, primarily to the United States where there are five million Jews (60% of whom are occupied in trade) and over four million Polish-Americans (who own more than 40,000 retail shops in the USA). This rather large aggregate number is an important factor, but a still more significant one is that the U.S. market enforces no import embargoes and has no import quota systems; it is also the richest and most capacious market in the world - imports from 1936 were for the value of $2,420 million. Yet the USA has been grossly neglected by Polish traders, as witness the fact that Poland's share in this huge import trade is only 0.4%. This exceedingly weak participation should and must be strengthened.
It is no consolation that Poland has increased her exports to the United States threefold during the last few years. For, this increase represents a larger export of agricultural products for the most part; it is not an expression of expansion but merely of the advantage taken of a transient state of affairs - that of restriction of sowings and of the crop failures of 1933 and 1934 in the United States. Polish exports of grain to that country in 1934 represented 52% of the total trade and were obviously not a stable feature - after all, the United States is an exporter of cereals; the remainder of the exports consisted of agricultural raw materials and half-products (29.5%), industrial raw materials and semi-manufactures for industrial purposes (0.5%)
Viewed from this light, Poland's export trade with the United States is far from satisfactory; it is not strange that we occupy thirty-sixth place as an importer to the U.S.A., ranking lower than Czechoslovakia and even Turkey.
Luckily the mistakes made can be easily rectified, especially those caused by lack of capital; and it is the object and basis of this Plan to secure this capital. It will then be possible: to make a more precise study of the American market; to extend the system of distribution with the help of the rational and purposeful utilization of the Jewish and Polish merchant communities in the United States; and to organize publicity and advertising campaigns upon a level of answering American requirements - the sums expended for this purpose will be large but they will certainly yield handsome returns. The U.S. market is accustomed to purchase in mass and the Polish producers, for technical and financial reasons, are at present unable to cope with such a demand. An influx of capital, pre-eminently for machine and other investments, the financing of export, and for a more satisfactory organization of raw material supplies, etc. will increase Poland's export to the United States (and to other countries) without drawing on the former's credit reserves since the present Plan envisages the tapping of new sources. Moreover, the considerable growth of export aimed at will assure the influx of new now non-existent supplies of foreign exchange for facilitating the transfer of Jewish capital. The export of flax and linens can be cited in this connection. The area under this fibre in Poland could be greatly increased in dependence on the possibility of financing the producers. The Czechs have less of this raw material but export enormous quantities of linen to the United States, whilst Poland sends out very little indeed. The investment of considerable sums in the flax plantations and for the purchase of up-to-date English or French machines for cleansing and hackling the fibre - an important factor in the economical use of the raw material and for the process of cotonization - will undoubtedly enhance Poland's export of flax and linens; this could yield a new, probably abundant source of foreign exchange.
The repairing of mistakes committed in the past and the marked growth of export possibilities which this special influx of capital will yield can be expected to result in a corresponding increase of outgoing trade and of foreign exchange receipts earmarked for the transfer of Jewish capital from Poland, and hence for the emigration contingent upon it. Over and above other advantages, this movement of capital and the liveliness in output and trade would in any case contribute to an extension of Poland's productive installations which would remain a permanent acquisition.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the Jewish problem in Poland is so acute that a solution must absolutely be found at all costs. Even if the above forecasts of the trend of world economic conditions and of the consequent repercussions and perturbations in Jewish relations are erroneous in any respect, the situation still remains the same as far as the Polish sector of the problem is concerned.
This is so because the agriculture of the country is at a level which it is difficult to raise without enormous capital outlays, more extensive methods in tilling the soil, etc. Poland has one of the lowest net money yields per hectare. This makes it difficult to increase the number of persons productively employed in spite of the rural overpopulation of the country. The number of industrial workers is exceedingly small; Poland has the lowest per capita figure of foreign trade in Europe in this connexion and the lowest index of industrial output. Both as regards agricultural and industrial investment works, Poland is being more and more outstripped by other countries. In short, it must be stated that Poland has a historically justified urge and ambition to play the geopolitical role which is hers by right, yet in spite of this, she is not able to afford subsistence to the whole of her population.
Effective and energetic measures must therefore be undertaken immediately and without further delay in order to find a solution to the vital and urgent problem which has been outlined herein.
There are appropriate roles for all concerned in collaboration on the task in hand. Those Polish Jews who are materially well off can direct their capital to new territorial fields and endeavour, with the sacrifice of a reasonable fraction of their wealth, in order ultimately to secure better conditions of life in a land of their own; Jewish wage-earners will transiently have to accept lower scales of pay for the good of the whole community; the Polish nation and government can facilitate the realization of the various elements of this Plan at their end; the Jewry and government of Great Britain and of the United States, interested in the definitive elimination of this problem from world politics and economy, can cooperate by accepting the roles set aside for them within the present Plan.
Warsaw, January-February 1937