Political Science 540. International Relations.

Fall, 2009

TH 9:00 - noon, BB 283

Professor Richard Stoll
BB 202, x3362; stoll at rice dot edu

Office Hours:

Tu 10:30 - 11:30

Th 1:30 - 2:30

Fr 2:00 - 3:00

You may also make an appointment to see me or contact me by e-mail. But you are welcome to stop by my office anytime the door is open. I am always happy to talk to you about the class, graduate school, or things related to political science. As a general rule, if you have a question, concern, or even if you are "just curious," contacting me sooner is better than contacting me later.

Course Description.

This course is designed to introduce you to the scholarly literature in international relations. We will cover a broad range of topics, but much of the focus will be on subjects and approaches that are commonly used by faculty and graduate students here at Rice. You will learn to critically evaluate the work of IR scholars, and develop a sense of the major issues, controversies and the current state of the discipline.

An Overview of Your Obligations

Students are expected to have read all of the assigned readings before the beginning of the seminar and, thus, be able to participate in class discussions. Each student must be an active participant in the seminar. I cannot overemphasize the importance of consistent and meaningful seminar participation.
Throughout the semester students will be required to do written assignments. The nature of the written work will vary as to the topic under discussion changes. These papers are due via email (stoll at rice dot edu) by 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday. Please use your last name as the filename. Unless you have a verified excuse, papers arriving after the deadline will not be given full credit.
Students will be required to make presentations to the class. Sometimes, but not always, these presentations will be based on your written work. Presentations are different from normal class participation. You will be told about presentations ahead of time.

Components of Your Final Grade.

Class participation	20%
Written assignments	30%
Presentations	20%
Final Exam	30%

Special Needs.

Any student with a documented disability needing academic adjustments or accommodations is requested to contact me as soon as possible, preferably during the first two weeks of class. All discussions will remain confidential. Students with disabilities need to also also contact Rice Disability Support Services in room 111 of Allen Center [713-348-]5841; adarice at rice dot edu). Fax: (713) 348 - 5888. If calling from a TTY/TDD, dial 711 or 800-735-2989 to be connected through a relay operator.

Texts

I have not ordered any books for the class. We will read all (or major portions) of each of the books listed below. If IR is your major field, you should strongly consider purchasing these books. On the other hand, if you are not going to be taking exams in IR, there is no real need to buy these books.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastiar Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. 2003. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 2005. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York. Columbia University Press.
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. New York. Cambridge University Press. *** This is available as an electronic book through Fondren Library. ***

Reading Assignments.

The course syllabus is a work in progress. Please note that I reserve the right to add or delete readings as the semester progresses. Readings that are not otherwise easily available (e.g., via the library's online resources) will be in a box on a bookshelf by my office. You are responsible for finding and retrieving materials that are online.

Cooperating on Assignments.

In this class there will be some group assignments in which you may divide up the tasks in the assignment in any way you wish. All members of the group will receive the same grade on these assignments. On all other assignments I expect each student to work independently.

Honor Code.

Rice has an Honor System. The Honor System places a great deal of trust -- but also responsibility -- on the student. All graded work in this course is covered by the Honor System. In each case I will explain what limitations and restrictions you should observe in order to comply with the Honor System. But there may be times when my explanations are incomplete or you do not understand what I have said. The best way to avoid any potential problems with the Honor System is this: if you ever have any questions about how the Honor Code applies to anything in this course, contact me.

Course Plan.

27-Aug. Introduction to the Study of International Relations.

Symposium: Methodological Foundations of the Study of International Conflict: Editor's Introduction. 1985. International Studies Quarterly 29(2):119.
Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de. 1985a. "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View." International Studies Quarterly 29(2): 121-136.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1985. "Toward Understanding in International Relations." International Studies Quarterly 29(2): 137-144.
Jervis, Robert. 1985. "Pluralistic Rigor: A Comment on Bueno de Mesquita." International Studies Quarterly 29(2): 145-149.
Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de. 1985b. "Reply to Stephen Krasner and Robert Jervis." International Studies Quarterly 29(2): 151-154.
Stoll, Richard J. 2005. "Conclusion: Multiple Paths to Knowledge?: Integrating Methodology and Substance in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution." In Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution, eds. Zeev Maoz, Alex Mintz, Cliff Morgan, Glenn Palmer and Richard J. Stoll. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,343-361.
Singer, J. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." World Politics 14(1): 77-92.
Drezner, Daniel. "How international relations theory would cope with a zombie uprising.." Theory of International Politics and Zombies. Available at: http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/theory_of_international_politics_and_zombies

3-Sep. Realism and Neorealism.

Cusack, Thomas R., and Richard J. Stoll. 1990. Exploring Realpolitik: Probing International Relations Theory With Computer Simulation. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chapter 2.
Deutsch, Karl W., and J. David Singer. 1964. "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability." World Politics 16(3): 390-406.
Gulick, Edward Vose. 1967. Europe's Classical Balance Of Power. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. Chapters 1-3.
Keohane, Robert O. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2003. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New Tork: W.W. Norton & Co.
Monten, Johnathan. 2006. "Thucydides and Modern Realism." International Studies Quarterly 50(1): 3-26.
Morgenthau, Hans and Kenneth Thompson 19855. Politics Among Nations: The Stuggle for Power and Peace. Sixth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 1: A Realist Theory of International Politics, and Chapter 12: The Balance of Power. There are multiple editions of this book, first published in 1948. Any edition is OK to read.
Oren, Ido. 2009. "The Unrealism of Contemporary Realism: The Tension Between Realist Theory and Realists' Practice." Perspectives on Politics 7(02): 283-301.
Schroeder, Paul. 1994. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." International Security 19(1): 108-148.
Senese, Paul D., and John A. Vasquez. 2008. The Steps to War: An Empirical Study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1.
Wagner, R. Harrison. 1993. "What was Bipolarity?" International Organization 47(1): 77-106.

10-Sep. Alternatives to Realism I.

Keohane, Robert O. 2005. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 2000. Power and Interdependence. New York: Longman.
Organski, A. F. K. 1960. World Politics. Alfred A. Knopf. Chapter 14. You can read either the first or second edition. The chapter is about the power transition.

17-Sep. Alternatives to Realism II.

Hayes, Jarrod. 2009. "Identity and Securitization in the Democratic Peace: The United States and the Divergence of Response to India and Iran's Nuclear Programs." International Studies Quarterly 53(4): 977-999.
Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

24-Sep. Foreign Policy Analysis I.

Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." The American Political Science Review 63(3): 689-718.
Davis, Otto A., M. A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1966. "A Theory of the Budgetary Process." The American Political Science Review 60(3): 529-547.
Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." The American Political Science Review 88(3): 577-592.
McGillivray, Fiona, and Alastair Smith. 2004. "The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations between States." International Organization 58(3): 567-600.
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." International Organization 42(3): 427-460.
Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." International Organization 53(2): 233-266.

1-Oct. Foreign Policy Analysis II.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alistair Smith, Randolph Stevenson and James Morrow. 2004. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Clarke, Kevin A., and Randall W. Sone. 2008. "Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival." American Political Science Review 102(03): 387-392.
Morrow, James, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson and Alistair Smith. 2008. "Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy." American Political Science Review 102(03): 393-400.

8-Oct. International Security.

Achen, Christopher H., and Duncan Snidal. 1989. "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies." World Politics 41(2): 143-169.
Biddle, Stephen, and Stephen Long. 2004. "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(4): 525-546.
Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." American Journal of Political Science 47(3): 427-439.
Pape, Robert A. 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." American Political Science Review 97(03): 343-361.
Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. 1998. "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(3): 259-277.
Wade, Sara Jackson, and Dan Reiter. 2007. "Does Democracy Matter?: Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(2): 329-348.

15-Oct. International Conflict I.

Levy, Jack S. 1998. "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace." Annual Review of Political Science 1(1): 139-165. ** Available online through Fondren Library. **
Powell, Robert. 1999. In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
Senese, Paul D., and John A. Vasquez. 2005. "Assessing the Steps to War." British Journal of Political Science 35(04): 607-633.

22-Oct. International Conflict II.

Bolks, Sean, and Richard Stoll. 2003. "Examining Conflict Escalation Within the Civilizations Context." Conflict Management and Peace Science 20(2): 85-109.
Bremer, Stuart. "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965." Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 309-341.
Morgan, T. Clifton, and Sally Howard Campbell. 1991. "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35(2): 187-211.
Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, Chapters 1 & 2.
Reed, William. 2000. "A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation." American Journal of Political Science 44(1): 84-93.
Tarar, Ahmer. 2006. "Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War." International Studies Quarterly 50(1): 169-188.

29-Oct. International Conflict III.

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization 49(3): 379-414.
Filson, Darren, and Suzanne Werner. 2002. "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War." American Journal of Political Science 46(4): 819-837
Gartzke, Erik. 1999. "War Is in the Error Term." International Organization 53(3): 567-587.
Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." American Political Science Review 99(04): 533-547.
Smith, Alastair, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6): 783-813.

5-Nov. Civil Wars.

Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6): 814-858.

12-Nov. Cooperation.

Axelrod, Robert. 1980. "Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24(1): 3-25.
Axelrod, Robert. 1981. "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists." The American Political Science Review 75(2): 306-318.
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." World Politics 38(1): 226-254.
Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" International Organization 50(3): 379-406.
Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." International Organization 52(2): 269-305.
Hoffmann, Robert. "Twenty Years on: The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited.' Available at: http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/3/2/forum/1.html.
Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30(2): 167-214.
Lake, David A. 1993. "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly 37(4): 459-489.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 721-737.
Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." The American Political Science Review 94(4): 819-835.

19-Nov. Institutions.

Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 3-32.
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." International Organization 55(4): 761-799.
Lake, David A. 1996. "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations." International Organization 50(1): 1-33.
Mitchell, Ronald B., and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. "Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange." International Organization 55(4): 891-917.
Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." International Organization 55(4): 829-857.

Information on Designing Posters.

Cain Project. 2008. Designing Scientific and Engineering Posters. Rice University. Accessed 11/17/2008.
Rice Undergraduate Research Symposium. 2008. RURS Poster Preparation. Rice University. Accessed 11/17/2008.
Rice University. 2008. Rice University Identity Standards. Rice University. Accessed 11/17/2008.