may add that the statesmen of Vienna, just like the politicians of Versailles, solved the problem in the sense of Polish liberty and autonomy. Poland became a constitutional kingdom under Russia. Unfortunately, the autonomy of Poland proclaimed by the Treaty of Vienna and solemnly guaranteed by all the signatory powers, remained a dead letter. And this violation of the Treaty was a foregone conclusion. One could not, with impunity, entrust the liberties of Poland to the despot of all the Russias. One might apply to Russia what Lincoln said of the United States before the war of secession: Russia could not be made half slave and half free. It was impossible to grant freedom to Poland whilst freedom was withheld from all the rest of the Russian The compromise of Vienna, from the nature of things, was therefore doomed to fail, as compromises are apt to fail when they embody two contradictory principles. In vain did the Powers remind the Russian tsar again and again of the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna. In vain did the Polish people rise again and again to defend their rights, which were guaranteed by Europe. No doubt if the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Vienna had acted together, Polish freedom might have survived and the cause of liberty would have triumphed, not only in Poland but in Europe. But here once more the forces of progress were divided. France followed once policy and Great Britain followed another. In 1863, when a ruthless Russian soldiery was shooting down the Polish insurrectionists in Warsaw, France made a solemn protest even at the risk of embroiling herself with a powerful potential ally, and called on Great Britain to intervene. But England refused to discharge her international obligations. But whilst England refused to support France on behalf of Poland, Prussia did intervene to support Russia against Poland. Once more the liberties of Poland were suppressed and drenched in the blood of her children.

Die Weltgeschichte is das Weltgericht (the history of the world is the Supreme Court of humanity), a court from which there can be no appeal. The broad facts which we have given are an elquent commentary on the philosophy of contemporary European politics, and on the supremacy of moral law in the governance of the world. They are a challenge to the apostles of the *Realpolitik.* They are a convincing demonstration of the significance of Polish liberty in the international order.

Again and again crimes and blunders have been committed. Again and again inexorable retribution has followed every blunder and every crime. And the longer the punishment was delayed, the heavier the penalties. Again and again, the Liberal Powers of Europe have failed to be true to themselves and to fulfill their international obligations. Again and again, Great Britain, following a policy of splendid isolation or of mistaken self-interest, has betrayed the cause of freedom.

Will the same blunders be repeated? Will England in 1921, as she did in 1863, go once more her own way, leaving France to follow the opposite policy? Will Poland once more be surrendered to the tender mercies of her enemies?

Every Liberal who knows the issues which are involved must devoutly hope and trust that at the eleventh hour the present dissension between Great Britain and France will make place to unity, and to a rational and a consistent and a European policy; that they may revert to the constructive aims of the Treaty of Versailles; and that they will jointly pledge themselves to defend the cause of Poland which always was, and which remains, the cause of freedom and civilization. Δ

Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, 1980–1989

Solidarity, Martial Law, and the End of Communism in Europe

By Andrzej Paczkowski. Translated by Christina Manetti. Rochester: Univ. of Rochester Press, 2015. xvi + 387 pages. ISBN 13-978-1-58046-536-6. Notes, index, bibliography. Hardcover. $99.00.

Marek Jan Chodakiewicz

Andrzej Paczkowski's monograph on Poland's crisis in the early 1980s, *Wojna polsko-jaruzelska: Stan wojenny w Polsce, 13 XII 1981-22 VII 1983* (Warsaw: Prószyński i ska, 2006) has now been translated into English as *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Poland, 1980-1989: Solidarity, Martial Law, and the End of Communism in Europe*. Whereas the original was a serious contribution to our understanding of the communist state of emergency, the section added to the English version does not improve on the original research conducted by Professor Paczkowski. On the contrary, it descends into platitudes about a "dialogue" between the moderates of the government on the one hand, and Solidarity on the other, resulting in a victory of "democracy" in 1989.

The author tackles the subject matter in a straightforward chronological manner. First, he describes Poland on the eve of Solidarity as "the weakest link" of the Soviet bloc that therefore was able to generate anticommunism's greatest national liberation movement, the nearly nine-million-people-strong Solidarity, including perhaps a million party members. Next, he retraces preparations for the crushing of the Polish freedom movement both in Moscow and Warsaw, as well as the antecedent maneuvers in other "fraternal" countries of the Soviet Bloc and in the West. Paczkowski then focuses on failed communist attempts to co-opt and emasculate Solidarity ("Operation Renaissance") by enlisting the assistance of the union's leader Lech Wałęsa. Martial law and government-coordinated violence spawned an anticommunist underground and civil resistance. Mass movement transformed itself into a series of decentralized and clandestine organizations. It was nonviolent for the most part, although a few hardcore patriots resorted to active and even armed opposition. However, though some self-defense groups were active during street demonstrations, the bulk of underground activity consisted of self-help operations, including a massive clandestine press endeavor.

A stalemate resulted. The communists were incapable of killing Solidarity, while Solidarity failed to articulate and execute any program that would bring victory either before or during martial law. For instance, the idea of a "self-governing republic" was "a utopia of sorts" (20). This was mainly because of the communist regime's monopoly of force, but also because after martial law most Poles, frightened by the display of communist power, withdrew their active support from Solidarity while refusing to submit to the puppet government. Most sought accommodation in either a realistic or a cynical manner. Only stalwarts remained in the active opposition. Even though they numbered in the tens of thousands they failed to overcome the totalitarian state (which, curiously, Paczkowski calls "authoritarian" or "ideocratic authoritarianism," pp. 17, 20, 320). In 1986 Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev intervened and encouraged Wojciech Jaruzelski to negotiate a "national concord" with the leftist advisors to Solidarity. At a series of confidential Round Table talks, self-anointed progressive elite mouthed a national liberation movement and struck a deal with the communists. Thus a parliamentary democracy came about in Poland and the Soviet bloc fell apart.

In the core of his monograph the historian is incisive, engaging, and realistic. He should particularly be praised for underscoring the capital significance of the Catholic Church as both a primary base of anticommunist resistance and the chief representative of Solidarity, or the Polish nation, before the puppet regime in Warsaw (80, 223–36). His unequivocal assessment of Pope John Paul II as a cardinal catalyst for freedom must be greatly appreciated (248–49). However, there are some serious bones to pick with Paczkowski's narrative.

First, the author fails to define crucial terms he apparently takes for granted. What is revolution? What is counterrevolution? (148). This should have been explained in the introduction. Paczkowski writes about "the revolutionary spirit" in the communist party, reignited because of the crushing of Solidarity (144). So were the communists revolutionaries? Yet elsewhere it is plain that the author considers Solidarity to be a "revolution" (11, 283). However, he never really defines it precisely. Was it a "revolution"? The author calls "Jaruzelski's martial law . . . a self-limiting counter-revolution," as a pun on Jadwiga Staniszki's famous depiction of

Solidarity as "self-limiting revolution" (148). The historian sometimes confuses the issue by freely quoting communist sources that label the Polish liberation movement as "counterrevolutionary" (55, 131), yet the reader is not informed that it is merely a quotation. Anyone who opposes communism is counterrevolutionary, and the word should be viewed as a compliment. Solidarity did not just aim to overthrow the existing order. It wanted to restore "normalcy" (*niech będzie normalnie*, as in "truthful history teaching" 19), that means the *status quo ante*, i.e., before the Soviet occupation and its imported revolution. Hence Solidarity was counterrevolutionary par excellence. Perhaps this is why, after initial praise, the left-leaning Western historians distanced themselves from that movement and consigned to oblivion such excellent books on Solidarity as Lawrence Goodwyn's *Breaking the Barrier.*

Second, the chasm between the core part of the monograph and its peripheral addendum is stunningly jarring. Whereas the core is impressively researched, even if one does not agree with some of the interpretation provided, the addendum lacks depth. There are lacunae in its methodology. For example, Paczkowski virtually ignores the secret police and its *agentura* before the imposition of martial law in December 1981 (56, 141). When he does note its presence, he appears tacitly dismissive of its importance: "secret informers. . . were actually only of little operational value, if any" (93). Surely at least a few of the multitude recruited proved to be valuable. It is also condescending to the reader when Paczkowski dismisses the opinion of the head of the KGB mission in Warsaw, General Vitalii Pavlov, who claimed that "there were secret SB [*Służba Bezpieczeństwa,* or secret police] informers 'at all levels of Solidarity,'" as "exaggerating greatly" (140). It was no exaggeration; there certainly were. It is little wonder that Paczkowski's treatment of Lech Wałęsa's as TW Bolek (*tajny współpracownik*) is inadequate (149–50).

This cavalier attitude toward the *agentura* is like ignoring the importance of spies and intelligence gathering when narrating the history of the Second World War. While discussing technical details of clandestine printing, Paczkowski is forced to admit that secret police informers were "numerous" but also claims that "the SB consciously did not make uses of all the information it had at its disposal, nor its destructive powers" (245). Then, after the well-scrutinized year 1983, Professor Paczkowski's work becomes a flaccid chronology rather than a trenchant analysis.

Third, the author occasionally promotes the myth that "Solidarity started the process of dismantling communism and saw it through to the end" (viii). This gives the movement too much credit. It was a major irritant but it lacked the capacity to destroy the Soviet system by itself. Later Paczkowski admits that Solidarity was incapable of winning in Poland. His most realistic appraisal is that Solidarity was a "contributing factor" to the end of the cold war and that "without the events that occurred in the Soviet Union as a result of Gorbachev era reforms . . . the communist system in Poland probably would not have fallen when it did, nor in the way it did" (xii-xiii). However, he still insists, sans proof, that without Solidarity Gorbachev would not have been forced to "change" the system. The sources of *glastnost'* and *perestroika* were internal Soviet, and not external Polish. Poland's widespread pathologies were not crucial for the USSR in the calculus of the 1980s, just like North Korean issues are not of prime importance to China today.

Paczkowski's leftist bias surfaces when discussing the 1970s. The historian's depiction of Poland's "democratic opposition" as a moral force of up to 3,000 is quite accurate, yet to dub the post-Stalinist and neo-Trotskiite communist and leftist dissidents as "anti-totalitarian, anti-communist" is at best inaccurate. At that time they were still busy fantasizing about reforming "real socialism," and not about democracy and independence. They evolved to liberalism only in the late 1980s. Next, forgetting Kazimierz Świtoń, who created Poland's first free trade union under communism, is inexcusable.

On the other hand, Paczkowski's landscape of the underground is very helpful, in particular its different hues. His thesis about discontinuity

between legal and illegal Solidarity and other clandestine groups is debatable (165). That new groups arose in secret is true enough but there was always a core of activists, usually in the leadership, who had had prior anticommunist experience. However, the author imparts the spirit of the secret world very well; one can only wish he was less dismissive of those of us who wanted to fight against the communists with arms in our hands. It is true that we were young and silly and potentially destructive. "Undoubtedly many members of the numerous youth groups dreamt of launching urban guerrilla warfare" (181). The author is quite clear about this, even jeering as when he refers to "a bombastic name. . . the Armed Forces of the Polish Underground" (166). What else would young people call themselves? Invoking the anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet war and postwar underground was natural for us. One wishes there was equal clarity in Paczkowski's referring to the communists as communists instead of as "Polish forces" (38). They were ethnic Poles, but at the same time they were anti-Polish forces like all colonial troops pitted against their own countrymen.

Paczkowski also argues that communist dictator Wojciech Jaruzelski (whose own early connections to the Soviet military intelligence and its Warsaw counterpart are once again curiously omitted, 74) introduced martial law under Soviet pressure, but that this was his decision and design. The idea that the Soviets, who initially wanted to invade, dismissed the idea of direct intervention totally and instead counted only on their Polish comrades requires further examination. In times of crisis politics is always dynamic. There is never a done deal. The Red Army withdrew from Budapest in 1956 only to return a few days later. It was not a ruse; it was a change of mind. Likewise, in 1979 Leonid Brezhnev and his cronies vowed to not inject Soviet troops into Afghanistan and stressed that the Afghan communists would have to solve their crisis themselves. Yet a few months later, Moscow intervened in force. Had Jaruzelski failed to execute his orders, Brezhnev would most likely have stepped in. In this context Paczkowski's opinion that "after December 13, Moscow was more dependent on the martial law team than the Polish generals (and secretaries) were on Moscow" (263) seems puzzling.

As mentioned before, the bulk of such contestable problems appears in the addendum, especially during the discussion of the Round Table and its aftermath. Paczkowski's analysis of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev is rather weak, and so is that of the United States and the "transformations" in the Warsaw Pact countries. Ditto the tail end of "People's" Poland. I cringed when Paczkowski suggested a parity between party hardliners and Solidarity opponents of the Round Table (292). Mocking the notion that there were "secret agreements" at Magdalenka prison (where deals were cut that were later fleshed out at the Round Table) because "a representative of the Episcopate always attended the meetings," is silly (294). There are ways to arrive at confidential arrangements under any circumstances. One marvels at the historian's slick contortions as when he admits that "the opposition's negotiators did not even try to propose holding a *completely* democratic elections [emphasis MJC]" (294). Has anyone ever heard of an incompletely democratic elections or a partial pregnancy? Why not say that at the Round Table the leftist part of Solidarity leadership agreed to a falsified election? In this context, why does the author say that "some of the radical opposition groups had called for a boycott" of the rigged elections (297)?

It is telling that in June 1989 pro-democracy groups in Poland were stigmatized as "radical." In fact, a friend at the University of Poznań who publicly called for a free election was called a fascist. To argue that because Solidarity was born in 1980, freedom issued from the Round Table agreements in 1989 is simply incoherent, a non-sequitur. I unveiled the secret of the transformation in my *Intermarium* (2012). Suffice it to say that, like Jaruzelski, Gorbachev wanted to save communism and not destroy it. However, the genie was out of the bottle, the Kremlin lost control, and the Soviet bloc imploded. Without this implosion the Round Table deal was eminently reversible, as were all other attempts at "socialist renewal." One wishes Professor Paczkowski realized that.

A word on the translation. It is readable, although one wishes that Christina Manetti ("who coped admirably with my style, even though it can sometimes be rather Baroque," xiii) eschewed copying the author's ways too closely for the sake of clarity. For example, Paczkowski sometimes uses communist vocabulary, as when he writes that the riot police "unblocked" an enterprise. This communist euphemism means that the police broke a strike by using violence during one of the "pacification" operations (88). There are a few poor choices in the vocabulary the book uses. Should it be "officers" or "officials of the MKS" (14)? To refer to Politburo members as "colleagues" and not "comrades" rings false (25). The proper name of a certain institution mentioned was "The Main Political Directorate of the Polish *People's* Army," denoting that it was not the Polish military but a communist one. There are also a few infelicitous translations of words or phrases. "Reasons for the judgment" at a court in English is a sentence or a sentencing brief (p. 107). To "verify (screen)" or "verified" should technically be to "vet" or "vetted" (112, 114); *bezpieczniki* can be better translated as "fuses" and not "safety catches" (272). To translate *niedochodowa* as "unremunerative" sounds unwieldy; "unprofitable" is better (291). In the military a general does not have "a personal secretary," and thus General Viktor I. Anoshkin was an aide-de-camp to Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov (328 n. 2). There are also a few typos, e.g., "wrecklessness," instead of "recklessness" (67); and it should be "Darłówek" and not "Darłowko" (99), "Polmos" and not "Polmo" (110).

All in all, we should appreciate the core part of Professor Paczkowski's work even as we note his left-wing point of view, while encouraging him to bring the addendum up to a higher standard befitting a scholar of his stature. Δ

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Taking Liberties

Gender, Transgressive Patriotism, and Polish Drama, 1786–1989

By Halina Filipowicz. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press (ohioswallow.com), 2014. xv + 361 pages. ISBN 978-0-8214-21147. Paper. $35.00.

George Gasyna

"THIS CONSTRUCTION CALLED POLISHNESS" (13)

Halina Filipowicz, professor of Polish Literature and Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin, has produced a remarkable revisionist literary history that will surely disrupt canonic understandings of what constitutes Polish patriotic writing, especially of the performative genres. Per the author's contention, it will help carry it out of the cellar of wounded national exceptionalism, itself the aftereffect of the reign of a martyrological, thanatophiliac subjectivity first articulated amid the agonies of Poland's national struggle for political existence in the long nineteenth century.

The study, fastidiously researched and indeed provocative on the face of it, has much to recommend it to readerships both general and scholarly, particularly as an exercise in cultural counterdiscourse in postmodern Polonistics. Filipowicz begins with a general definition of what constitutes patriotism—in particular, how the concept can or should be differentiated from mere "nationalism" or worse, embittered and "crusading chauvinism" (5)—and how the meanings of the term have been positioned and repositioned in the Polish case to create a division between true and false sentiments *pro patria* as a kind of "cultural liturgy" (12) crystallized around "a cluster of just a few associations" (13). In a move that surely forms the most significant of the book's interpolations, patriotism—Polish as well as others—is found to have been structurally enjoined to a particularly gendered discourse of proper heroism that in turn leads the author to consider the range of women's roles in the maintenance