| Political Science 527 | Rick Wilson |
| Fall 2004 | Baker 226 |
| Monday 1:30pm | 713 - 348-3352 |
This course is an introduction to
Institutional Analysis and Design. The study of political institutions has been
the bread and butter of political science since Aristotle. This course moves
past classical institutionalism and treats contemporary ways of analyzing
individual behavior in institutions. Try to keep an open mind. In the course
you will be reading material gathered from a number of different disciplines.
You will be introduced to a number of ways of thinking about the role of
institutions for constraining behavior as well as encouraging behavior.
Week 01 August 27
Week 02 August 30
Week 03 September 6
Week 04 September 13
Week 05 September 20
Week 06 September 27
Week 07 October 4
Week 08 October 11 (Mid-term break)
Week 09 October 18
Week 10 October 25
Week 11 November 1
Week 12 November 8
Week 13 November 15
Week 14 November 22
Week 15 November 29
The course will be run as a seminar. A seminar means that you will be treated as a "junior colleague." Everyone is expected to contribute to discussion. As a consequence, completing the reading prior to each class meeting is mandatory. This will enable you to ask questions of material that is unclear (and some of it will be) and to force the members of the seminar (including the instructor) to keep on the ball. The readings will involve substantial use of the library facilities -- both electronic and hard copy. If you use the library's hard copy, return it to its proper place when you're done. In addition, some of the material will be available in my box in the mailroom.
To help you think carefully about the material, I am requiring that you write, each week, a 2-3 page memorandum covering one of the readings. The memorandum should do 4 things. First, it should outline the main point to the book/article. Second, it should indicate how this book/article fits with the others that were assigned for this week. Third it should detail how well the argument or the data support the main point. Fourth it should detail any new directions or extensions that are worthwhile. Because we meet on Monday afternoon and I would love to see the memos before class, the memos are due on Sunday at 4:00 pm. The memo should be emailed to me. I will try to comment on your memos prior to class. In order to make this course run smoothly everyone must turn his or her work in on time! Stragglers will be regarded with ill humor.
You will also be required to write a final paper for the class (approximately 15 to 25 pages). It will be an original research paper. My preference is that you apply some of the concepts you have learned to an empirical case. Your paper topic will be worked out in advance with the instructor.
The following can be purchased. I have not ordered any through the bookstore. There are plenty of on-line options in the world. Go shopping.
Skyrms, Brian. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. <$19.56>
Knight, Jack. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. <$20.95>
Miller, Gary J. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1992. <$18.95>
North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. <$14.95>
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994. <$23.95>
Grading is straightforward.
Paper 40%
Memorandum 40%
Class Participation 20%
Course Outline:
The following represents a reading list (in progress) for the semester. The management reserves the right to change the menu. I’ll try to put things up on the website, so check it for up-to-date readings. The supplemental readings are for your personal edification. Some might be interesting and I continually add things to the list.
Week 1. (Aug. 27) Overview and Theoretical Concepts
Alt, James E., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. "Rules, Restrictions, Constraints: Structure and Process in the New Institutional Economics." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 154, no. 4 (1998): 735-43.
Moe, Terry M. 1991. "Politics and the Theory of Organization." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 7 (Special Issue): 106 29
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. "The Approach of Institutional Economics." Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998): 166-92.
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 734-49.
Thelen, Kathleen. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 369-404. (Available via: http://riceinfo.rice.edu/Fondren/Electronic/ejalpha.html#A).
Remmer, Karen. "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis." World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 34-61.
Supplemental Readings:
Greif, Avner. 1998. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies." In Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds.) The New Institutionalism in Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. pp. 77-104.
North, Douglass C. 1998. "Economic Performance through Time." In Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds.) The New Institutionalism in Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. pp. 19-45.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." Journal of Theoretical Politics (July): 131-49.
Week 2 (Aug. 30). Actors and Artisanship
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1993. "The Development of Contemporary Political Theory." In William A Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, and Norman J. Schofield (eds.) Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Vincent. 1980. "Artisanship and Artifact." Public Administration Review 35 (Sept.): 519-30.
Camerer, Colin F. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4 (1997): 167-88.
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernest Fehr, Herbert and Gintis, and Richard McElreath. "Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-Scale Socieites." American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (2001).
Supplemental Reading:
Simon, Herbert A. 1985. "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science." American Political Science Review pp. 293-305.
Bianco, William. 1998. “Different Paths to the Same Result: Rational Choice, Political Psychology, and Impression Formation in Campaigns.” American Journal of Political Science. 42: 1061-1081.
Elster, Jon. 1999. Alchemies of the mind : rationality and the emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Elster, Jon. 1990. "When Rationality Fails." In The Limits of Rationality. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 19-51).
Henrich, Joe, Kevin McCabe, Wulf Albers, Rob Boyd, Peyton Young, Axel Ockenfels and Gerd Gigerenzer "What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?" In Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhart Selten (eds.) Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.
Rabin, Mathew. 1998. "Psychology and Economics." Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1): 11-46.
Coase, Ronald H. 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal of Law and Economics.
Ellickson, Robert C. 1998. "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County." In Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds.) The New Institutionalism in Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. pp. 46-76.
Skyrms, Brian. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Supplemental Reading:
Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hoffman, Elizabeth and Mathew Spitzer. 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests." Journal of Law and Economics. 25 (1 ): 73-98.
Vira, Bhaskar. 1997. "The Political Coase Theorem: Identifying Differences between Neoclassical and Critical Institutionalism." Journal of Economic Issues; 31 (3): 761-79.
Kahneman, Daniel; Knetsch, Jack L.; Thaler, Richard H. 1990. "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem." Journal of Political Economy. 98 (6): 1325-48.
Coleman, James S. 1990. "Norm-Generating Structures." In The Limits of Rationality. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 7 (pp. 250-273).
Majeski, Stephen J. 1990. "Comment: An Alternative Approach to the Generation and Maintenance of Norms." In The Limits of Rationality. Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 7 (pp. 273-281).
Hirshleifer, David and Eric Rasmusen. 1989. "Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Ostracism." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 12: 87-106
Knight, Jack and Jean Ensminger. 1998. "Conflict over Changing Social Norms: Bargaining, Ideology, and Enforcement." In Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds.) The New Institutionalism in Sociology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. pp. 105-126.
Week 4 (Sept. 13). Personal and Political Trust
Jackman, Robert W. and Ross A. Miller. 1998. “Social Capital and Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science. 1: 47-73. (Available via: http://riceinfo.rice.edu/Fondren/Electronic/ejalpha.html#A).
Bohnet, Iris, Bruno S. Frey, and Steffen Huck. 2001. More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding. American Political Science Review 95 (1):131-144.
Kollock, Peter. 1994. “The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust.” American Journal of Sociology. 100: 2 (September), 313-345.
Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker. 2000. “Political Trust and Trustworthiness.” Annual Review of Political Science. 3: 475-507. (Available via: http://riceinfo.rice.edu/Fondren/Electronic/ejalpha.html#A).
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology. 91: 481-510.
Ruscio, Kenneth P. 1999. “Jay’s Pirouette, or Why Political Trust is not the Same as Personal Trust.” Administration and Society. 31: 5 (November), 639-657.
Supplemental Reading:
Kramer, Roderick M. 1999. “Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions.” Annual Review of Psychology. 50: 569-598. (Available via: http://riceinfo.rice.edu/Fondren/Electronic/ejalpha.html#A).
Coleman, James S. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of Sociology. 94 (Supplement): S95-S120.
Hall, Peter A. 1999. “Social Capital in Britain.” British Journal of Political Science. 29 (3): 417-461.
Light, Ivan, Im Jung Kwuon, and Deng Zhong. 1990. “Korean Rotating Credit Associations in Los Angeles.” Amerasia. 16 (1): 35-54.
Mondack, Jeffrey L. 1999. Special Issue of “Psychological Approaches to Social Capital.” Political Psychology. 19 (3).
Week 5 (Sept. 20). Action Situations
Ostrom, Elinor. 1986. "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions." Public Choice 48:3-25.
Crawford, Sue and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. "A Grammer of Institutions." American Political Science Review. 89 (3): 582-600.
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 1-2 (pp. 3-97).
Supplemental Readings.
Eggertsson, Thráinn. 1995. On the Economics of Economics." Kyklos 48 (2): 201-210
Kiser, Larry, and Elinor Ostrom. 1982. "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches." In Strategies of Political Inquiry, ed. Elinor Ostrom. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications (pp. 179-222).
Week 6 (Sept. 27). Transaction Costs and Contracting Problems
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (All)
Williamson, Oliver E. 1993. "The Evolving Science of Organization." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 149 (1): 36-63.
Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild.” Journal of Political Economy V. 102: 745.
Supplemental Readings.
Gibbons, Robert. 1998. "Incentives in Organizations." Journal of Economic Perspectives. 12 (4): 115-32.
Ensminger, Jean 1992. Making a Market: The institutional transformation of an African Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 1-32).
Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." Economics and Politics 2: 1-23.
Moe, Terry M. 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 7: 213-53.
Miller, Gary J. 1992. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (All)
Supplemental Readings.
Baker, G., R. Gibbons and K.J. Murphy. 1999. "Informal authority in organizations." The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 15 (1): 56-73.
Week 8 (Oct. 11). Mid-term Break
Week 9 (Oct. 18). Quasi-private goods
Ben-Porath, Yoram. " Economics and the Family-Match or Mismatch? A Review of Becker's a Treatise on the Family." Journal of Economic Literature 20, no. 1 (1982): 52-64.
Wintrobe, Ronald. "Some Economics of Ethnic Capital Formation and Conflict." In Nationalism and Rationality, edited by Albert Breton, 43-70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
De Alessi, Louis. 1993. "How Markets Alleviate Scarcity." In Rethinking Institutional Analysis. Vincent Ostrom, David Feeny and Helmut Picht, eds. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press. Chapter 11 (pp. 339-376).
Supplemental Readings.
Ben-Porath, Yoram. 1980. "The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange." Population and Development Review 6: 1-31.
Fisman, Raymond, and Tarun Khanna. 1999. Is trust a historical residue? Information flows and trust levels. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38:79-92.
Lehmann, Erik, and Doris Neuberger. 2001. Do lending relationships matter? Evidence from bank survey data in Germany. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 45:339-359
Pollak, Robert A. 1985. "A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households." Journal of Economic Literature 23 (June): 581-608.
Week 10 (Oct. 25). Common Pool Resource Dilemmas
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapters 5-15 (pp. 99-329).
Gächter, Simon and Ernst Fehr. 1999. "Collective action as a social exchange." Journal Of Economic Behavior And Organization. 39 (4): 341-369
Supplemental Readings.
Aggarwal, Vinod K. and Cedric Dupont. 1999. “Goods, Games, and Institutions.” International Political Science Review. 20 (4): 393-409.
Singleton, Sara. 1999. “Commons Problems, Collective Action and Efficiency: Past and Present Institutions of Governance in Pacific Northwest Fisheries.” Journal of Theoretical Politics. 11 (3): 367-391.
Week 11 (Nov. 1). Collective Action Problems
Cox, Gary W. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chapters 4-5 (pp. 85-135).
Bendor, Jonathan and Dilip Mookherjee. 1987. “Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action.” American Political Science Review. 81 (1): 129-154.
Chong, Dennis. 1993. "Coordinating Demands for Social Change." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 528: 126-141.
Supplemental Readings.
Bawn, Kathleen. 1998. "Congressional Party Leadership: Utilitarian versus Majoritarian Interests." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 23 (2): 219-243.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" British Journal of Political Science. 23: 235-266.
Week 12 (Nov. 8). Collective Choice Problems
Riker, William H. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 432-46.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. "Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 19: 149-179.
Sinclair, Barbara. 1994. "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy." Legislative Studies Quarterly. 19: 477-494.
Week 13 (Nov. 15). Aggregate Effect of Institutions
Hammond, T.H. and Gary J. Miller. 1987. “The Core of the Constitution.” American Political Science Review. 81: 1155-1174.
Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. "Bargaining in Legislatures." American Political Science Review 83, no. 4 (1989): 1181-206.
Frechette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel, and Steven F. Lehrer. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open Versus Closed Amendment Rules." American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003): 221-32.
Supplemental Reading:
Tsebelis, George. 1999. “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis.” American Political Science Review. 93: 3 (September), 591-608.
Week 14 (Nov. 22). Institutional Design and Political Systems
Boix, Carles. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." American Political Science Review 93, no. 3 (1999): 609-24.
Benoit, Kenneth, and Jacqueline Hayden. "Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland's Electoral System, 1989-2001." Journal of Politics 66, no. 2 (2004): 396-427.
Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. "Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies." American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (2003): 379-90.
Supplemental Reading:
Crémer, Jacques and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1999. “Political Confederation.” American Political Science Review. 93: 1 (March), 69-83.
Cox, Gary. 1999. "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination." Annual Review of Political Science 2: 145-161.
Huber, John D, and Nolan McCarty. 2001. Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining. American Political Science Review 95 (2):345-360.
Week 15 (Nov. 29). General Re-examination
Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (All)