The Southwestern Philosophical Society

Dues are just $40.00 a year for regular members, $20.00 a year for students, and include a subscription to Southwest Philosophy Review, which publishes two issues a year.

To join the society, send inquiries to May Sim, Secretary/Treasurer, Department of Philosophy, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA 01610-2395 MSIM@holycross.edu or join at the conference.

Abstracts

“On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts”

Torin Alter, University of Alabama talter@bama.ua.edu

Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem metaphysically possible. If they are then, most agree, physicalism is false. David Braddon-Mitchell and John Hawthorne have (independently) developed a novel response for physicalists. They argue that phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure, which is revealed by how we would react if an oracle tells us that physicalism is true; and that this explains the zombie intuition. Robert Stalnaker argues similarly. However, not only does the conditional analysis fail to explain the zombie intuition: the two are incompatible. And the oracle argument has fatal flaws. In particular, it is self-defeating.

“Ethics in Foucault and Deleuze”

Chris Blakley, Louisiana State University Blakley@lsu.edu

The work of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, along with the latter’s collaboration with Felix Guattari, are not known for their contributions to moral philosophy. In this paper, I challenge this received opinion of Foucault and Deleuze’s works by arguing that ethics is a central concern in much of their works, especially Foucault’s History of Sexuality project and Deleuze/Guattari’s two-volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia project. More specifically, I show that the guiding problematic in their work is to diagnose the sources of what they call microfascism or the “fascism in our heads” (e.g. self-subjugating forms of subjectivity) and identify the resource for combating such forms of existence through the creation of new forms of subjectivity. In doing so I show how ethics is a central concern in the work of both Foucault and Deleuze/Guattari.

“Utilitarianism and the Moral Significance of an Individual”

James Cain, Oklahoma State University jcain@okstate.edu

Classical utilitarianism attempts to reduce the moral significance of the individual to something more basic: the value of the individual is seen as fully grounded in considerations of utility maximization. This paper criticizes this aspect of utilitarianism and tries to do so through an appeal to considerations that would be acceptable to one who embraces utilitarianism. First, an example is developed in which (1) a pair of mutually exclusive actions each yield infinite utility; (2) neither action can be said to yield more utility than the other, and (3) one of the actions is clearly preferable. This provides a case in which the moral significance of the individual cannot be fully reduced to considerations of utility maximizing features of the action. A second example, developed along the lines of the first example, involves only finite utilities.

“The Limits of Conversation: Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Religion”

Elizabeth Cooke, Creighton University efc09574@creighton.edu

In this paper I will argue that religious pluralism may not produce the kind of fruit we pragmatists expect to bear from multiple perspectives—not necessarily because of disagreement, but because of a lack of understanding of the religious argument. Utilizing Mead’s theory of role taking, I argue that taking the role of the other is required to understand another in conversation. When we do this, we understand the context in which linguistic novelty emerges, such that novel responses in a conversation are meaningful, although not necessarily predictable. In the case of hearing a different religious argument, if we do not know how a person will “go on,” in the sense of understanding his novel responses, then perhaps we do not understand his religiously based view. Several implications of this view are offered.

“Cultural Crisis and the Role of the Artist”

Russ Couch, Southern Illinois University Carbondale rcouch@siu.edu

This paper seeks to bring to light the role of the artist in culture. By looking at Hannah Arendt’s declaration of a crisis affecting culture it is found that the “relative permanence” of cultural products, specifically those of art, have succumbed to the designation of entertainment. As such, these items no longer are able to foster tradition, from which human beings can come to understand the world in which they live; moreover, the ability to judge has become atrophied. Arendt’s recognition of the problem focuses on the ability to judge, overlooking a condition for its possibility- the artist. Returning to Kant the paper locates the importance of the artistic genius for culture and develops the other side of Arendt’s emphasis on judgment.

“Knowing Better: Epistemic Underpinnings of the Moral Criticism of Fiction”

Eva Dadlez, University of Central Oklahoma edadlez@ucok.edu

Moral criticism of fiction involves epistemic questions, in that the possibility of such criticism can depend on treating fiction as a potential source of unjustified belief. Fiction can promote acquisition of unjustified beliefs about the advisability of actions, becoming a source of ideas about things deemed worth trying. Alternatively, a work's ethical endorsements -- or the fictional rationale for their adoption -- can engender a conceptual dissonance that makes imaginative engagement problematic. In either case, a work may become liable to ethical and aesthetic criticism on epistemic grounds.

“Intentions, Plans, and Weakness of Will”

Dylan Dodd, University of California Santa Barbara carlitos@umail.ucsb.edu

Most philosophers have identified weakness of will with an agent’s acting in a way that is inconsistent with what she judges to be best. Recently, however, Richard Holton has argued that this view is wrong, and that instead, weakness of will has to do with a certain sort of failure to act on one’s intentions. In this paper, after criticizing his complete account, I develop my own account of weakness of will that is at least along the lines suggested by Holton. I claim that an agent A exhibits weakness of will at a time t just in case A acts contrary to a policy A has at t.

“On Assertion and Robustness: Second Thoughts on Jackson’s Way Out”

Ian Dove, University of Nevada Las Vegas ian.dove@ccmail.nevada.edu

Frank Jackson argues that indicative conditionals have assertion-conditions separate from their truth-conditions. His theory is an attempt to make the Equivalence Thesis – that the indicative conditional, (P ® Q), has the truth-conditions of the material conditional (P É Q) – palatable to people not initially inclined to the material account. I suggest a way to understand Jackson’s account in terms of Modus Ponens. That is, Jackson’s account can be construed as taking a speaker’s willingness to deploy a conditional in Modus Ponens as a requirement for its assertion. Although there is much to celebrate in Jackson’s account, I argue for the addition of another criterion – Modus Tollens. This two-criterion account, I argue, is more general and therefore, prima facie better than Jackson’s account.

“The Value of Solidarity”

Tim Dunn, University of Wisconsin, Waukesha tdunn@uwc.edu

In showing solidarity with others, we are reacting to a certain kind of natural injustice, namely the injustice that results when some individuals fare worse than others through no fault of their own. Solidarity is valuable as a reaction to this injustice. Of course, it is not the only valuable reaction toward injustice: making sacrifices that do benefit others is also an appropriate way to promote distributional goods such as desert and equality. However, sacrifices that do not benefit others, when done for the right reasons, can be morally admirable, for reasons analogous to the reasons why promoting desert is valuable. The utilitarian account of value has no room for distributional or relational intrinsic goods, and as such fails to account adequately for the value of both desert and equality, and thus, solidarity.

“The Equivocal or Question-Begging Nature of Evil Demon Arguments for External World Skepticism”

Mylan Engel, Northern Illinois University tg0mej1@wpo.cso.niu.edu

Skeptics often motivate external world skepticism [EWS] by appealing to skeptical hypotheses, like the deceiving demon hypothesis, which if true, would entail that none of our perceptual beliefs are true. The skeptic then argues that the mere possibility of demon-induced deception precludes knowledge of the external world. I explain where these skeptical arguments go wrong, while also explaining why they initially have such strong intuitive appeal. I show that such arguments either equivocate with respect to “possibility” or beg the question against the non-skeptic and, either way, provide no grounds for EWS. I conclude that the possibility of demon-induced deception, when properly understood, poses no threat to our knowledge of the external world.

“A Puzzle About Epistemic Standards”

Richard Greene, Weber State University rgreene@weber.edu

In this paper I shall consider three strategies for solving a standard Cartesian skeptical puzzle: the Moorean solution, the contextualist solution, and the solution of those who would deny that knowledge is closed under known deductive inference (for convenience sake I’ll refer to this as the nonclosure position). Both the Moorean and the contextualist respond to the skeptic by arguing that in non-skeptical contexts the standards for knowledge are sufficiently low as to warrant the attribution of knowledge to normal epistemic agents. I’m going to argue that focusing on standards for knowledge simpliciter or on standards for knowledge in a given context in this way is problematic. A few problem cases will raise a puzzle for the Moorean and the contextualist, which the nonclosure theorist is easily able to handle. My further conclusion will be that these problem cases provide a prima facie reason to favor the nonclosure theorist.

“Methodological Questions: An analysis of Heidegger’s Interrogative Methodology as Expressed in the Introduction to Being and Time.”

Tim Hyde, Stony Brook University TimHyde@compuserve.com

Any systematic interpretation of Being and Time must address the following two issues:

(i) The shift in Being and Time from the question of being to the question of the meaning of being, and,

(ii) The relationship between the more transcendental approach of Being and Time and the “historical-mindfulness” of Heidegger’s subsequent works.

By analyzing the four distinct ways in which Heidegger formulates the interrogation of being in the introduction to Being and Time, I argue that the terminological distinction—lost in translation and overlooked by most readers—between the Seinsfrage [the being-question] and the Frage nach dem Sein [the question of being]

(i) Allows us to understand the conceptual logic behind and the phenomenological grounds of the move from the question of being to the question of the meaning of being, and,

(ii) Entails two approaches to being, namely, what Heidegger later calls the leading question and the grounding question.

“Fairness as an Equilibrium”

Charles Kurtz, Thiel College ckurtz@thiel.edu

Abstract: Fairness is a legitimate philosophical topic that has been largely ignored by philosophers while economists have developed it. The topic is much richer than expected, as will be shown through a series of examples. Who should be listed first on a paper, when the authors each have different reasons for taking precedence? How do merit and egalitarianism force a rise in CEO pay? Can you be happy with a good deal in the face of someone else appearing happier? Is it good that there is a “group of death” in soccer’s World Cup? The examples can be used to promote the view that there are many fairness arguments, and that what is ultimately fair depends on the strength of the various arguments from fairness.

“Trumping Preemption Considered”

Sean Landis, Texas Tech University sean.p.landis@ttu.edu

I argue that, although Jonathan Schaffer’s recent counterexample to accounts of causation known as “trumping” is a unique case of preemption, it nevertheless does not present problems to theories of causation above and beyond standard cases of preemption. I contend that the force of trumping cases relies on the underdeveloped notion of an event causally “running to completion.” In examining how it is that an event’s “running to completion” does not covary with an event’s causing the effect in question, I argue that the preemptive feature of trumping—that the trumping cause and the trumped non-cause are after the same effect—is only incidental. I conclude that a formulation of trumping which takes its incidentally preemptive nature into consideration yields the proper counterfactuals indicating what is and is not a cause in trumping cases.

“Blessed With Awareness: Wolterstorff, Danto and Hornby on Responding to Art”

Edward G. Lawry, Oklahoma State University elawry@okstate.edu

This essay notes that Nick Wolterstorff makes an important point in calling attention to the antipathy shown by the last 250 years of aesthetics to overt responses to art on the part of audiences. However, he seems to think this problem only arises in what he calls “memorial” art. With the help of Arthur Danto’s book on The Abuse of Beauty, I attempt to generalize the issue to all the arts and conclude that the issue is crucial to settling the problem of the conception of art Danto is pursuing in his book. I endorse a Dantoesque articulation about that conception with the help of a curious op-ed piece by Nick Hornby—that art is a fit between aesthetic properties and a meaning that the art is about, and that this fit transforms us by enabling us to feel the importance of our very sense of conscious awareness.

“Motivating Inferentialism”

Mark McCullagh, University of Guelph mmcculla@uoguelph.ca

Robert Brandom has supported his inferentialist conception of semantic content by appealing to the claim that it is a necessary condition on having a propositional attitude that one appreciate the inferential relations it stands in. When we see what considerations can be given in support of that claim, however, we see that it doesn't even motivate Brandom's inferentialist semantics. The problem is that that claim about what it takes to have a propositional attitude does nothing to show that its inferential relations are a feature of its content rather than of the relation that the subject stands in to that content---that is, the attitude. The claim with which Brandom motivates his inferentialist approach to semantics doesn't motivate that approach at all.

“The Internalist Counterexample to Reliabilism”

Mark McEvoy, Hofstra University phimvm@hofstra.edu

An unadorned form of process reliabilism (UPR) contends that knowledge is true belief, produced by a reliable process, undefeated by a more reliable process. There is no requirement that one know that one’s belief meets this requirement; that it actually does so is sufficient. An integral aspect of UPR, then, is the rejection of the KK thesis—the thesis that to know that p, one must know that one knows that p. One popular method of showing the implausibility of UPR goes as follows. One specifies a case where a subject satisfies all of UPR’s conditions on knowledge but still “clearly” fails to know. Since the subject satisfies all of UPR’s conditions on knowledge, but fails to know, the conditions for knowledge are not as UPR maintains. UPR’s analysis, it is alleged, leaves something out. That something is usually taken to be that the subject lacks appropriate evidence for his belief. This is the internalist counterexample to UPR. In this paper I argue that the internalist counterexample fails to refute UPR.

“A Non-Realist Theory of Objective Moral Truth”

Chris Meyers, University of Southern Mississippi cd.meyers@usm.edu

I want to articulate and defend a metaethical position that allows for objective moral truths without the metaphysical commitments of moral realism. The problem with moral realism is that it either requires normative facts in the world, which are subject to Mackies “queerness” argument), or they must accept reason-externalism (the claim that moral facts do not by themselves provide reasons to act). But reason-externalism is implausible; normativity is an essential part of moral concepts. As I will illustrate, part of what we mean by a moral terms such as “good” is that we have reason to pursue or promote it. Since moral claims are about reasons to act, there can be objective moral truths without any truth makers. Reasons to act do not refer to facts but to rational principles are conditional statements such as what one would consent to in certain hypothetical situations.

“Game Preserve Ethics: The Case for Hunting the Poor”

Harret Gardin, as told to Michael Patton, University of Montevallo PattonM@montevallo.edu

It has been famously argued by Garrett Hardin that helping the poor, specifically feeding the starving, will lead to an all-too-common tragedy: the death of even more starving people in a subsequent generation. Hardin’s proposal of letting the poor starve has triggered responses by Singer and Unger (and others) that claim we have an obligation to provide aid to the starving. This essay shows that both the traditional liberal answers (aid-giving) and the more conservative answers suggested by Hardin have failed and suggests a promising third way of approaching the problem of extensive starvation.

“Should Peter Singer Become an Ethical Meat Eater?”

George Schedler, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale geosched@siu.edu

Those who subscribe to the utilitarianism of the sort which Peter Singer invokes in his argument for universal vegetarianism should accept the “argument for ethical meat eating.” It is as follows.

We are morally obligated to adopt any practice that would maximize the likelihood of the greatest satisfaction of desires of animals and humans. Without sacrificing anything of greater moral value, ethical meat eating would most likely reduce animal suffering and increase human and animal pleasure more than either (a) universal vegetarianism or (b) present dietary practices. Therefore, we are morally obligated to adopt a policy of ethical meat eating.

“Centering Value Pluralism in Environmental Ethics”

Kenneth Shockley, The University at Buffalo kes25@buffalo.edu

Recently, Anthony Weston proposed “multicentrism” as a new framework for environmental ethics. I argue that there are similarities between Weston’s multicentrism and the pluralism advanced by Thomas Nagel in “The Fragmentation of Value.” While Weston’s position seems remarkably divorced from stereotypically human values, and thereby divorced from the sort of considerations with which Nagel is concerned, once we clarify his sense of centrism Weston’s position relies on the human point of view in a manner that is both reasonable and in line with Nagel’s position. I conclude that if the multicentrist position advocated by Weston is to be developed into a practicable ethic it will have to maintain its grip on a certain weak form of anthropocentrism.

“Making Friends with Confucius and Aristotle”

May Sim, College of the Holy Cross MSIM@holycross.edu

Aristotle and Confucius agree that cultivation and expression of virtue is the main point of friendship and its service to human life. The differences between Aristotelian and Confucian friendship flow from their metaphysics. Aristotle’s metaphysics leads him to divide friendship into three types and to order them hierarchically toward a focal sense that is most final, complete, and self-sufficient. Aristotle’s explicit metaphysics has no counterpart in original Confucianism. I argue that Aristotle’s metaphysics can provide Confucius with a rationale for his claims about the priority of the friendship of virtue over the other types. On the other hand, Confucius’ practical emphasis on human relationships presents its own theoretical challenge. I shall argue that Aristotle needs a more robust metaphysics of relations to deal adequately with friendship, especially the friendship of virtue.

“Cosmopolitan Sovereignty and the Morality of Intervention”

Edward Song, University of Virginia edward.song@virginia.edu

In this paper, I attempt to argue that cosmopolitan accounts of state sovereignty are typically too demanding in the moral expectations that they place on countries, and too aggressive in their willingness to intervene in order to get countries to shape up to meet the full range of rights that we associate with liberal democracies. What is particularly worrisome is not merely the familiar practical concerns surrounding intervention (military or otherwise), but the way in which intervention, even when done to satisfy objective and benevolent moral ends, sometimes amounts to the coercive imposition of one state’s or coalition’s will on a people. I will try to show why such interventions are harmful and also suggest why these neo-Kantian cosmopolitan approaches to international justice rather characteristically fail to appreciate it.

“Harman vs. Virtue Theory: Do character traits explain behavior?”

Chris Tucker, Purdue University tuckercs@purdue.edu

In recent years some philosophers have argued that empirical evidence from social psychology challenges the existence of character traits. They also claim that if there are no character traits, then character-based virtue theory is false. Gilbert Harman is one such philosopher. In his “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology,” he suggests that the empirical evidence indicates that character traits do not explain our behavior. From this fact he concludes that character traits do not exist. In this paper I attempt to reconstruct what I take to be his argument, and then I will explain why the empirical evidence is not only consistent with the existence of character traits, but also to be expected by virtue theory.

“An Empirical Challenge to Dissatisfaction Theodicy”

Mark Webb, Texas Tech University mark.webb@ttu.edu

Some philosophers of religion claim that one reason God permits suffering is to make people dissatisfied with their lives so they will turn to him. That theodicy is inadequate because 1) that strategy of behavior modification constitutes punishment (in the psychologists’ sense), and 2) punishment is not the most effective strategy of behavior modification. Since God can be expected to use the most effective strategy available to him, such a theodicy is inadequate.

“Forgiveness and Moral Improvement”

Brad Wilburn, Washington University bwilburn@artsci.wustl.edu

To understand forgiveness, we should consider it as located within the practice of reconciliation. Though forgiveness is not necessarily embedded within a process of reconciliation, this is its happiest home, and so considering it in this context is conceptually illuminating. The process of reconciliation, in turn, is closely connected with moral improvement, primarily of the wrongdoer, but also of the one doing the forgiving.