

Dr. Monika Nalepa
Baker 222C
Nalepa@rice.edu

Class meets: Monday 12:30-3:30
Office hours: Friday 10:30 to 12:30

POLI 520
Approaches to Comparative Government

This course aims at introducing you to the classic topics and most recent developments in the study of comparative politics. It is impossible to cover such a diverse field over the course of a single semester. Therefore, I was forced to make choices, focusing on some approaches – such as rational-choice explanations of political behavior—at the cost of omitting others. In terms of substance we will be talking about political culture, regime transitions, democratic institutions (in particular legislatures), ethnic conflict, civil wars, and decentralization.

Requirements

1. Participation

This is a seminar, not a lecture class and it will be taught in the format of discussion. This means that the quality of each meeting will critically depend on the contributions of participants. This creates a collective action problem. To overcome it, I will provide you with individual incentives in the form of grades for participation. For each meeting you should come prepared having read the assigned readings. Reading each text means being able to answer the following questions:

- *Reconstruct the argument:* What is the question (or puzzle) the author is addressing? What form does it take? What are the premises and assumptions of the argument? Are the assumptions plausible? What is the causal mechanism? Is it clear? Is the theory internally consistent?
- *EITM:* Does the author suggest a method for testing his or her hypotheses? If not, what would be the observable implications of his or her theory? Do the hypotheses follow logically from the theory? Does the operationalization of dependent and independent variables correspond to the theoretical concepts of interest? Are better measures possible?
- *Empirical Design:* Is the research design used by the author(s) suitable for testing these theoretical hypotheses? Can you think of alternative methods? Would these alternative designs allow us to gain more leverage in testing the theoretical hypotheses? Are there other relevant empirical issues the work has failed to consider? Are the data and construction of measures described in sufficient detail so as to permit replication?
- *Results:* Have the results been interpreted correctly? Are the interpretations substantively interesting? How well do the findings fit with theoretical expectations? Are there other possible explanations of the phenomenon of interest that need to be considered? Are there other testable implications arising from the theory that might give us greater leverage on the posited relationships?

After the end of each seminar meeting, you will be assigned a grade for your participation.

2. Literature Reviews and Presentations

In addition to participating in class discussion, you must complete three group assignments. These assignments require your group to conduct a literature review on a specific research topic (related to our weekly readings) that you will present to the class in the form of a 30-minute PowerPoint presentation. Above all else, your literature review should provide a *synthesis* of the literature. That is, your review should not simply be a chronological discussion of individual

pieces of research on an article-by-article or book-by-book basis. Instead, you should attempt to find important points of comparison or contrast within the literature as a whole and then organize your review around these points. This is not always an easy task, but (as you will find out as your academic careers progress) learning to write a literature review in this way will greatly improve your own research efforts. Normally, each group member will receive the same grade. Group members are expected to contribute equally to the literature review and presentation. If this expectation is not met by a group member, I will reduce that person's grade by 20%. You are responsible for creating your own groups (**need not be the same throughout the semester**) and need to report to me the members of the groups at least two weeks in advance of the presentation.

3. Final exam

There will also be a final exam that is similar in format to the comparative prelim exam. The questions will be focused on the central substantive and methodological topics discussed in the seminar. Two weeks in advance of the final exam, I will distribute sample questions.

4. Plagiarism

When preparing your answers, please pay special attention to citing all referenced material. You must attribute ALL ideas that are not your own to their rightful owner. When in doubt about how to reference a certain idea, you may consult the following webpage from Rice's honor code links (<http://www.plagiarism.org/>) or ask me in person. Plagiarism is a very serious academic offense and can have detrimental consequences to your career.

5. Grading:

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Class participation: | 25% (grade assigned after EVERY meeting) |
| Group assignments: | 45% |
| Final exam: | 30% |

6. Students with Disabilities

Any student with a documented disability seeking academic adjustments or accommodations is requested to speak with me during the first two weeks of class. All discussions will remain as confidential as possible. Students with disabilities will need to also contact Disability Support Services in the Ley Student Center.

7. Readings

Readings are listed on the course schedule. All journal articles are available either on JSTOR (or another online source) or at Fondren Library. Books are expensive. I leave up to you which books among those we will be using you want to purchase (via Amazon or another online bookstore). All chapters from books that are assigned will be copied and placed in the mailroom at least one week before the assignment date. When making copies of your own, please use the duplex printing feature and, if possible, share your copy with a fellow student.

Course Schedule

September 10th

ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND METHODOLOGY

Bates, Robert H. 1996. "Area Studies and the Discipline." APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 7(1): 1-2.

Hall, Peter A. 1997. "Area Studies." APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 8,2: 22-4.

Bates, Robert H. 1997. "Theory in Comparative Politics?" APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 8(1): 1-2.

Geddes, Barbara. 1997. "Paradigms and Sandcastles." APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 8(1): 18-20.

Bates, Robert H. 1997. "Comparative Politics and Rational Choice: A Review Essay." *American Political Science Review* 91(3): 699-704.

Weingast, Barry. 1997. "Formal Theory in Comparative Politics." APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 8(1): 6-7.

Collier, David. 1999. "Building a Disciplined, Rigorous Center in Comparative Politics." APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 10(2): 1-2, 4.

Wallerstein, Michael. 2000. "American Imperialism in Comparative Politics." APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 11(1): 1-3.

Laitin, David D. (2002). "Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline," in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Political Science: State of the Discipline* (New York: Norton).

Lieberman, Evan (2005). "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review* 99, No. 3 (August): 435-452.

Liphart, Arendt. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review* 65(3): 682-93.

Jackman, Robert W. 1985. "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 161-82.

Fearon, James D. 1991. "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science." *World Politics* 43 (2): 169-95.

Collier, David, et al. 1998. "Discussion: Comparative Method in the 1990s." APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics 9(1): 1-2, 4-25.

Coppedge, Michael. 1999. "Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large-N and Small-N in Comparative Politics." *Comparative Politics* 31: 465-476.

September 17

POLITICAL CULTURE

Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. 'The Renaissance of Political Culture.' *American Political Science Review* 82: 1203-1230.

Jackman, Robert W. & Ross A. Miller. 1996. 'A Renaissance of Political Culture?' *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 632-659.

Muller, Edward N. & Mitchell A. Seligson. 1994. 'Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships.' *American Political Science Review* 88: 635-652.

Bates, Robert H., et al. 1997. "Culture and Rational Choice." *APSA-CP: Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics* 8(2): 5-21.

Putnam, Robert D. 1994. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press: Chapters 1,2,4,5.

Inglehart, R. (2000). Culture and Democracy. In L. E. Harrison & S. P. Huntington (Eds.), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (pp. 80-97). New York: Basic Books.

Inglehart, R. (1999). Trust, Well-Being and Democracy. In M. Warren (Ed.), *Democracy and Trust* (pp. 88-120). New York: Cambridge University Press.

September 24

REGIME TRANSITIONS

Lipset, Seymour Martin. APSR, March, 1959 or *Political Man*, Doubleday 1960, Ch.2.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A., and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies*. Edited by Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Latin American Program., *Transitions from authoritarian rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Przeworski, Adam. 1992. *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Edited by J. Elster and M. McPherson, *Studies in Rationality and Social Change*. Cambridge, MA: CUP: Chapters 1 &2.

Recommended:

Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press. Chapters 1-3.

Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy, 1971, 1-16, 33-47

Literature review 1: Pacted transitions

October 1

DEMOCRATIZATION

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: intro, chapters 1,2, (recommended 3)

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2005. *Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press: Preface and Chapters 1,2,4,5, and 11

Geddes, Barbara. "What Do We Know About Democratization," Annual Review of Political Science 2, 129-148.

October 8

CIVIL WAR

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The logic of violence in civil war, Cambridge studies in comparative politics*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: intro, Chapters 1,2,4,5 and 9 (recommended 3)

Petersen, Roger Dale. 2002. *Understanding ethnic violence: fear, hatred, and resentment in twentieth-century Eastern Europe, Cambridge studies in comparative politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1,2,3,4, and 6.

Literature Review 2: The study of civil wars in comparative politics

October 17

ETHNIC CLEAVAGES

Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa, Political economy of institutions and decisions*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press: Intro, Intro to Part I, Part II, Part III

Fearon, James, David Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." American Political Science Review 97 (1):75-90.

October 22

PARTY SYSTEMS

Aldrich, John Herbert. 1995. *Why parties? : the origin and transformation of political parties in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: Parts I and III

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1-4.

Lipset, S.M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press. pp. 1-64

Recommended:

Appendices I and II in Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 2006. *Mapping policy preferences II : estimates for parties, electors, and governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, et. Al 1999. Post-Communist Party Systems, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael Laver. 2007. *Party policy in modern democracies*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.

Literature Review 3: Estimating policy positions

October 29th

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY COMPETITION

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers: Chapter 8.

Cox, Gary W. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 903-35.

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-624.

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making votes count : strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems, Political economy of institutions and decisions*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1,2,4,7,10,11, and 15.

Literature Review 4: Electoral Law Reform

November 5th

ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPRESENTATION

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven: Yale University Press: Chapters 1-6, and 10

Manion, Melanie. 1996. "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside." *American Political Science Review* 90 (4): 736-48.

November 12th

LEGISLATURES AND EXECUTIVES

Huber, John D. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 269-82.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1-3, 7, 8, and 13.

Jones, Mark P., and Wonjae Hwang. 2005. "Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 267-82.

Huber, John D. 1996. *Rationalizing parliament : legislative institutions and party politics in France, Political economy of institutions and decisions*. New York: Cambridge University Press: Intro and Chapters 1-4.

Martin, Lanny W., and Randolph T. Stevenson. 2001. "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 33-50.

Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2005. "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review." *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 93-106.

Literature Review 5: Coalition Formation

November 19th

LEGISLATURES AND BUREAUCRACIES

Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1,3,4, and 7.

Epstein, David, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers, Political economy of institutions and decisions*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1,3,4,5 (recommended 6&7)

Literature Review 6: Moral Hazard and Principal Agent Problems in studying bureaucracies

November 26th

LEGISLATURES AND COURTS

Vanberg, Georg. 2004. *The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1,2,3,4 and 7.

Staton, Jeffrey K. 2006. "Constitutional Review and the Selection Promotion of Case Results." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 98-112.

Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. "The logic of strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 96:291-303.

December 3rd

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DECENTRALIZATION

Frye, Timothy, "The Perils of Polarization: Economic Performance in the Postcommunist World," *World Politics* 54(2002): 308-337.

Gehlbach, S. 2006. The consequences of collective action: An incomplete-contracts approach. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3):802-823.

Treisman, Daniel. 2007. *The architecture of government: rethinking political decentralization*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1, 2 and TBA