To Concede or To Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances

Supplemental Material

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This document includes the proof of Proposition 4 and an example of emboldenment. It also includes a figure showing the distribution of our key independent variable and tables for all of the robustness checks mentioned in the text and footnotes. Before each table is a brief description of the robustness check. After each description in parentheses is the page number or footnote where the robustness check is mentioned in the article.

Proof of Proposition 4 (Restraint or Abandonment)

Proof. Suppose $\frac{c_a}{v_a} \ge q - p + \frac{k_a}{v_a}$. The condition implies that if the challenger demands $x > x^{(1)}$, then the ally will advise the target to accept it and will not join the target in the ensuing war when the target rejects the demand.

- 1. Suppose the challenger demands $x \leq x^{(3)}$. Then, $Pr(x \leq x^{(2)})v_cx + Pr(x^{(2)} < x \leq x^{(1)})v_cx + Pr(x > x^{(1)})((1-p)v_c c_c)$ = $Pr(x \leq x^{(1)})v_cx + Pr(x > x^{(1)})((1-p)v_c c_c)$ = $Pr(c_t \geq (x+p-1)v_t k_t)v_cx + Pr(c_t < (x+p-1)v_t k_t)((1-p)v_c c_c)$ = $\frac{\overline{T} (x+p-1)v_t + k_t}{\Delta} v_c x + \frac{(x+p-1)v_t k_t T}{\Delta}((1-p)v_c c_c)$ The FOC is $\frac{\overline{T} (x+p-1)v_t + k_t}{\Delta} v_c \frac{v_t v_c x}{\Delta} + \frac{v_t}{\Delta}((1-p)v_c c_c) = 0$, therefore, $x_2^* = \frac{\overline{T}}{2v_t} \frac{p}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{k_t}{2v_t} + \frac{1}{2v_c}((1-p)v_c c_c)$, or $x_2^* = 1 \frac{p}{2} \frac{c_c}{2v_c}$. If x_2^* is an interior solution, then $x_2^* < x^{(3)}$, i.e., $1 \frac{p}{2} \frac{c_c}{2v_c} < (1-q) + \frac{c_a}{v_a}$. Hence, the condition for x_2^* to be an optimal solution is $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q \frac{p}{2}$.
- 2. Suppose the challenger demands $x > x^{(3)}$. Then, $Pr(x \le x^{(2)})v_cx + Pr(x^{(2)} < x \le x^{(1)})((1-q)v_c c_c) + Pr(x > x^{(1)})((1-p)v_c c_c)$ $= Pr(c_t \ge (x+q-1)v_t + k_t)v_cx + Pr((x+p-1)v_t k_t \le c_t < (x+q-1)v_t + k_t)((1-q)v_c c_c) + Pr(c_t < (x+p-1)v_t k_t)((1-p)v_c c_c)$ $= \frac{\overline{T} (x+q-1)v_t k_t}{\Delta} v_c x + \frac{(q-p)v_t + 2k_t}{\Delta} ((1-q)v_c c_c) + \frac{(x+p-1)v_t k_t \underline{T}}{\Delta} ((1-p)v_c c_c).$ The FOC is $\frac{\overline{T} (x+q-1)v_t k_t}{\Delta} v_c \frac{v_t v_c x}{\Delta} + \frac{v_t}{\Delta} ((1-p)v_c c_c) = 0$, therefore, $x_2^{**} = \frac{\overline{T}}{2v_t} \frac{q}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{k_t}{2v_t} + \frac{1}{2v_c} ((1-p)v_c c_c)$, or $x_2^{**} = 1 \frac{q}{2} \frac{c_c}{2v_c} \frac{k_t}{v_t}$. Again, if x_2^{**} is an interior solution, then $x_2^{**} > x^{(3)}$, i.e., $1 \frac{q}{2} \frac{c_c}{2v_c} \frac{k_t}{v_t} > 1 q + \frac{c_a}{v_a}$. Thus, the condition for x_2^{**} to be an optimal solution is $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} + \frac{k_t}{v_t} < \frac{q}{2}$.

Note again the conditions found in 1 and 2 cannot hold simultaneously. Therefore we consider each case separately.

Suppose $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q - \frac{p}{2}$, then x_2^* is optimal for $x < x^{(3)}$, while there is no optimal interior solution for $x > x^{(3)}$. Since $x > x^{(3)}$ is half open and half closed, and x = 1 is never optimal, $x_2^* = 1 - \frac{p}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c}$ is optimal for all $x \in [0,1]$ for this case. Suppose $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} + \frac{k_t}{v_t} < \frac{q}{2}$, then x_2^{**} is optimal for $x > x^{(3)}$ and there is no optimal interior solution for $x < x^{(3)}$. Comparing the boundary point $x^{(3)}$ with x_2^{**} , it can be shown again that demanding $x^{(3)}$ gives C a higher payoff than demanding x_2^{**} . As in case 1, if neither $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q - \frac{p}{2}$ nor $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} + \frac{k_t}{v_t} < \frac{q}{2}$ holds, then the optimal solution is $x^{(3)}$. In sum, if $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q - \frac{p}{2}$, then C demands $x_2^{**} = 1 - \frac{p}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c}$; otherwise C demands $x^{(3)}$.

In terms of the equilibrium outcome, if C's equilibrium demand, whether it is $x^{(3)}$ or x_2^* , is greater than $x^{(1)}$, then there is bilateral war between the target and the challenger (the ally will not aid the target after failing to restrain the target); otherwise, the equilibrium outcome is peace due the ally's restraining effect.

Example of Emboldenment (Footnote 24)

Below is an example that illustrates the existence of the emboldening effect when $x^{(3)}$ is uncertain.

Let $p = 0.4, q = 0.7, \frac{k_t}{v_t} = 0.2, \frac{c_t}{v_t} = 0.25, \frac{c_c}{v_c} = 0.2, v_c = 1, v_a = 0.9, \text{ and } k_a = 0.2.$ Additionally, let c_a be uniformly distributed on (0, 0.63).

Given these values, $x^{(2)} = 1 - q + \frac{c_t - k_t}{v_t} = 0.35$, $x^{(1)} = 1 - p + \frac{k_t + c_t}{v_t} = 1.05$. Since $x^{(3)} = 1 - q + \frac{c_a}{v_a}$, $x^{(3)}$ is uniformly distributed on (0.3, 1).

Now consider the challenger's possible demands. (1) If the challenger demands some $x \le x^{(2)} = 0.35$, then it will be accepted and the challenger's highest payoff is $x^{(2)}v_c = 0.35$. (2) The challenger cannot demand $x > x^{(1)} = 1.05$ because $0 \le x \le 1$. (3) If the challenger demands some x such that $0.35 < x \le 1$, then its expected payoff is:

$$Pr(x^{(3)} \le 0.35)(0.3 - 0.2) + Pr(0.35 < x^{(3)} \le 1)[Pr(x < x^{(3)})x + Pr(x > x^{(3)})(0.3 - 0.2)]$$

$$= \frac{0.05}{0.7} \times 0.1 + \frac{0.65}{0.7}(\frac{1-x}{0.7}x + \frac{x-0.3}{0.7}0.1)$$

$$= \frac{0.05}{0.7} \times 0.1 + \frac{0.65}{0.7}(\frac{x-x^2+0.1x-0.03}{0.7})$$

$$= \frac{0.05}{0.7} \times 0.1 + \frac{0.65}{0.7}(\frac{1.1x-x^2-0.03}{0.7})$$

Maximizing the above expected utility gives us the challenger's optimal demand in this range: $x^* = 0.55$. Then the highest payoff for the challenger from demanding $0.35 < x \le 1$ is 0.37. Since this value is greater than 0.35 from case (1), the best overall demand that the challenger can make is 0.55. Such a demand can lead to war by an emboldening effect. For example, if the ally's cost of war is $c_a = 0.2$, then $x^{(3)} = 0.52 < 0.55$, and the ally would recommend "reject" to the target and the target would follow the advice.




Figure 1: Distribution of the Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance *Notes.* This figure shows the distribution of our key independent variable, the target's cost of damaging its alliance. The mean of the variable is .77 and its standard deviation is .28.

Table 1 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting if one of its allies resists. This happens in four observations (footnote 45).

Table 1: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, $1816\hbox{-}2000$

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	38**
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	(.14) 27*
Chanenger has an Applicable Chensive Amance	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	44**
Challenger's Duchability of Winning in Dileteral Wan	(.11) .19
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	(.12)
Constant	1.61**
D: 1 1 11 11	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41** (.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40** (.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51** (.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	57** (.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 2 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting only if it responds with a display or use of force (footnote 44).

Table 2: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, $1816\hbox{-}2000$

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	43**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	30*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	43**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.28*
Constant	(.12) 1.59**
Constant	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	(.04) $51**$
Chanenger-Target Shimarity of Interests	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	59**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting only if it responds with a use of force (footnote 44).

Table 3: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, $1816\hbox{-}2000$

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	48**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	05
	(.74)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	63**
	(.13)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.30*
Constant	(.12) 1.40**
Constant	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	(.21)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
Challer on Tarret Isint Description	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06 (.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	(.04) 51**
Chancing of Target Diffinality of Interests	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	63**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting only if it responds with a use of force that results in war. The *Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact* variable drops out because there are no cases in our sample where the challenger had an applicable neutrality pact and the dispute escalated to war (footnotes 39 and 44).

Table 4: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	-1.02**
	(.36)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.76**
	(.28)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.61
	(.10)
Constant	-1.04
	(.73)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	25
	(.21)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

peaceyears, (peaceyears)², (peaceyears)³ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 5 reports the results of our analysis when we only include observations where the target had one bilateral alliance (footnotes 49 and 62).

Table 5: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, $1816\hbox{-}2000$

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	85**
	(.21)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	73**
	(.23)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	62**
	(.19)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.64**
	(.23)
Constant	2.06**
Di Li I III II	(.28)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.59**
	(.08)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.61**
	(.07)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	26**
	(.07)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	42**
	(.02)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	24**
	(.09)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	42**
Constant	(.16) 1.31**
Constant	
Rho	(.23) 77**
TUIO	(.15)
Observations	94,500
Uncensored Observations	264
	201

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 6 reports the results of our analysis when we only include observations where the target's allies were all members of the same multilateral alliance (footnote 49).

Table 6: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, $1816\hbox{-}2000$

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	49**
	(.15)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	35*
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	(.15) 29*
Chancing of has an Applicable recutianty fact	(.14)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.20
	(.14)
Constant	1.73**
	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.33**
	(.05)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.39**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.04
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	(.04) 42**
Chanenger-Target Capitar-to-Capitar Distance	42 (.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	07
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	.01
	(.07)
Constant	.65**
	(.12)
Rho	61**
Observations	(.08)
Uncensored Observations	450,305 790
O HOGHSOLEG COSEL ACTIONS	130

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 7 reports the results of our analysis when we use only the target's strongest alliance to generate the *Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance* variable (footnote 49).

Table 7: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, $1816\hbox{-}2000$

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	40**
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	(.13) 27*
Chanenger has an Applicable Chensive Amance	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	44**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.22
Constant	(.12) 1.61**
Constant	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
	2044
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28** (.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
Tr	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40** (.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
v v	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03** (.10)
Rho	58**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 8 reports the results of our analysis when we control for the raw capabilities of the target (pages 22 and 27).

Table 8: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance (.16) Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance (.14) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact (.12) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War (.12) Target's Capabilities89 (.79) Constant 1.72** Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance (.22) Dispute Initiation Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance (.04) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance40** (.01) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy06 (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests52** (.05) Constant 1.03** (.10) Rho56** (.08) Observations 585,467 Uncensored Observations 1,085	Target Resistance	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	_ 50**
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance 27 (.14) (.14) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact 41** (.12) (.12) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .16 (.12) (.12) Target's Capabilities 89 (.79) (.79) Constant 1.72** (.22) (.22) Dispute Initiation .28** Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance .28** (.04) (.04) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact .41** (.04) (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War 06 (.03) (.04) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance 40** (.01) (.04) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 (.04) (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52** (.05) (.05) Constant 1.03** (.08) (.08)	Target 5 Cost of Damaging 165 Amance	
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact (.12) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War (.12) Target's Capabilities89 (.79) Constant 1.72** (.22) Dispute Initiation Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance (.04) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War (.04) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance (.03) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy06 (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests52** (.05) Constant 1.03** (.10) Rho56** (.08) Observations 585,467	Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	\ /
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War		(.14)
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} & .16 \\ & .(.12) \\ &$	Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	41**
Target's Capabilities		(.12)
Target's Capabilities $ (.79) $ Constant $ (.79) $ Constant $ (.22) $ Dispute Initiation $ (.22) $ Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance $ (.04) $ Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact $ (.04) $ Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War $ (.03) $ Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance $ (.03) $ Challenger-Target Joint Democracy $ (.04) $ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests $ (.05) $ Constant $ (.05) $ Constant $ (.10) $ Rho $ (.56** \\ (.08) $ Observations $ 585,467 $	Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.16
$ \begin{array}{c} (.79) \\ 1.72^{**} \\ (.22) \\ \hline \textit{Dispute Initiation} \\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance} & .28^{**} \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact} & .41^{**} \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} &06 \\ (.03) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**} \\ (.01) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array} $		(.12)
Constant $\begin{array}{c} 1.72^{**}\\ (.22) \\ \hline \textit{Dispute Initiation} \\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance} & .28^{**}\\ (.04)\\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact} & .41^{**}\\ (.04)\\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} &06\\ (.03)\\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**}\\ (.01)\\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06\\ (.04)\\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**}\\ (.05)\\ \hline \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**}\\ (.10)\\ \hline \\ \text{Rho} &56^{**}\\ (.08)\\ \hline \\ \text{Observations} & 585,467\\ \hline \end{array}$	Target's Capabilities	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Constant	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance $ (.04) $ Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact $ (.04) $ Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War $ (.04) $ Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance $ (.03) $ Challenger-Target Joint Democracy $ (.01) $ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests $ (.05) $ Constant $ (.10) $ Rho $56** \\ $		(.22)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact $(.04)$ Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War 06 $(.03)$ Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance 40^{**} $(.01)$ Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 $(.04)$ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52^{**} $(.05)$ Constant 1.03^{**} $(.10)$ Rho 56^{**} $(.08)$ Observations $585,467$	Dispute Initiation	
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact} & .41^{**} \\ & (.04) \\ \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} &06 \\ & (.03) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**} \\ & (.01) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ & (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ & (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ & (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ & (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array} $	Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War 06 (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance 40^{**} (.01) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52^{**} (.05) Constant 1.03^{**} (.10) Rho 56^{**} (.08) Observations $585,467$		(.04)
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} &06 \\ & (.03) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40** \\ & (.01) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ & (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52** \\ & (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03** \\ & (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56** \\ & (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array}$	Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} & (.03) \\40^{**} \\ (.01) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ (.10) \\ \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ (.08) \\ \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \end{array}$		(.04)
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**} \\ & & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & \\ & & & \\ & & \\ & & & \\$	Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 $(.04)$ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52^{**} $(.05)$ Constant 1.03^{**} $(.10)$ Rho 56^{**} $(.08)$ Observations $585,467$		
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ & (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ & & (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ & & (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ & & (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array} $	Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} & \begin{array}{c} (.04) \\52^{**} \\ (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & \begin{array}{c} 1.03^{**} \\ (.10) \\ \end{array} \\ \text{Rho} & \begin{array}{c}56^{**} \\ (.08) \\ \end{array} \\ \text{Observations} & \begin{array}{c} 585,467 \\ \end{array} $		\ /
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ & (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ & & (.10) \\ \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ & & (.08) \\ \\ \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \end{array} $	Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	
Constant $(.05)$ Constant 1.03^{**} $(.10)$ Rho 56^{**} $(.08)$ Observations $585,467$,
Constant 1.03** (.10) Rho56** (.08) Observations 585,467	Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	-
Rho $(.10)$ Cobservations $(.08)$		
Rho56** (.08) Observations 585,467	Constant	
(.08) Observations 585,467		
Observations 585,467	Rho	
,		
Uncensored Observations 1,085		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 9 reports the results of our analysis when we include the capabilities of the target's defensive allies and the capabilities of the targets offensive allies into the *Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War* variable (footnote 52).

Table 9: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	27*
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	(.13) 43**
Chancinger has an rippineasic Ohensive rimanec	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	50**
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	(.12) .91**
Constant	(.17) 1.36**
Constant	(.19)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.52**
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	(.04) .57**
Chancinger has an Applicable Neutrality 1 act	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	-1.32** (.05)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	45**
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	(.01) 13**
Chancinger Target John Democracy	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	58** (.06)
Constant	1.80**
Rho	(.11) 56**
	(.07)
Observations Uncensored Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 10 reports the results of our analysis when we use a two-step probit estimator instead of the censored probit model (footnote 54).

Table 10: Two-Step Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	46 * *
	(.16)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	31*
	(.15)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	50**
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	(.13) .25
	(.13)
Inverse Mill's Ratio	60**
	(.08)
Constant	1.87**
	(.29)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
Challanan's Doob shilter of Winning in Diletard War	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	(.03) 40**
Onanenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	04
Chancingor Target volum Democracy	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	52**
o o	(.05)
Constant	1.04**
	(.10)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 11 reports the results of our analysis when we use a probit model with the selection variables included in the outcome equation (footnote 54).

Table 11: Probit Analysis of Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	42*
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	$(.14) \\16$
	(.16)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	30* (.13)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.20
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	(.14) 17**
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	(.04) 30*
	(.14)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	.02 (.19)
Constant	1.58**
Observations	$\frac{(.42)}{1,085}$

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

peaceyears, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in estimation

Table 12 reports the results of our analysis when we include the *Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance* variable in the outcome equation (footnote 55).

Table 12: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	38**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	27^{*}
	(.13)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	45**
	(.12)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.21
	(.12)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	.02
Constant	(.05) 1.56**
Constant	(.26)
Dispute Initiation	(.20)
	2044
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	(.04) .41**
Chanenger has an Applicable Neutranty 1 act	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
chancing of Tribandino, of Tribining in Bhavorar Train	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
TNI.	(.10)
Rho	62**
	(.12)
Observations Uncensored Observations	585,467 $1,085$
Uncensored Observations	1,000

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 13 reports the results of our analysis when we include the *Challenger-Target Joint Democracy* variable in the outcome equation (footnote 55).

Table 13: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, $1816\hbox{-}2000$

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	37**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	29*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	44**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.20
Challenger Target Joint Demogracy	(.12) $24*$
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	(.12)
Constant	1.62**
Constant	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	()
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
0-10-1	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	05
Challenger Target Similarity of Interests	(.04) 51**
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	(.05)
Constant	1.02**
Collision	(.10)
Rho	57**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 14 reports the results of our analysis when we include the *Challenger-Target Similarity* of *Interests* variable in the outcome equation (footnote 55).

Table 14: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance (.14) Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance (.14) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact 43^{**} (.12) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .22 (.12) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests .14 (.15) Constant 1.50^{**} (.25) Dispute Initiation Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance .28** (.04) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact .41** (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .06 (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance .40** (.01) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy .06 (.03) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests .52** (.05) Constant .1.03** (.10) Rho56** (.08) Observations .585,467 Uncensored Observations .1,085	Target Resistance	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance 26 (.14) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact 43^{**} (.12) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .22 (.12) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests .14 (.15) Constant 1.50^{**} (.25) Dispute Initiation Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance .28** (.04) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact .41** (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .06 (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance .40** (.01) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy .06 Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests .52** (.05) Constant .1.03** (.10) Rho56** (.08) Observations .585,467	Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	43**
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact		
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact 43** (.12) (.12) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .22 (.12) (.12) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests .14 (.15) (.15) Constant 1.50** (.25) (.25) Dispute Initiation .28** Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance .28** (.04) (.04) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact .41** (.04) (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance 40** (.01) (.04) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 (.04) (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52** (.05) (.05) Constant 1.03** (.10) Rho 56** (.08) Observations 585,467	Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	26
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .22 (.12) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests .14 (.15) Constant .1.50** (.25) Dispute Initiation Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance .28** (.04) Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact .41** (.04) Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War .06 (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance .40** (.01) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy .06 (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests .52** (.05) Constant .1.03** (.10) Rho56** (.08) Observations .585,467		
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} & .22 \\ & .22 \\ & .22 \\ & .22 \\ & .22 \\ & .22 \\ & .22 \\ & .22 \\ & .23 \\ & .24 \\ & .25 \\$	Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	43**
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} & .14 \\ .15 \\ .15 \\ .15 \\ .15 \\ .25 \\ \hline $		(.12)
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} & .14 \\ & .15 \\ \hline \text{Constant} & 1.50^{**} \\ & .25 \\ \hline \\ \hline \textit{Dispute Initiation} \\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance} & .28^{**} \\ & .04 \\ \hline \text{Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact} & .41^{**} \\ \hline \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} & .06 \\ \hline \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**} \\ \hline \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ \hline \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ \hline \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ \hline \text{Chostant} & 1.03^{**} \\ \hline \text{Chostant} & .10 \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ \hline \text{Cobservations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array} $	Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Constant} & \begin{array}{c} (.15) \\ 1.50^{**} \\ (.25) \\ \hline \\ Dispute Initiation \\ \hline \\ \text{Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance} & .28^{**} \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact} & .41^{**} \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} &06 \\ (.03) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**} \\ (.01) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array}$		` /
Constant $ \begin{array}{c} 1.50^{**} \\ (.25) \\ \hline \\ Dispute Initiation \\ \hline \\ Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance \\ (.04) \\ Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact \\ (.04) \\ Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War \\ (.03) \\ Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance \\ (.01) \\ Challenger-Target Joint Democracy \\ (.04) \\ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests \\ (.05) \\ Constant \\ (.10) \\ \hline \\ Rho \\ (.08) \\ \hline \\ Observations \\ \hline \end{array} $	Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Constant	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance $ (.04) $ Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact $ (.04) $ Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War $ (.04) $ Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance $ (.03) $ Challenger-Target Joint Democracy $ (.04) $ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests $ (.05) $ Constant $ (.10) $ Rho $ (.08) $ Observations $ 585,467 $		(.25)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact $(.04)$ Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War 06 $(.03)$ Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance 40^{**} $(.01)$ Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 $(.04)$ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52^{**} $(.05)$ Constant 1.03^{**} $(.10)$ Rho 56^{**} $(.08)$ Observations $585,467$	Dispute Initiation	
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact} & .41^{**} \\ & (.04) \\ \text{Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War} &06 \\ & (.03) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**} \\ & (.01) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ & (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ & (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ & (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ & (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array} $	Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War 06 (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance 40^{**} (.01) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52^{**} (.05) Constant 1.03^{**} (.10) Rho 56^{**} (.08) Observations $585,467$,
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War 06 (.03) Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance 40^{**} (.01) Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 (.04) Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52^{**} (.05) Constant 1.03^{**} (.10) Rho 56^{**} (.08) Observations $585,467$	Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance		(.04)
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance} &40^{**} \\ & (.01) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ & (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ & (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ & (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ & (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array} $	Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy 06 $(.04)$ Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests 52^{**} $(.05)$ Constant 1.03^{**} $(.10)$ Rho 56^{**} $(.08)$ Observations $585,467$,
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Joint Democracy} &06 \\ (.04) \\ \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} &52^{**} \\ (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & 1.03^{**} \\ (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} &56^{**} \\ (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \hline \end{array} $	Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests} & \begin{array}{c} (.04) \\52^{**} \\ (.05) \\ \text{Constant} & \begin{array}{c} 1.03^{**} \\ (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} & \begin{array}{c}56^{**} \\ (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} & 585,467 \\ \end{array} $		\ /
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests $ \begin{array}{c}52^{**} \\ (.05) \\ \text{Constant} \\ 1.03^{**} \\ (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} \\56^{**} \\ (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} \\ \end{array} $	Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
Constant $(.05)$ 1.03^{**} $(.10)$ Rho 56^{**} $(.08)$ Observations $585,467$,
Constant 1.03^{**} (.10) Rho 56^{**} (.08) Observations $585,467$	Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	-
$ \begin{array}{c} (.10) \\ \hline \text{Rho} \\ (.08) \\ \hline \text{Observations} \end{array} $		
Rho56** (.08) Observations 585,467	Constant	
(.08) Observations 585,467		,
Observations 585,467	Rho	
,		
Uncensored Observations 1,085		,
	Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 15 reports the results of our analysis when we only include observations from the Cold War period (footnote 62).

Table 15: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1945-1990

Target Resistance	
Turget Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	46*
	(.21)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	32
	(.20)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	46**
	(.16)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.19
	(.16)
Constant	1.28**
Dispute Initiation	(.27)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.02
Chancingor has an rippinoasic Chonsive rimance	(.73)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.57**
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(.05)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	05
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	50**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	10
	(.06)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	92**
Constant	(.07) 2.10**
Constant	(.14)
Rho	38**
TVAL V	(.08)
Observations	406,757
Uncensored Observations	730

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 16 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude observations from the Cold War period (footnote 62).

Table 16: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-1944 & 1991-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	46**
Tanget b Cost of Damaging 165 Timanee	(.17)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	49**
Tr	(.19)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	23
	(.17)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.37*
	(.17)
Constant	2.11**
	(.25)
Dispute Initiation	
	0044
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.93**
Challan and has an Analisable Nantuslita Deet	(.08) .22**
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	(.06)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	(.00) 11
Chanenger's Frobability of Williams in Dhaterar War	(.06)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	31**
Chancingor Targot Capitar to Capitar Distance	(.02)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	01
	(.05)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	$09^{'}$
, v	(.09)
Constant	15
	(.16)
Rho	94**
	(.15)
Observations	178,710
Uncensored Observations	355

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 17 reports the results of our analysis when we control for the Cold War (footnote 62).

Table 17: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	48 * *
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	26
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	45**
	(.12)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.24*
	(.12)
Cold War Period	.19**
	(.08)
Constant	1.52**
	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.27**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	41**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	05
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51**
	(.05)
Cold War Period	.03
	(.02)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	57**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 18 reports the results of our analysis when we control for the number of allies the target has (footnote 62).

Table 18: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	45**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	26*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	45**
Challan and Dool ability of Winning in Diletand War	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.25*
Target's Number of Allies	(.12) .01
rarget's Number of Ames	(.01)
Constant	1.63**
Constant	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	(.20)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.02**
DI	(.10)
Rho	59**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 19 reports the results of our analysis when we drop observations where the target and challenger are members of a common defense pact (footnote 62).

Table 19: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
	40 44
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	43**
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	(.15) $47**$
Tr	(.16)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	49**
	(.14)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.24
	(.13)
Constant	1.73**
	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.33**
	(.05)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.38**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	11**
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	41**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	16**
	(.05)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	61**
	(.06)
Constant	1.15**
	(.11)
Rho	63**
	(.08)
Observations	528,388
Uncensored Observations	796

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 20 reports the results of our analysis when we use a threshold of 5 or higher on the polity2 variable to code our Challenger-Target Joint Democracy variable (page 26).

Table 20: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	40**
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	(.14) 27*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	44** (.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.22
Constant	(.12) 1.63**
	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	(.04) .41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06 (.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	(.01) 09**
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	(.04) 51**
Chanenger-rarger Shimarity of Interests	(.05)
Constant	1.03** (.10)
Rho	58**
Observations	(.08) 585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 21 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude the *Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance* variable (page 27).

Table 21: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Turget Tecsissianice	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	22
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	41**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.08
	(.11)
Constant	1.29**
	(.18)
Dispute Initiation	
	20**
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
Challenger has an Applicable Newtonlite Deat	(.04) .41**
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	(.04) 06
Chancinger 8 1 100ability of Williams in Bhaterar War	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
Chancingor ranges capital to capital Distance	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
o o	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51**
· ·	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	53**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 22 reports the results from the selection equation of Table 2 in the manuscript but also reports the coefficients and standard errors for the *peace years*, *peace years*², *peace years*³ variables (footnote 61).

Table 22: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	51**
	(.05)
Peace Years	04**
	(.002)
Peace Years ²	0007**
	(.00003)
Peace Years ³	000003**
	(.0000002)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	58**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05