

**INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**  
**POLI 541, SPRING 2009**  
**Tuesday 2:00-5:00 PM, 283 Baker Hall**

**INSTRUCTOR:**

Professor Ashley Leeds  
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Office Hours: MW 2:00-3:30 PM or by appointment

**COURSE CONTENT:**

This seminar is intended to provide Ph.D. students with an opportunity to read and discuss a range of scholarly literature on cooperation in the international system and to plan their own research projects on related topics. Students will be expected to demonstrate their ability to evaluate arguments and empirical evidence, to recognize linkages among studies and identify scientific progress, and to develop their own research designs. You should leave this course with a basic familiarity with current research on international cooperation, a workable plan for your own research project, and improved skills in analytical thinking and writing.

**EVALUATION:**

Grades will be determined in the manner described below. The Rice University Honor Code applies to all assignments for this course.

**25% -- *Class Participation and Attendance***

The quality of a graduate level seminar depends to a great extent on the efforts of the students. You play a big role in creating your course. I expect that you will come to class each week prepared to discuss the assigned material and that you will share your ideas, questions, and views actively. Because class participation is vital to your performance in this course, please see me at once if you feel uncomfortable speaking in class.

Please leave ample time to read the work assigned for each week carefully. While you are reading, you should consider the following questions:

**What is the purpose of the study?** Does the author intend to describe the state of the world or the state of the literature? Does the author intend to advance a new theory? Does the author intend to provide an empirical test of an existing theory? How well does the author accomplish his or her goal?

**What is the author's argument?** What research question is the author trying to answer, and how does he or she answer it? What are the assumptions (explicit and implicit) upon which the author's argument is based? What are the independent and

dependent variables, and what is the logic that links them together?

**Is the theory logically consistent?** Is it plausible?

**Is the theory empirically relevant?** Is the empirical record commensurate with expectations drawn from the theory? If the author provides empirical tests, are the operational measures of the concepts and the methods of analysis appropriate? What further evidence would you use to evaluate the argument? What further testable hypotheses follow from this theory? How would you design a study that could determine the empirical relevance of the author's approach in comparison to other approaches?

**Is the research interesting?** How does this argument fit into the literature? What does this study tell us that we didn't already know? What should it tell us that it doesn't? What questions still need to be answered?

**What policy recommendations would you make based on this study?**

**How do the selections we read this week fit together?** How do they fit into the course as a whole? Are we seeing progress in this research area?

I hope that we will engage in vigorous academic debate, but during these class discussions, classroom etiquette is vital. Please work to ensure that you make comments in ways that invite discussion. Our classroom contains members with various life experiences, divergent perspectives, varying levels of experience with political science research, and different strategies for defending their views. Please state your opinions constructively and respectfully, listen carefully when your colleagues are speaking, and speak to me if you are offended by something that is said in class.

Obviously it is impossible to participate in a seminar discussion if you are not in attendance. I expect no absences in the course, and I encourage you to discuss any circumstances with me that will preclude you from attending class. I also expect you to arrive on time. If you do need to miss class, please contact me ahead of time to let me know that you will not be able to attend and to make arrangements to complete an alternate assignment.

Grades for participation will be assigned at the end of the semester, but you may ask for feedback on your performance at any time. If you have concerns about the quality and quantity of your participation in the course, I hope you will speak to me.

### **25% – *Weekly Memos on Readings***

Each week for which there are reading assignments, each student must submit a memo on the assigned reading. Your memo should combine a brief summary of the work with a reaction to it. You should distill the main point(s) of the set of readings and integrate the week's work coherently. I will be looking for evidence that you (1) understand the main arguments and conclusions of the articles/books, (2) see how the assigned readings for the week relate to one another and to the course, (3) can think about where the field should go from here and what needs to be done next. Memos that are well organized, clear, concise, demonstrate an understanding of the assigned readings, and offer insightful analysis will receive the highest grades. Your memo must be typed, double spaced, with one inch margins on all sides, written with proper grammar and spelling, and in a font size no smaller than 11

point. The memo must not exceed three pages; I will not accept longer papers. Memos are due by 8:00 am on the day of class. They may be submitted by email as attachments in .pdf, Microsoft Word, or WordPerfect format. Alternatively, you may leave a hard copy in my mailbox in the political science department.

I will not accept any memos after the class meets unless you have made special arrangements with me ahead of time. You will receive a letter grade for each memo. At the end of the term I will drop your lowest grade and average the grades for the remaining memos to determine your final memo grade.

### **50% – Research Paper**

*Research Question – due February 3*

*Literature Review and Argument – due March 13 – 10%*

*Gradable Draft – due April 14 – 15%*

*Final Draft – due April 29 – 25%*

Your major written assignment for the semester is to prepare a paper that analyzes a question of interest to you and related to international cooperation. The result should be similar to a political science journal article. You should explain why your question is important, review the existing scholarly literature that provides the basis for your study, develop your argument and hypotheses, evaluate your hypotheses empirically, and discuss the results and implications of your study for future research and for policy.

The paper will be due in several stages. You must turn in a paragraph long description of the topic/research question you plan to study on **February 3**. While I will not grade this description, you will lose credit on your final project if you fail to hand it in. On **March 16**, I will collect the literature review and argument portion of your paper for grading. This section must explain the question you are addressing and provide a critical review of the literature that will provide a basis for your argument and study. It must also develop your argument and list your hypotheses. This draft should be accompanied by a bibliography and should include appropriate citations. A complete draft of your paper is due on the last scheduled day of class, **April 14**. This should be a version of your paper that is ready to be graded (presumably not your first draft). I will grade these papers and return them to you with comments, so you will have an opportunity to make improvements if you choose before the final draft is due on **April 29**. These due dates are firm. Late papers will be penalized one half letter grade per day, including weekends, unless an extension has been granted by the instructor prior to the due date.

At our last class meeting, each student will present his or her research to the class as a whole. The presentation should be no more than fifteen minutes, which will be followed by questions and discussion.

I encourage you to work closely with me on your individual papers throughout the semester. You need not wait for due dates to get feedback on your work. I am happy to help you at every stage of the process from identifying a topic, to locating background literature, to developing your argument, to setting up the research design and locating relevant data sources. It will be easier for me to help you, however, if you begin early and plan ahead. I am unlikely (for instance) to be in my office and available to help at 10:00 pm the night before the paper is due!

## **SPECIAL PROVISIONS:**

Students with documented disabilities who require special accommodations should express their needs during the first two weeks of class. All discussions will remain confidential. Students with disabilities must also contact Disability Support Services in the Ley Student Center. The Department of Political Science is happy to do whatever we can to assure each student full and rewarding participation in classes.

## **DISCUSSION SCHEDULE:**

This syllabus should not be viewed as a comprehensive listing of all scholarly literature on international cooperation, nor of all the “good” or “important” work on international cooperation; that would be impossible to cover in one semester. The reading selections are skewed towards works that employ statistical analysis and/or formal modeling, since these are the methodological approaches emphasized at Rice in our graduate training. Some issue areas and approaches are not well represented due to constraints of time; it is impossible to devote time to every issue area in which there has been substantial research on international cooperation in a single semester. Even for the topics that are covered, you will read only a representative sample of the existing literature. This selection of readings, however, should serve to provide a good introduction to our scholarly understanding of international cooperation, and the readings included herein should point you in profitable directions for future study on topics that you wish to pursue further.

### **Week #1: January 6: Introduction to Course**

#### **Week #2: January 13: Why Cooperate?**

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, chapters 8-10.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science* 162 (3859): 1243-1248.

Coase, R.H. 1974. The Lighthouse in Economics. *The Journal of Law and Economics* 17 (2): 357-376.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

#### **Week #3: January 20: Early Explanations for International Cooperation: International Institutions and Hegemonic Stability**

Gilpin, Robert. 1987. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 3.

Lake, David A. 1993. Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential? *International Studies Quarterly* 37: 459-489.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapters 3, 4 & 6.

Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. *Economics and Politics* 2 (1): 1-23.

Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapters 1-3.

#### **Week #4: January 27: Norms**

- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52 (4): 887-917.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1986. An Evolutionary Approach to Norms. *American Political Science Review* 80 (4): 1095-1111.
- Kelley, Judith. 2008. Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring. *International Organization* 62 (2): 221-255.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2008. Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization* 62 (2): 689-716.
- Busby, Joshua William. 2007. Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2): 247-275.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

#### **Week #5: February 3: Bargaining in International Politics**

- Krasner, Stephen. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. *World Politics* 43 (3): 336-366.
- Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization* 52 (2): 269-305.
- Tollison, Robert D. and Thomas D. Willett. 1979. An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations. *International Organization* 33 (4): 425-449.
- Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games. *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-460.
- Stasavage, David. 2004. Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in International and Domestic Bargaining. *International Organization* 58 (4): 667-703.
- Barkin, J. Samuel. 2004. Time Horizons and Multilateral Enforcement in International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2): 363-382.
- Slapin, Jonathan B. 2008. Bargaining Power at Europe's Intergovernmental Conferences: Testing Institutional and Intergovernmental Theories. *International Organization* 62 (1): 131-162.
- Statement of Research Question Due in Class*

#### **Week #6: February 10: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation**

- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4): 979-1002.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56 (3): 477-513.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2008. *Punishing the Prince*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Colaresi, Michael. 2004. When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover. *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 555-570.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch? *International Organization* 59 (1): 1-38.

#### **Week #7: February 17: No class; ISA annual meeting**

#### **Week #8: February 24: Institutional Design**

- Lake, David A. 1996. Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations. *International Organization* 50 (1): 1-33.

- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4): 761-799.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. *International Organization* 48 (3): 425-458.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange. *International Organization* 55 (4): 891-917.
- Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. Contracting Around International Uncertainty. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 549-565.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization* 55 (4): 829-857.
- Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization* 62 (3): 477-505.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2008. The International Law and Politics of Climate Change. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (2): 243-268.

**Week #9: March 3: No class, spring break**

**Week #10: March 10: Why Do States Use International Organizations?**

- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1): 3-32.
- Voeten, Erik. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *International Organization* 59 (3): 527-557.
- Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *International Organization* 60 (1): 1-34.
- Fang, Songying. 2008. The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 304-321.
- Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-374.
- Voeten, Eric. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 845-858.
- Hathaway, Oona A. 2007. Why do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (4): 588-621.
- Allee, Todd L. and Paul K. Huth. 2006. Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover. *American Political Science Review* 100 (2): 219-234.

**March 13: Literature Review and Argument Due by 12:00 pm**

**Week #11: March 17: Variance in and Development of International Organizations**

- Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2): 241-276.
- Haftel, Yoram Z. and Alexander Thompson. 2006. The Independence of International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2): 253-275.
- Grigorescu, Alexandru. 2007. Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (3): 625-648.
- Voeten, Erik. 2007. The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. *International Organization* 61 (4): 669-701.
- Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization* 53 (4): 699-732.

- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2): 397-419.
- Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. Is There A Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements? *International Organization* 58 (3): 459-484.

### **Week #12: March 24: Compliance with International Agreements**

- Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *International Organization* 50 (3): 379-406.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-835.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611-622.
- Simmons, Beth A. and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 623-631.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties. *International Organization* 57 (4): 801-827.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (4): 721-737.
- Morrow, James D. 2007. When do States Follow the Laws of War? *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 559-589.
- Kelley, Judith. 2007. Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements. *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 573-589.

### **Week #13: March 31: Compliance 2: Domestic Politics and Causal Mechanisms**

- Dai, Xinyuan. 2006. The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (5): 1-24.
- Dai, Xinyuan. 2007. *International Institutions and National Policies*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chapters 4 & 5.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chapters 3 & 4.
- Gartzke, Erik and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. Why Democracies May Be Less Reliable Allies. *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 775-795.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments. *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2).
- Gibler, Douglas M. 2008. The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (3): 426-454.

### **Week #14: April 7: The Effectiveness of International Agreements**

- Helm, Carsten and Detlef Sprinz. 2000. Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (5): 630-652.
- Ringquist, Evan J. and Tatiana Kostadinova. 2005. Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (1): 86-102.
- Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference? *The Yale Law Journal* 111 (8): 1935-2042.
- Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (2): 174-195.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *International Organization* 57: 337-372.

Mattes, Michaela. 2008. The Effect of Changing Conditions and Agreement Provisions on Conflict and Renegotiation Between States with Competing Claims. *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2): 315-334.

**Week #15: April 14: Presentation of student research and course wrap-up.**  
***Draft of Research Paper due in class.***

***April 29: Final Draft of Research Paper due by 12:00 pm***