

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
POLI 541, SPRING 2007
T 1:30-4:30 PM, 283 Baker Hall

INSTRUCTOR:

Professor Ashley Leeds
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Office Hours: M 2:00-3:00 PM, T 10:00-11:00 AM, or by appointment

COURSE CONTENT:

This seminar is intended to provide Ph.D. students with an opportunity to read and discuss a range of scholarly literature on cooperation in the international system and to plan their own research projects on related topics. Students will be expected to demonstrate their ability to evaluate arguments and empirical evidence, to recognize linkages among studies and identify scientific progress, and to develop their own research designs. You should leave this course with a basic familiarity with current research on international cooperation, a workable plan for your own research project, and improved skills in analytical thinking and writing.

EVALUATION:

Grades will be determined in the manner described below. The Rice University Honor Code applies to all assignments for this course.

25% -- Class Participation and Attendance

The quality of a graduate level seminar depends to a great extent on the efforts of the students. You play a big role in creating your course. I expect that you will come to class each week prepared to discuss the assigned material and that you will share your ideas, questions, and views actively. Because class participation is vital to your performance in this course, please see me at once if you feel uncomfortable speaking in class.

Please leave ample time to read the work assigned for each week carefully. While you are reading, you should consider the following questions:

What is the purpose of the study? Does the author intend to describe the state of the world or the state of the literature? Does the author intend to advance a new theory? Does the author intend to provide an empirical test of an existing theory? How well does the author accomplish his or her goal?

What is the author's argument? What research question is the author trying to answer, and how does he or she answer it? What are the assumptions (explicit and implicit) upon which the author's argument is based? What are the independent and

dependent variables, and what is the logic that links them together?

Is the theory logically consistent? Is it plausible

Is the theory empirically relevant? Is the empirical record commensurate with expectations drawn from the theory? If the author provides empirical tests, are the operational measures of the concepts and the methods of analysis appropriate? What further evidence would you use to evaluate the argument? What further testable hypotheses follow from this theory? How would you design a study that could determine the empirical relevance of the author's approach in comparison to other approaches?

Is the research interesting? How does this argument fit into the literature? What does this study tell us that we didn't already know? What should it tell us that it doesn't? What questions still need to be answered?

What policy recommendations would you make based on this study?

How do the selections we read this week fit together? How do they fit into the course as a whole? Are we seeing progress in this research area?

I hope that we will engage in vigorous academic debate, but during these class discussions, classroom etiquette is vital. Please work to ensure that you make comments in ways that invite discussion. Our classroom contains members with various life experiences, divergent perspectives, varying levels of experience with political science research, and different strategies for defending their views. Please state your opinions constructively and respectfully, listen carefully when your colleagues are speaking, and speak to me if you are offended by something that is said in class.

Obviously it is impossible to participate in a seminar discussion if you are not in attendance. I expect no absences in the course, and I encourage you to discuss any circumstances with me that will preclude you from attending class. I also expect you to arrive on time. If you do need to miss class, please contact me ahead of time to let me know that you will not be able to attend and to make arrangements to complete an alternate assignment.

Grades for participation will be assigned at the end of the semester, but you may ask for feedback on your performance at any time. If you have concerns about the quality and quantity of your participation in the course, I hope you will speak to me.

15% – Analytical Paper and Presentation

Each week, one student will write a paper reviewing the week's readings. The student will distribute the paper to the members of the class by 5:00 pm on Monday via email and will make a brief oral presentation at the beginning of class. There is no page minimum or limit, but I anticipate that most papers will be between five and ten pages. Your paper should be typed, double-spaced, and stapled, and should include at least one inch margins on all sides and page numbers on each page. I expect your papers to be free from errors in grammar and spelling. Please proofread well.

The paper should not merely summarize the assigned readings. While some summary may be useful, the paper should be aimed at providing a critical review that links the readings together and provides

an analysis of the contributions and limitations of the work as well as some discussion of where it might lead us in the future. It might also be helpful to put the readings in the larger context of the themes of the course and indicate how they seem to fit.

In grading the papers, I will consider the following dimensions: (1) Does the student demonstrate an understanding of the assigned readings? (2) Does the student offer an insightful analysis of the readings? Does the student see ways in which different pieces fit together and/or contrast with one another? Does the student situate the work within the broader themes of the course effectively? Does the student provide independent insight? (3) Is the paper well organized, coherent, clear, and concise? Can I follow a clear argument from beginning to end that is well supported with evidence? Is the writing both grammatically correct and stylistically appropriate to political science scholarship?

In designing your oral presentation, you should assume that the class members have read both the assigned readings and your paper. Rather than reviewing the entire paper again, pick out some issues to raise that are likely to inspire discussion and get the meeting moving. You should plan to speak no longer than ten minutes.

Students will have the opportunity to express preferences over which week they are assigned to present. Assignments will be announced by the second class meeting.

15% -- *Midterm Exam*

Approximately halfway through the semester, you will be asked to complete a midterm exam. I will distribute a question, and you will have approximately ten days to write an analytical paper in response to that question based on the literature we have covered in the first half of the course. Your goal will be to demonstrate your familiarity with the literature you have read for the course, as well as an ability to articulate linkages among the readings, to explain the major debates, to identify strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature, and to recognize profitable directions for future research. The tentative due date is **March 2**. Late papers will be penalized one full letter grade per day, including weekends, unless an extension has been granted by the instructor prior to the due date. Extensions will be granted only under extraordinary circumstances.

45% – *Research Design*

Research Question – due February 6

Literature Review – due March 16 – 10%

Complete Draft – due April 17 – 10%

Final Draft – due May 7 – 25%

Your major written assignment for the semester is to prepare a paper that lays out an argument and research design for a question of interest to you and related to international cooperation. The result should be similar to a political science journal article minus the section describing the empirical results. You should explain why your question is important, review the existing scholarly literature that provides the basis for your study, develop your argument and hypotheses, and explain how you plan to evaluate your hypotheses empirically. While you need not complete the empirical analysis, you do need to explain the research design, including how you would operationalize your concepts, how you would obtain data to conduct the analysis, and how you would interpret results. Your paper should conclude with a discussion of the implications of your study for future research and for policy.

The paper will be due in several stages. You must turn in a paragraph long description of the topic/research question you plan to study on **February 6**. While I will not grade this description, you will lose credit on your final project if you fail to hand it in. On **March 16**, I will collect the literature review portion of your paper for grading. This section must explain the question you are addressing and provide a critical review of the literature that will provide a basis for your argument and study. The literature review should be accompanied by a bibliography and should include appropriate citations. A complete draft of your paper is due on the last scheduled day of class, **April 17**. This should be a version of your paper that is ready to be graded (presumably not your first draft). I will grade these papers and return them to you with comments, so you will have an opportunity to make improvements if you choose before the final draft is due on **May 7**. These due dates are firm. Late papers will be penalized one full letter grade per day, including weekends, unless an extension has been granted by the instructor prior to the due date.

At our last class meeting, each student will make a brief presentation of his or her research design to the class as a whole. The presentation should be no more than fifteen minutes.

I encourage you to work closely with me on your individual papers throughout the semester. You need not wait for due dates to get feedback on your work. I am happy to help you at every stage of the process from identifying a topic, to locating background literature, to developing your argument, to setting up the research design and locating relevant data sources. It will be easier for me to help you, however, if you begin early and plan ahead. I am unlikely (for instance) to be in my office and available to help at 10:00 pm the night before the paper is due!

SPECIAL PROVISIONS:

Students with documented disabilities who require special accommodations should express their needs during the first two weeks of class. All discussions will remain confidential. Students with disabilities must also contact Disability Support Services in the Ley Student Center. The Department of Political Science is happy to do whatever we can to assure each student full and rewarding participation in classes.

REQUIRED READING:

The following books are on reserve at Fondren Library, but you may wish to purchase your own copies of some or all of them.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mattli, Walter. 1999. *The Logic of Regional Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Yarbrough, Beth V. and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1992. *Cooperation and Governance in International Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

The remaining readings are primarily articles from scholarly journals that can be located at Fondren Library. Many are also available on-line through J-STOR or other on-line services.

This syllabus should not be viewed as a comprehensive listing of all scholarly literature on international cooperation, nor of all the “good” or “important” work on international cooperation; that would be impossible to cover in one semester. The reading selections are skewed towards works that employ statistical analysis and/or formal modeling, since these are the methodological approaches emphasized at Rice in our graduate training. Some issue areas and approaches are not well represented due to constraints of time; it is impossible to devote time to every issue area in which there has been substantial research on international cooperation in a single semester. Even for the topics that are covered, you will read only a representative sample of the existing literature. This selection of readings, however, should serve to provide a good introduction to our scholarly understanding of international cooperation, and the readings included herein should point you in profitable directions for future study on topics that you wish to pursue further.

DISCUSSION SCHEDULE:

Week #1: January 9: Introduction to Course; Review of Schools of Thought and Approaches to Studying International Relations

Keohane, Robert O. 1989. *International Institutions and State Power*. Boulder: Westview Press, chapter 1.

Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49.

Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutional Theory. *International Security* 20 (1): 39-51.

Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. *International Organization* 52 (4): 729-757.

Week #2: January 16: The Demand for International Cooperation

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, chapters 8-10.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science* 162 (3859): 1243-1248.

Coase, R.H. 1974. The Lighthouse in Economics. *The Journal of Law and Economics* 17 (2): 357-376.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Week #3: January 23: The Supply of International Cooperation 1: Hegemonic Stability Theory and International Institutions

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Yarbrough, Beth V. and Robert M. Yarbrough. 1992. *Cooperation and Governance in International Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. *International Organization* 36 (2): 185-205.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables.

International Organization 36 (2): 497-510.

Week #4: January 30: The Supply of International Cooperation 2: Norm Emergence

- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52 (4): 887-917.
- Axelrod, Robert. 1986. An Evolutionary Approach to Norms. *American Political Science Review* 80 (4): 1095-1111.
- Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Week #5: February 6: Bargaining in International Politics

- Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization* 49 (3): 379-414.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. *World Politics* 43 (3): 336-366.
- Fearon, James D. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization* 52 (2): 269-305.
- Tollison, Robert D. and Thomas D. Willett. 1979. An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations. *International Organization* 33 (4): 425-449.
- Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games. *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-460.
- Stasavage, David. 2004. Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in International and Domestic Bargaining. *International Organization* 58 (4): 667-703.
- Barkin, J. Samuel. 2004. Time Horizons and Multilateral Enforcement in International Cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2): 363-382.

Statement of Research Question Due in Class

Week #6: February 13: Institutional Design

- Lake, David A. 1996. Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations. *International Organization* 50 (1): 1-33.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization* 55 (4): 761-799.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. *International Organization* 48 (3): 425-458.
- Mitchell, Ronald B. and Patricia M. Keilbach. 2001. Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange. *International Organization* 55 (4): 891-917.
- Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. Contracting Around International Uncertainty. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 549-565.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization* 55 (4): 829-857.
- Langlois, Catherine C. And Jean-Pierre Langlois. 2001. Engineering Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Phased International Agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (3): 599-619.

Week #7: February 20: Why Do States Use International Organizations?

- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1): 3-32.
- Voeten, Erik. 2005. The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force. *International Organization* 59 (3): 527-557.
- Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of

- Information Transmission. *International Organization* 60 (1): 1-34.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2002. Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (6): 829-856.
- Allee, Todd L. and Paul K. Huth. 2006. Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover. *American Political Science Review* 100 (2): 219-234.
- Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization* 56 (2): 339-374.
- Voeten, Eric. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 845-858.

Midterm exam distributed (Due Friday, March 2 by 5:00 pm)

Week #8: February 27: No class; ISA annual meeting

Week #9: March 6: No class, spring break

Week #10: March 13: Variance in and Development of International Organizations

- Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization* 57 (2): 241-276.
- Haftel, Yoram Z. and Alexander Thompson. 2006. The Independence of International Organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2): 253-275.
- Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization* 53 (4): 699-732.
- Downs, George W., David M. Roake, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. *International Organization* 52 (2): 397-419.
- Gilligan, Michael J. 2004. Is There A Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements? *International Organization* 58 (3): 459-484.

March 16: Literature Review Due by 5:00 pm

Week #11: March 20: Compliance with International Agreements

- Simmons, Beth A. 1998. Compliance with International Agreements. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 75-93.
- Downs, George W., David M. Roake, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *International Organization* 50 (3): 379-406.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2000. Re-Evaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (5): 686-699.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties. *International Organization* 57 (4): 801-827.
- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-835.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611-622.
- Simmons, Beth A. and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods. *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 623-631.

Week #12: March 27: The Effectiveness of International Agreements

- Mitchell, Ronald B. 2006. Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements. *Global Environmental Politics* 6 (3): 72-89.
- Helm, Carsten and Detlef Sprinz. 2000. Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental

- Regimes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (5): 630-652.
- Ringquist, Evan J. and Tatiana Kostadinova. 2005. Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol. *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (1): 86-102.
- Botcheva, Liliana and Lisa L. Martin. 2001. Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and Divergence. *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (1): 1-26.
- Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference? *The Yale Law Journal* 111 (8): 1935-2042.
- Reinhardt, Eric. 2001. Adjudication Without Enforcement in GATT Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (2): 174-195.

Week #13: April 3: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation

- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (4): 979-1002.
- McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. 2000. Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-Specific Punishments. *International Organization* 54 (4): 809-824.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *International Organization* 56 (3): 477-513.
- Svolik, Milan. 2006. Lies, Defection, and the Pattern of International Cooperation. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4): 909-925.
- Dai, Xinyuan. 2006. The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (5): 1-24.
- Colaresi, Michael. 2004. When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover. *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 555-570.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch? *International Organization* 59 (1): 1-38.
- Gartzke, Erik and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2004. Why Democracies May Be Less Reliable Allies. *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 775-795.

Week #14: April 10: Integration and Supranationalism

- Mattli, Walter. 1999. *The Logic of Regional Integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Deudney, Daniel H. 1995. The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, circa 1787-1861. *International Organization* 49 (2): 191-228.
- Alter, Karen J. 1998. Who are the "Masters of the Treaty"? European Governments and the European Court of Justice. *International Organization* 52 (1): 121-147.

Week #15: April 17: Presentation of research designs and course wrap-up.

Draft of Research Design due in class.

May 7: Final Draft of Research Design due by 12:00 pm