Abstract
The nature of human mental representations continues to be a topic of active debate within cognitive science. That is, cognitive scientists continue to wonder whether the knowledge the average person has about an object is represented symbolically or in a modality-specific way, or whether both kinds of representations might be available for use.
Recently, evidence has been accumulating that some kinds of representations, namely those used when we are producing or understanding language, are embodied. According to such theories, when we are using language, we are simulating what is being talked about. For example, Glenberg and Kaschak have shown that in understanding a sentence like Mary opened the drawer, we are actually imagining the action, generating a mental image of the event, and activating motor programs having to do with motion towards the body (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak & Glenberg, 2000).
Thus far, however, researchers promoting embodied cognition have ignored the fact that when we are using language, we frequently physically simulate what we are talking about through gesture. Specifically, speakers often literally embody what they are talking about, by using their hands and bodies as though they were a participant taking part in the event. This behavior has been described as character viewpoint gesture. This talk presents a set of experiments assessing the circumstances that elicit character viewpoint gesture. I argue that character viewpoint gestures are triggered by two factors: discourse novelty (whether information being communicated is discourse old or new) and properties of the stimulus itself (e.g., animacy, whether a stimulus is rich or sparse in information). Implications for theories of embodied cognition are discussed.