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Hatice Özsoy

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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Economics, Bogazici University, Turkey, 2000.

B.A., Business Administration, Bogazici University, Turkey, 2000.

Graduate Studies:

Ph. D., Economics, Rice University, 2007 (expected).

Dissertation Title: Essays in Mechanism Design and Decision Theory.

References:

Professor Simon Grant
Dept. of Economics, Rice University
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Professor Peter Mieszkowski
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(713) 348 3453 mieszko@rice.edu

Professor Hervé Moulin (Primary Advisor)
Dept. of Economics, Rice University
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Fields:

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Game Theory, Decision Making under Uncertainty, Industrial Organization.

Teaching Experience:

Instructor, *Principles of Economics I* (UG), Spring 2006.

Teaching Assistant, *Microeconomics III* (G), Fall 2005.

Teaching Assistant, *Microeconomic Theory I* (G), Fall 2003 and Fall 2004.

Teaching Assistant, *Environmental and Energy Economics* (UG), Spring 2004 and Spring 2005.

Teaching Assistant, *Mathematical Economics* (G), Fall 2001, Bilkent University, Turkey.

Professional Activities:

Presentations: The 17th International Conference on Game Theory, New York, 2006; Society for Economic Design Meeting, Bodrum, Turkey, 2006; Public Economic Theory Meeting, Marseilles, France, 2005; Rice University Microeconomic Theory Workshop, 2005; Society for Economic Design Meeting, New York, 2002; The Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Pasadena, 2002; NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Istanbul, Turkey, 2001.

Attended the Hebrew University Summer School in Economic Theory on “Matching, Auctions, and Market Design,” Jerusalem, Israel, 2005.

Referee for *International Journal of Game Theory*, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, and *Mathematics of Operations Research*.

Completed Papers:

“A characterization of Bird's rule,” job market paper.

Abstract: I study a distribution network problem where a set of users have to share the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree. I consider covert-merging and overt-merging as forms of strategic behavior in these problems. There is no covert-merge-proof cost allocation rule. Several rules studied in the literature are vulnerable to overt-merging as well. Bird's rule, on the other hand, is characterized by overt-merge-proofness, core selection, and tree invariance.

“Coordinated splitting in probabilistic scheduling,” forthcoming (subject to revision) in *International Journal of Game Theory*.

Abstract: A set of users arrive at the same time to a single server. Splitting one's job under several aliases can be profitable even to a single user, yet it has been shown that many reasonable rules are immune to such maneuvers. We investigate the profitability of coordinated splitting by several users. Our results suggest that the Uniform rule is essentially the only discipline immune to coordinated splitting.

Transfer maneuvers yield a similar result within the class of quasi-proportional rules: all scheduling rules that satisfy demand monotonicity, scale invariance, and are immune to transfer maneuvers are essentially the same as the Uniform rule. More interesting rules are immune to transfers between two users only.

“Supra-Implementation with Transfers of Discrete Choices,” with Semih Koray, 2002.

Abstract: In a transferable utility context, where the agents are endowed with quasi-linear utilities and the distribution of rights is determined by a subgame-perfect implementable status-quo function along with a surplus division rule, we construct a mechanism through which the total surplus maximizing social choice rule respecting the given rights structure is implemented in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. We refer to this as supra-implementing the status-quo function which can be taken as any ordinary social choice function to represent socially secured individual utility levels at each utility profile.

Research in Progress:

“Purely Subjective Probabilistic Sophistication with Stochastic Monotonicity,” with Simon Grant and Ben Polak.

Abstract: Machina & Schmeidler show that probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in a Savage setting without imposing expected utility by dropping Savage's axiom P2 (sure-thing principle) and strengthening his axiom P4 (comparative probability). This stronger axiom, however, embodies a degree of separability analogous to P2. We obtain probabilistic sophistication using Savage's original axiom P4 and a weaker (and more natural) analog of Savage's P2. We show that this leads to an alternative characterization of second-order probabilistically sophisticated beliefs developed by Ergin & Gul, where the agent may have a preference over gambles that yield the same probability distribution, but depend on different issues.