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Hervé Moulin Baker Hall 266 |
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| EDUCATION: | Ph.D., Economics, University of Paris, 1975 |
| RESEARCH INTERESTS: | Micro-economic theory, game theory, social choice theory, distributive justice. Hervé Moulin's current research explores mechanisms of resource allocation, such as assignment, matching, voting rules and cost sharing. A central question is the interface between the incentives properties of these mechanisms and their normative properties of equity and efficiency. |
| WORKING PAPERS AND FORTHCOMING PAPERS: | "Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms", October 2007. "Efficient, strategy-proof and almost budget-balanced assignment", April 2007. "An efficient and almost budget balanced
cost sharing method", August 2006 "The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing ”, forthcoming, Economic Theory.
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| RECENT PUBLICATIONS: | "On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting and transferring of jobs,"Mathematics of Operations Research, 2, 32, 266-283, 2007. “Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing” (with
Yves Sprumont), Games and Economic Behavior, 55, 152-188, 2006. “Collective choice under dichotomous preferences,” Figure 3, Figure 4 (with Anna Bogomolnaia and Richard Stong), Journal of Economic Theory, 122, 165-84, 2005. "Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average costs," (with Hervé Cres), International Economic Review, 44, 3, 1097-1115, 2003. “Fair queuing and other probabilistic allocation methods," (with Richard Stong), Mathematics of Operations Research, 27, 1, 1-30, 2002.
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