Faculty

Hervé Moulin
George A. Peterkin Professor of Economics

Baker Hall 266
Ph: 713.348.3312 or 3532
Fax: 713.348.6329
Email: moulin@rice.edu

Curriculum Vitae

 

 
EDUCATION: Ph.D., Economics, University of Paris, 1975
   
RESEARCH INTERESTS: Micro-economic theory, game theory, social choice theory, distributive justice. Hervé Moulin's current research explores mechanisms of resource allocation, such as assignment, matching, voting rules and cost sharing. A central question is the interface between the incentives properties of these mechanisms and their normative properties of equity and efficiency.
   
WORKING PAPERS AND FORTHCOMING PAPERS:

"Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms", October 2007.

"Efficient, strategy-proof and almost budget-balanced assignment", April 2007.

"An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method", August 2006

Impartial division of a dollar”, (with Geoffroy De Clippel, Florenz Plassmann and Nicolaus Tideman), forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory.

"Minimizing the Worst Slowdown: Off-Line and On-Line," forthcoming, Operations Research.

Proportional Scheduling, split-proofness and merge-proofness”, forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior.

"The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing ”, forthcoming, Economic Theory.

 

   
RECENT PUBLICATIONS:

"On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting and transferring of jobs,"Mathematics of Operations Research, 2, 32, 266-283, 2007.

Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing” (with Yves Sprumont), Games and Economic Behavior, 55, 152-188, 2006.

"On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing,Figures 1-3 (with Yves Sprumont), Journal of Economic Theory, 125, 1-35, 2005.

Collective choice under dichotomous preferences,Figure 3, Figure 4 (with Anna Bogomolnaia and Richard Stong), Journal of Economic Theory, 122, 165-84, 2005.

Random matching under dichotomous preferences, ” (with Anna Bogomolnaia), Econometrica, 72, 1, 257-279, 2004.

“Characterization of additive cost sharing methods,” (with Rakesh Vohra), Economic Letters, 80, 399-407, 2003.

"Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average costs," (with Hervé Cres), International Economic Review, 44, 3, 1097-1115, 2003.

Fair queuing and other probabilistic allocation methods," (with Richard Stong), Mathematics of Operations Research, 27, 1, 1-30, 2002.