

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ARCHAEOLOGY

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There are many equally valid ways to write a history of how archaeologists contributed to the intellectual climate of their times. Some historians emphasize the discipline's dependency relations with history, geology or anthropology. For others, prehistorians' priorities simply reflect evolving middle class values. These views do not give archaeologists their due. For the intellectual history of archaeology has been the search to comprehend unrecorded motivations. Were the actors upon the ancient stage much like us, such that we can recreate their motivations in our mind? Or were they playing to a script that is untranslatable to an audience from another time, another society?

Recently, these same questions have split philosophers of the social sciences into partisan camps. Beginning with their Enlightenment forebearers, archaeologists anticipated many of the arguments that now set philosophers at each others' throats.

One dominant faction in the philosophy of the social sciences (Quine 1960, 1969)* assumes that there must be a basis for cross-cultural understanding. They accept that there is no objective way to judge between two mutually incompatible theories about motivations for a certain action. Nevertheless, they argue for a unity-of-method with the natural sciences as the best way to find progressively better ways to predict future behavior. Goals of cross-cultural understanding and prediction are just too much for the competing faction (Rorty 1979, Winch 1958). This second group believes that childhood socialization endows each neatly bounded social group with sets of inner rules, intuitive manuals of translation of appropriate behavior. This manual is closed fast to the outsider. The insightful observer might judge the internal coherence of acts guided by another group's inner rules, but will

* It is useful to see the relationship in time of key individuals. Dates are for their central writings or, occasionally, most important excavations.

forever be a stranger to the deeper, mystical inner logic. A third minority faction (Hollis 1979, 1982), asserts that all humankind shares universal ways of looking at the world. Such innate dispositions define our common humanity.

Almost every core concept -- unity-of-method, prediction, inner rules, internal coherences, innate dispositions -- have surfaced repeatedly for 250 or so years as archaeologists have struggled to know how scatters of lithics or a Classical figured krater might provide a window onto the maker's motivations. This obsession to understand the motivations of the long-dead grew partially out of contact with peoples whom Europeans could rank as progressively more Primitive, and partially out of something moldering in the soil beneath their feet.

INTELLECTUAL LIBERATION: THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Europe's world expansion would not have sufficed to challenge medieval ecclesiastical doctrine that all but the Christian chosen were lesser approximations of God's image. There was far too much need for justification of conquest and genocide, such as Fray Ginés de Sepúlveda's (c.1560) assertion that the Savages of the Americas were not even human. All that began to change with the realization that the rude stones and bones being unearthed in increasing numbers from the ancestral soil of Europe looked undeniably like those made by barbarous tribes far away. The best Enlightenment minds asked the archetypal archaeological question that rests the basis for all current assertions of universal human rights: Are they what we were once -- or are now still? It is difficult, with our late 20th century cynicism and ennui, to imagine the intellectual liberation that resulted.

Some historians of archaeology date the intellectual birth of the discipline to 1859. In that indisputably revolutionary year, the Biblical short chronology of a 6000 year span for humankind fell apart. However, a century earlier the inquiring minds of Europe began to invent a new authority to interpret distant savages and their own distant ancestors. The

philosophes looked upon the face of modern Savages and ancient Brutes and saw there none of the revealed certainties of the senescent medieval order.

Of course, the Enlightenment was not conceived in a vacuum. Since the 16th century, curios from voyages of discovery and amateur diggings, together with natural science samples, found their way into *Wunderkammern*, or Cabinets of Curiosities. These were far more than proto-museums. They were the mirror of the universe, where Divine purpose was exposed to scrutiny of reason. Scholars scrutinized their *Wunderkammern* for universal, mechanical laws championed by Descartes, Kant, Buffon and Newton. For humans, too, were forged into God's Great Chain of Being and so belonged with all things measurable -- animate and inanimate, present and ancient.

God made the Great Chain according to immutable Principles. The Principle of Plenitude asserted that each link in the Great Chain was a unique, well-differentiated "natural species". Each link was present since the Creation, each unchanging. Open inquiry was soon to show that the Chain was not static; extinctions and evolution of new forms had to be accounted for. Nevertheless, the Plenitude principle of unique entities reemerges again and again. Of more immediate influence on Enlightenment thinking were the Principles of Graduation and Continuity: each organism differs only slightly from its lower or higher neighbor on a Great Chain forged without gaps. Progress.

Linnaeus was ranking species according to Graduation and Continuity when he invented, *Homo troglodytes*, the link immediately below the rudest of living Primitives. So too, Soame Jenyns (1790) who produced a seriation of humanity from the "brutal Hottentot" to Newton. In Peter Heylyn's *Microcosmos* of 1636, we find North American aboriginals compared to Europeans 300 years after Noah's flood. While the members of the Scottish Enlightenment (Ferguson, Stewart, Adam Smith, Millar) and their French counterparts (Turgot, de Concorcet, Buffon, Montesquieu, Voltaire) were to make God an irrelevancy to the discovery of the principles of causation, they embraced concepts of Gradation and

Continuity as they grappled with the evidence of ancient times in their endeavors to know the workings of the minds of people very different than themselves.

The Enlightenment equation of ethnographic distance from Europe with the historical distance ancestors was not in itself particularly revolutionary. Certainly, it would not have been considered a remarkable insight when, in 1750, Turgot stated that all stages of development leading to the European nations were represented somewhere in the world. Earlier, the Scandinavian and English nationalists had made similar uniformitarianist assumptions about their ancestors. What was pioneering were the methods of analysis and the initial presumption of a transcendent, constant human nature.

The goal of these studies was to isolate the laws of human history by pragmatic observation, classification and experiment. The laws thus revealed were to possess the same structure as natural science laws and, because they were lessons to reduce humanity's pain, were of even higher status. Laws were predictive. Infinite perfectibility was the law of nature. Societies develop along universal, linear stages, each developing out of the preceding. Scientific society was the highest moral end of history.

History could only be treated as an equal to natural science because of an abiding faith that all humanity was borne of a common ancestor. This (monogenist) faith in global innate equality of intelligence, articulated by Buffon (1749) and Ferguson (1767) is passed on to the next generation by Prichard (1813, 1841) as the "psychic unity" of the Social Evolutionists. But, de Condorcet, in his ten-stage, unilinear history Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain (1793), is the most revolutionary in his use of antiquity. Modern hunters and gatherers are survivals from the original human condition. They may still be steeped in ignorance because of environment or historical accident, but not because of biological (racial) barriers to progress or because of they degenerated from an earlier condition. In fact, Th. Jefferson's 1784 excavations of Virginia burial mounds (arguably the only systematic archaeological excavation conducted as part of the Enlightenment project) were undertaken to gather data to counter the argument of

degeneration of North American animals, indigenous peoples and their institutions. Thus, the problem of comprehending the motivations of peoples distant in customs or in time was really a non-problem: They may be us as we once were, but they are us, nonetheless.

CULTURE AND RACE CONFLATED

The Enlightenment remained in its armchair. As the 19th century reaction against revolutionary ideas of equality and the Napoleonic betrayal set in, nascent field archaeology fell increasingly into the hands of nationalists and mystical Romantics. To be sure, Saint-Simon (1813-25) and, especially, August Comte greedily consumed classical antiquity and comparative prehistory as they carried the sputtering torch of progress and unity -of- method. In his *Système de Politique Positive* (1824) and *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (1830-42), Comte articulates a grand hierarchy of all the sciences. Social Physics (history) will be the last to mature, but will boast the profoundest laws. In the end, however, Comte's grandiose plans for history simply became irrelevant to the growing numbers of advocational field archaeologists. For them, the living prehistory represented by the diverse peoples of the new colonies overseas served as a quite adequate and uncomplicated illustration of how ancient peoples lived. If those savages had had a history, it was irrelevant. These nationalists and mystics held that each people had their own particularistic history, determined by geographical accident or race. Nationalism melded with the conceit that natural selection produced some races superior in intelligence and capacity for complex social institutions, while others -- argued Lubbock in his *Prehistoric Times* (1865) -- were destined only for cultural stasis. Thus was Plenitude elevated to doctrine and Graduation and Continuity abandoned to dreamers.

Much of early antiquarian archaeology was conducted to illustrate the long continuity of the sovereign character of separate European peoples at a time when middle class nationalism competed with the internationalism of the tired aristocracy. Belief in a monogenist humanity was replaced by devotion to unities and boundaries. As early as 1734, the Society of Dilettanti was founded on the premise that the monuments of Greece and Rome illustrated the distinct, immutable character of those civilizations. The argument was strengthened by the very alienness of ancient pharonic civilizations illustrated in Denon's Description de l'Egypte (1809) and of the wondrous finds revealed by the

tunnelings of Layard at Nimrud (1844), Botta at Ninevah (1842) or by Schliemann at Hissarlik (Troy, 1870-79) and Mycenae (1876). Many of these finds were removed to the great European museums, where today we still see the ethos of the bounded civilization in Assyrian or Egyptian wings. In how many museums are floors devoted to global stages of social evolution?

While Boucher de Perthe at Abbeville (1830s-60s) or Rigollot at St. Acheul (early 1800s) might use ethnographic examples to illustrate the uses of the stone tools they found, or Frere (1797) and MacEnery (mid 1800s) for handaxes from British caves, the underlying purpose of these excavations was to prove that sufficient time had elapsed for a deep foundation for, respectively, a distinctively French or English culture. In England this approach had its precedents in the older antiquarian publishing of ancient monuments by Th.Leland (1533), Wm.Camden (1586), John Aubry (1670), and especially Wm.Stukeley (1740s). Some invented mythological ancestry for the ancient Britons derived from the Classical texts. But in Stukeley's *Druids* we see the yearnings for distinguished ancestors.

Often, the search for the unique and for the universal co-existed by an uneasy truce. Ole Worm (early 1600s), C.J.Thomsen (1819-36), J.J.A. Worsaae (1849) and S.Nilsson (1868) argued, on the one hand, for applicability of their Three Age system (Stone, Bronze, Iron) beyond Scandinavia. Yet, these same pioneers argued that the souls of modern nations are embedded in their antiquities. Arguments of separate (polygenist) creation and boundedness of peoples proliferated, as did dreamy-eyed arguments of mystical inner rules dividing Frenchmen from Germans, as they did Gaul from Teuton.

In this ethos of unique entities, the often-irreconcilable divisions of archaeology were born. Classical Archaeology and Egyptology emerged from their origins as high-class looting. What authority for interpretation could not be had directly from the texts (epigraphy) was derived by connoisseurship. Certain masterpieces allowed an empathic knowledge of the makers intentions because they were material expressions of the genius of the makers' era. Entire critical, but text-poor periods (the Nile Pre-Dynastic, for example)

were relatively ignored. In Biblical Archaeology, the Text was even more omnipresent but, unfortunately, not always the object of disinterested, objective scholarship. We see that legacy in Israel today, where much very fine field archaeology is shackled to elements of highly nationalistic ideology or to the desire to confirm Bible stories. In colonial Rhodesia, the meticulous excavation results of MacIver (1905) and Caton-Thompson (1931) were suppressed in favor of farcical, Biblical-based interpretation of Great Zimbabwe, a situation not officially reversed until the recent independence of the nation that now bears the name of those ruins. In North America, scholars who refused to believe indigenous peoples capable of building large earthen monuments had to invent Biblical (Lost Israelites) or legendary peoples (Mound Builders).

Text-driven and art historical interpretations are not a western monopoly. China had its own version of the Three Age system, as early as the first century BC, based upon Yüan K'ang's study of ancient artifacts. However, Li Chi who found oracle bones at Anyang (1928) that confirmed Bronze Age dynastic records is more honored than, for example, the brilliant Shen Kua, who in the 11th century tried to interpret ancient objects independent of Confucian tradition. Even after 1949, there has been a tendency in China to devote enormous resources to elite finds (such as the terracotta army of the first Ch'in emperor), rather than to investigate the lives of all segments of society. Japan devotes vast sums to an archaeology driven by official dynastic chronicles or dedicated to identification of putative physical types, if not to the demonstration of racial purity. Little wonder that pseudo-archaeology is a major prop to the rightist movement. In India, very early civilizations, such as the Indus, are identified from the ancient texts as pre-Vedic, the destroyers as the migratory Aryans. What unites all these examples is the fundamental belief that archaeology properly is the study of unique peoples who made decisions about how to deal with the physical and social environment in ways peculiar only to themselves, understandable only to their direct descendants.

Radical nationalism is mystical. In this nineteenth century invention that was to have horrific consequences in our own century, understanding of past peoples' motivations can only be achieved by their direct historical descendant, those sharing the same inner logic. Each age, each people has its own discrete 'spirit', unchanging over vast expanses of time, but utterly impenetrable by the sciences. Knowledge come about only by a mystical communication with human feelings of the past. Such ideas had their most influential expression in the German historicist school of Humbolt, Ranke, and Herder (with his fixed races and Germanic uniqueness), supported by the writings of the philosophers Schliermacker, Fichte, and Dilthey. The last, particularly, described the "internal coherences" that made peoples distinct and could allow empathic communication (*Verstehen*) with the spirit of their age

Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics (1823-29) gave the key to a long and often-shameful articulation of archaeology with historicism. Hegel argued that historical essences of nations were lodged in certain privileged aesthetics and that different peoples' destinies were of unequal historical and moral rank. Hence his assessment of Africans as "capable of no development or culture, and as we see them at this day such have they always been". Only the direct historical descendant of the same group or the scholar who can loose him or herself in the diagnostic aesthetic can read that particular manual of translation. Historicist nationalism was a boon to fieldwork. G.Kossinna in his Die Deutsche Dorgeschichte (11912) encouraged "Indo-Germaic" archaeology as the way to find the objects with which to communicate with a people whose heroic moment came 1000 years before the Romans. O.Spengler (1926, The Decline of the West) presented a vast tableau of eight nations and their defining aesthetics - stone for Egypt, the symmetrical human body for Classical Greece, and the (tragically) expansive "Faustian" space for the Germans. A horrified Spengler lived long enough to see Kossinna's and his ideas perverted into Hitler's theories of Aryan culture builders and *Untermenschen* culture-destroyers, but not long enough to witness the extensive excavations to find artifacts of the *Germanteum* (racial essence) of

the Germanic tribes, undertaken during the early 1940s by Himmler's archaeological corps, the SS-Ahnerebe. Similarly, Mussolini's minions excavated the Forum of Trajan to celebrate the Italian nation's rediscovered glory. These were theories of how to know the ancients that incinerated the world.

The insecurities of Germany's unification process spawned these mystical archaeologies. In a prosperous and confident England and America, some Enlightenment ideas were repackaged as Social Evolutionism. The first of these was the belief that cross-cultural ethnographic and archaeological could reveal universal social laws. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics (1850), promulgated one such law: the rise of civilization and the progress of humankind (unequal, because of racial or environmental differences) were the results of the struggle caused by population increases and insufficiency of food predicted by Malthus (1798). The vast comparative projects of L.H. Morgan (1877) and E.B. Tylor (1865-93), following on work by Bachofen (1861) and McLennan (1865) led to elaborate schemes of unilinear social evolution with their ranked universal stages. In Ancient Society, Morgan offers seven ethical stages from Lower Savagery to Civilization, each with its characteristic artifact, way of life, social and family organization. The grand synthesizers created a new demand for quality data, cheerfully provided by evolutionist archaeologists such as Pitt-Rivers, who pioneered principles of recording and stratigraphic excavation at Cranborne Chase (1887-98). Few saw the need to question the Plenitude thesis that variability in the ethnographic record mirrors humanity's past. So argued Lubbock in 1865. So Sollas still maintained in his 1911 Ancient Hunters, where he equates Tasmanians with the European Lower Palaeolithic society, the Middle Palaeolithic with Australian Aboriginals, and the Upper Palaeolithic with the Eskimo and Kalahari San.

The Social Evolutionists revived another Enlightenment belief. In his 1851 Man and his Migrations, Latham asserted that the question of the unity or non-unity of the mankind was one of the outstanding questions of prehistory. The Social Evolutionists reinvented several versions of 'psychic unity'. Within the same stage, ethnographic and archaeological peoples

share the same emotions and same intellectual capacities. Such was Bastian's (1860) argument for his concept of *Elementargedanken*, 'elementary ideas' and the foundation of Frazer's (1887, 1890) belief in cross-cultural survivals of primitive totems and religion. The motivations of ethnographical peoples and of the ancients, however alien, were ultimately comprehensible. One could again look to a science of culture.

Only a limited amount of field archaeology was conducted explicitly under the original Social Evolutionary rubric. An enormous amount was done under its Marxist descendant. Great irony attaches to the history of Marxist archaeology. In Marx's 1859 Critique of Political Economy, history is not about mysticism or the progress of the human mind, but about changes brought about by material conditions. From his reading of Morgan, Engels developed an authoritative ideology of universal human development, a Theory of Stages, in his 1884 Origin of the Family.

However, the doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist social evolutionism that ossified by the 1930s proved inadequate to interpret the great diversities of societies exposed by the voluminous excavations in mainland China and the Soviet Union. In time, historical materialism yielded to determined nationalism. Increasingly, the interpretive chapters of fine technical site reports would have little to do with the excavated material. In the Soviet Union after World War II, research was increasingly devoted to defining ethnic areas or to ethnogenesis. In China, archaeology was an instrument of political education. Theoreticians, such as Xia Nai (1979), devoted their efforts to reconciling Marxist laws to a special, proudly-Chinese case of social development and to a chauvinistic search for innovation centers (eg., Honan and east Shensi for Neolithic and Bronze Age origins) By the 1950s and 60s, western archaeologists looking to these countries for a processual, materialist alternative to culture history were severely disappointed.

STABILITY AND DISCREATNESS: CULTURE HISTORY

By mid-century, Marxist archaeology more resembled one of several alternatives to Social Evolutionism, rather than its scientific refinement. The culture history alternative in the United States was the product of Boas's rejection of cross-cultural unilinearism and of reactions against the racist Mound Builder theories. Boas reacted eloquently against all forms of speculative, comparative laws of evolution, race or progress. He argued that culture was far too complex. He and the influential two generations of archaeologists trained by him or by his students argued that discrete cultures were the appropriate units of study, but only in their geographical and temporal distribution.

North American archaeology had been developing in this direction since the early decades of the new century, after S.F.Havens (1856) and Cyrus Thomas (1885, 1898) discredited the Mound Builder thesis. Excavation was increasing apace, but the data were in a theoretical chaos. Cushing (1886) and Fewkes (1900), after experiments with evolutionism, pioneered the direct historical method. Prehistoric remains should be interpreted by analogy with practices of presumed descendant groups. Spinden's (1917) Archaic complex was a mature early example of the culture history methodology that depended closely upon time and space charts identical to those that made V.G.Childe's Dawn of European Civilization (1925) so revolutionary. The culture history method was historically particularistic. Boundaries between cultures were relatively impermeable. Diffusion did occur (innovations coming ultimately from a Mesoamerican center of innovation). But living ethnic groups were presumed to have changed little from their prehistoric progenitors. Kroeber (1916) and Spier (1917) at Zuni, Kidder on the Pecos (1924) and Ford in the Mississippi Valley (1936) improved excavation techniques and pioneered the analytical tools, such as seriation and formal artifact taxonomies, that would be formalized into elaborate classifications of ethnic systems, type artifacts and geographical boundaries, such as McKern's Midwestern Taxonomic Method (1939).

By mid century, both Europeans and North Americans shared a fundamental skepticism that the motivations of the long-dead could ever be known. C.Hawkes (1954) provided the classic articulation of the unscalable ladder of archaeological inference. Archaeologists might understand technology and perhaps economy and subsistence, but social rules, political organization and, particularly beliefs were forever closed books (except insofar as direct historical descendant informants were available to enlighten us). Peoples of a bounded culture shared values, norms, and cultural expectations. If not born to that society, one could do no more than classify the geographical horizon styles and the time-persistent cultural traditions of the infinite variety in human culture.

European archaeologists were at the disadvantage of being less certain of the presumed direct descendants for the great and chaotic proliferation of prehistoric cultures which were being identified as fieldwork intensified in the early decades of the 20th century. Archaeologists were influenced by Ratzel (1885-88) and the *Kulturkreis* school of discrete folk cultures spreading from innovation centers and by the *Ex Oriente Lux* -brand of Near Eastern diffusionism of O.Montelius (1899). There was a proliferation of historically and geographically discrete cultural entities, each given a find-spot or diagnostic-artifact name (Beaker folk; Battle Axe culture; La Tène). In all this particularistic detail, the big picture was often lost. Perhaps it is no wonder that the great archaeology-loving public turned to the hyperdiffusionist drivel of G. Elliot Smith (1928) or Lord Raglan (1939).

The great exception was V.G.Childe (1925-51). Childe made his reputation with the grand synthesis (Dawn of European Civilization) that extracted time and space order out of this confusion of local cultures. He used a framework of technological stages and diffusion of the big ideas of prehistory out of the Near East. Archaeological cultures were still individual entities, best classified by ethnicity rather than by technology. Diffusion was a major mechanism of change, but the circumstances were always local.

In his cross-cultural comparative interests and his view of cultures as open, adaptive systems driven by materialist processes, Childe was very much the exception for his time.

There were other exceptions that prefigured major aspects of the New Archaeology: the insistent adaptive ecology of J.G.D. Clarke (1932, 1952), the Virú Valley settlement patterns of G. Willey (1953), and the peerless statistics of A. Spaulding (1953). W.W. Taylor is perhaps the best publicized prophet of changes soon to sweep the field. In his 1948 A Study of Archaeology, he made a classic New Archaeology argument about the descriptive sterility of culture history and advocates what he called conjunctive archaeology. If culture is to be thought of in functionalist terms as all practices that allow humans to adapt to their environment, then the archaeologist must make an integrated study of food, settlement, environmental, etc., as well as tools and ceramics.

THE NEW ARCHAEOLOGY

However, in one significant way W.W. Taylor cannot be called the first New Archaeologist. Taylor argued that the archaeologist can never be a part of the past, so it is impossible for him or her to reconstruct a civilization. The archaeologist is cut off forever from past motivations. Contrary to that essential pessimism, nothing was impossible in the unbounded enthusiasm of New Archaeology's first flush. Archaeology as a science would transform the discipline into a true anthropology of the past. It was simply a matter of time before archaeologists would have access to all rungs of Hawkes' ladder of inference. In 1968, the publication date of Sally and Louis Binford's call-to-action, New Perspectives in Archaeology, science and computers promised a new world that could be compatible with the infant ecological and ZPG movements, revolution was in the air in politics and civil rights, and the key word was *relevance*. Archaeology would never be relevant if archaeologists ignored the person behind the pot. An examination of case studies from the American Southwest and Mousterian France, the Binfords' landmark book even purported to reveal the motivations of the long-dead. Historical particularism was out. Cross-cultural analogies were in. And so, too, was a promise of a new science that would use all the statistical power, isotopic dating, laboratory techniques and models of borrowed from

brethren sciences to create new laws of society that were every bit as powerful for prediction as those in the natural sciences. This was not just derivative unity-of-method with the sciences. Archaeology would be a science that physicists would envy (although old fogies soon quipped about "physics envy").

The New Archaeology was many things and would soon be accused of many others. It is useful to look at the debates that quickly wracked the New Archaeology, because these show us what the practitioners themselves judged to be important. The issue of how to judge itself a mature science soon divided the North American and British versions. The spokesman for the latter was D.Clarke (1968, 1972) who argued that the "undisciplined empirical discipline" needed a corpus of models. Clarke saw these as visualizing devices that functioned in the other sciences to relate observation to theoretical ideas. He saw culture as a dynamic equilibrium system, very close in concept to contemporary culture ecology. However, he had little time for formal logical proofs.

In the United States, debate raged for or against formal rules of explanation. Some (eg., Flannery 1968, 1972) argued for a organic Systems Theory view of culture as adaptive interaction of subsystems. Others, with Watson, LeBlanc and Redman's Explanation in Archaeology (1971) as their bible, argued for nothing less than the hypothetico-deductive method of explanation by Covering Law to boost the discipline to science's elevated status.

The second debate concerned what many felt was the fastest, most reliable route to high-level inferences about what motivated behavior in the past, namely explanation by analogy. How direct-historical did the sources for analogy have to be? This was a question that was to splinter the remarkably monolithic New Archaeology and that pushed one of the founders, Louis Binford, to reverse entirely his position on the question of whether ancient beliefs and intentions could ever be reconstructed. At about that time, a shrill challenge to New Archaeology's scientific optimism sounded from across the Atlantic.

RECENT REINVENTION OF A CONGITIVE ARCHAEOLOGY

The most aggressive application of the post-modern critique of claims of objectivity and of authoritative scholarship has come principally from Cambridge and a few English redbrick universities. The majority of English-speaking archaeologists, however, have remained fundamentally skeptical of the underlying message that the Real Past may never be accessible and that even to attempt is an intolerable act of political repression. The so-called Post-Processualists began first to mine the positivist breastworks of New Archaeology. They decried the determinism of the systems approach, cultural ecology and the stadial, evolutionary schemes that had come to dominate the study of complex societies (Trigger 1984). The unofficial spokesperson of the movement, Ian Hodder (1982, 1984) converted from a being a models-and-math student of D.Clarke. Showing the influence of the Frankfurt school and, particularly, Giddens (1984, 1990) and Bourdieu (1984), Hodder renounced all attempts to make archaeology into an anthropology aping the natural sciences. Hodder and D. Miller (1982) turned their attention to artifacts as symbols. They posited that material symbols reflect and simultaneously create the inner logic of a community, the guide to practical action for all members of that community. Behavior is negotiation between individuals and between different sub-groups (classes, genders, minorities) with these symbols as currency.

The Post-Processualists use many ethnographic examples (and many more from contemporary Britain) to reinvent the historicist argument that anyone not a member of a community can never know true motivations behind socially created meaning. Different cultures generate alternative forms of reality. It is only the pure hubris of western social science (and the New Archaeology in particular) that allows an archaeologist from the outside to presume to know better than anyone else what is going on. Hodder in Reading the Past (1986) takes the historian R.G.Collingwood (1946) as his direct bridge back to the historicist philosophers, specifically Dilhtey. He argues that demonstrable direct descendants are the only authoritative source for knowing the beliefs and meanings of a

particular people in the past. Lacking those existential expects, one must use the decidedly inferior expedient of historical imagination excited by analogy and a deep intuitive feeling for the "internal coherences" of the symbolic evidence.

One of the triumphs of the New Archaeology was an explosion of field work on a number of processual issues, such as the emergence of food production or the growth of complex society (states, cities). Now Post-Processualists, such as Hodder (1984) and Miller and Tilley (1984), say all that must stop. The very act of "discovery", as conducted by western archaeologists, is political expropriation and social control. Excavation is necessarily appropriation of the past for the purpose of maintaining structures of political inequality in the present. Prehistories are only folktales. According to Hodder, "... it is presumptuous and dangerous for an archaeologist to write the past for others".

The intention is to encourage alternative voices in archaeology, but the reaction to such statement by Third World colleagues has been swift and scathing. These critics resent the paternalism that assumes that non-western scholars will passively accept anything written about their past. They go in to argue that, since most research has been conducted in Europe, the United States, or in lands critical to the west's view of its superior cultural heritage (eastern Mediterranean and Near East), to ban future field archaeology as despised "discovery" would forever render the past of most of the globe an impoverished, derived shadow of the richer past of better-researched lands. Dirt archaeologists point to the weaknesses in the ethnographic examples used and to the lack of excavation conducted under the Post-Processual banner at a time when the archaeological record is disappearing at a breathless rate.

The theoretical reaction to Post-Processualism is still vague. It does not even have a name. However, in early responses to the Post-Processualist charges of excessive positivism and political repression and in the new research themes emerging during the second half of the 1990s, the reaction appears to resemble what the philosophers of the social sciences call interpretive pluralism. It can serve, therefore, to summarize the often-opposing currents of

claims to know the motivations of long-dead peoples that have coursed through the intellectual history of archaeology.

Post-Processualists are accused of having attacked a caricature of the New Archaeology. In its place, they have elevated their own internal circle of logic, without criteria of good or bad interpretation, that leads to unverifiable just-so stories and speculations about unrecorded intentions. Reaction focuses on their unwillingness to conduct an auto-deconstruction of the post-modernist presumptions they have mined from the humanities or from Critical Theory and applied to archaeology without regard to the consequences. Such consequences are, according to Third World colleagues, a new paternalism propped up by a tyranny of jargon and, according to mainstream archaeologists, the appearance of nihilism as the Post-Processualists sever all links to the Real Past of the external world.

For a minority, reaction takes the form of retreat into narrow empiricism of ethno-archaeological, actualistic and experimental studies to develop Middle-Range statements about how mechanical behavior translates into the statics of the archaeological record. Others import biological models of adaptive evolution to study complexity. French colleagues are pioneering Logicism, a formal logic for reducing artisan knowledge into sequence chains that can be organized algorithmically. Most contemporary archaeologists are uncommitted to formal unity-of-method with the natural sciences and are uncertain about what prediction might mean in archaeology. They are, However, committed to cross-cultural comparisons, to the study of processes, and to the proposition that an external world and a past exist independent of our imaginations. The duty of the archaeologist, then, is to find a new but not exclusionary empiricism that will encourage multiple ways of looking at a phenomenon by scholars bringing different values and experiences to their choice of theories. Interpretations must respect constraints imposed by the data.

One of the enduring legacies of Post-Processualism is the general acceptance that archaeology is the study of the remains of past people's actions upon a world as socially constructed and perceived. The process of social construction, however, is not mystical.

Behavior does not depend upon an inner logic (manual of translation) that is forever hidden from outsiders to the community. As C.Renfrew and E.Zunrow state in *The Ancient Mind* (1995), "one of the most troubling problems in archaeology is to determine about what or in what manner did prehistoric people think."

There is an emerging optimism that past motivations can be at least partially revealed through the investigation of how symbols and objects function as devices or insignia communicating peoples' view of themselves. The faith in the comprehensibility of motivations can be seen in just a sample of new research themes: looking for the transformations of millennia-old reservoirs of symbols and ideologies in, for example, Chinese or Mayan shamanism and cosmology or in African systems of occult knowledge; the convergence in prehistory, classical archaeology and Egyptology in a search for representations of reality in literate ancient societies; climate, not as something passively to be responded to, but to be entered as myth or legend into the social memory as a reservoir of options for future stress. There appears to be a determination not to descend into the vituperative denigration of opponents. This is fertile ground, then, for the growth of interpretive pluralism in archaeology: for the respectful, yet skeptical interaction of multiple points of view about how to achieve cross-cultural knowledge of what motivated people's actions in the past and about how to enter data fields that , today, we do not even imagine exist.

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