

# Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence

## Supplemental Material

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This document includes tables for all of the robustness checks mentioned in the text and footnotes. The model numbers at the top of the columns of the tables correspond to the models in Table 1 of the manuscript. Before each table is a brief description of the robustness check. After each description in parentheses, is the page number or footnote where the robustness check is mentioned in the manuscript.

Table A1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in our main analysis.

**Table A1: Descriptive Statistics**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Obs</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>MID Dispute Initiation</b>	<b>585,432</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>0.043</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>585,432</b>	<b>0.914</b>	<b>0.174</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>1<sup>1</sup></b>
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	<b>585,432</b>	<b>0.913</b>	<b>0.151</b>	<b>0.024</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	<b>572,178</b>	<b>2.276</b>	<b>0.620</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	585,432	0.030	0.171	0	1
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	585,432	0.049	0.216	0	1
Challenger-Target Distance	585,432	8.198	0.825	1.609	9.421
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	585,432	0.701	0.197	-0.217	1
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	585,432	0.121	0.326	0	1
Peace Years	585,432	34.944	34.362	0	184

<sup>1</sup> Rounded to the nearest ten thousandth place.

Table A2 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude observations of ongoing dispute years (footnote 7).

**Table A2: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.48**</b> (0.05)	-	<b>-1.38**</b> (0.25)	-	<b>-1.39**</b> (0.25)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.74**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.60**</b> (0.24)	-	<b>-1.63**</b> (0.24)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	-	<b>0.94**</b> (0.27)	-	<b>0.96**</b> (0.27)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	-	<b>-0.04*</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.03*</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.21** (0.04)	0.25** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)	0.27** (0.04)	0.18** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.34** (0.04)	0.40** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)	0.41** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.53** (0.05)	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.53** (0.05)	-0.47** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	1.36** (0.10)	1.65** (0.11)	2.82** (0.23)	1.03** (0.11)	2.88** (0.24)
Observations	585,099	585,099	585,099	571,852	571,852

**Table Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.**

Table A3 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude observations in which the potential target formed alliances during the same year a dispute begins (footnote 8).

**Table A3: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.44**</b> (0.05)	-	<b>-1.41**</b> (0.25)	-	<b>-1.42**</b> (0.25)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.74**</b> (0.06)	<b>-1.67**</b> (0.24)	-	<b>-1.71**</b> (0.25)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	-	<b>1.02**</b> (0.27)	-	<b>1.05**</b> (0.27)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	-	<b>-0.03</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.04*</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.19** (0.05)	0.22** (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.25** (0.04)	0.16** (0.05)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.36** (0.04)	0.42** (0.04)	0.35** (0.04)	0.43** (0.04)	0.35** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.42** (0.06)	-0.48** (0.05)	-0.42** (0.05)	-0.47** (0.06)	-0.43** (0.06)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Constant	1.29** (0.11)	1.61** (0.11)	2.81** (0.24)	0.99** (0.11)	2.88** (0.25)
Observations	585,369	585,369	585,369	572,116	572,116

**Table Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.**

Table A4 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude observations in which the potential target was a member of NATO (footnote 11).

**Table A4: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.61**</b> (0.05)	-	<b>-1.83**</b> (0.26)	-	<b>-1.91**</b> (0.26)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.57**</b> (0.06)	<b>-1.73**</b> (0.24)	-	<b>-1.86**</b> (0.25)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	-	<b>1.30**</b> (0.28)	-	<b>1.40**</b> (0.29)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	-	<b>-0.11**</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.12**</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.23** (0.05)	0.31** (0.05)	0.20** (0.05)	0.33** (0.05)	0.20** (0.05)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.20** (0.05)	0.30** (0.05)	0.18** (0.05)	0.31** (0.04)	0.18** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.42** (0.01)	-0.42** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.16* (0.06)	-0.32** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.28** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.07)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)
Constant	1.32** (0.11)	1.41** (0.12)	2.90** (0.24)	1.09** (0.12)	3.23** (0.25)
Observations	496,898	496,898	496,898	483,644	483,644

**Table Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.**

Table A5 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude observations in which the potential challenger and the potential target share a defense pact with one another (footnote 11).

**Table A5: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.48**</b> (0.05)	-	<b>-1.55**</b> (0.25)	-	<b>-1.57**</b> (0.25)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.79**</b> (0.06)	<b>-1.82**</b> (0.24)	-	<b>-1.88**</b> (0.25)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	-	<b>1.13**</b> (0.28)	-	<b>1.16**</b> (0.28)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	-	<b>-0.05**</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.05**</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.24** (0.05)	0.27** (0.05)	0.19** (0.05)	0.31** (0.05)	0.19** (0.05)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.30** (0.04)	0.36** (0.04)	0.27** (0.04)	0.37** (0.04)	0.28** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.39** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.54** (0.06)	-0.66** (0.06)	-0.62** (0.06)	-0.58** (0.06)	-0.63** (0.06)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)
Constant	1.45** (0.11)	1.77** (0.12)	3.07** (0.24)	1.15** (0.12)	3.18** (0.25)
Observations	528,091	528,091	528,091	514,921	514,921

**Table Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.**

Table A6 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude allies of the target which are also allied to the challenger (footnote 12).

**Table A6: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.46**</b> (0.05)	-	<b>-1.85**</b> (0.27)	-	<b>-1.85**</b> (0.27)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.91**</b> (0.06)	<b>-2.24**</b> (0.26)	-	<b>-2.29**</b> (0.27)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	-	<b>1.43**</b> (0.29)	-	<b>1.45**</b> (0.30)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	-	<b>-0.05*</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.05*</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.23** (0.05)	0.25** (0.05)	0.17** (0.05)	0.30** (0.05)	0.17** (0.05)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.34** (0.04)	0.38** (0.04)	0.29** (0.04)	0.40** (0.04)	0.30** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.39** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.53** (0.06)	-0.68** (0.06)	-0.65** (0.06)	-0.57** (0.06)	-0.67** (0.06)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)
Constant	1.44** (0.11)	1.91** (0.12)	3.51** (0.26)	1.11** (0.11)	3.56** (0.26)
Observations	523,177	523,177	523,177	509,946	509,946

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A7 reports the results of our analysis when we allow the relationship between the alliance's capabilities relative to the challenger's capabilities and dispute initiation to be non-linear by including a squared and cubed term of the measure (footnote 14).

**Table A7: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-1.74**</b> (0.68)	<b>-3.01**</b> (0.77)	<b>-2.76**</b> (0.80)
<b>(Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies)<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>4.68**</b> (1.32)	<b>5.49**</b> (1.34)	<b>5.02**</b> (1.38)
<b>(Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies)<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>-3.44**</b> (0.74)	<b>-3.81**</b> (0.76)	<b>-3.55**</b> (0.78)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.44**</b> (0.25)	<b>-1.44**</b> (0.26)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.77**</b> (0.29)	<b>0.76**</b> (0.29)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.02</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.18** (0.04)	0.15** (0.04)	0.15** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.34** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.39** (0.01)	-0.39** (0.01)	-0.39** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.44** (0.05)	-0.44** (0.05)	-0.44** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Constant	1.22** (0.14)	2.62** (0.28)	2.61** (0.29)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.



Table A8 reports the results of our analysis when we include only the capabilities of the members of the potential target's strongest single alliance (page 18).

**Table A8: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.50**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.45**</b> (0.24)	<b>-1.46**</b> (0.24)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.65**</b> (0.23)	<b>-1.67**</b> (0.24)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>1.00**</b> (0.26)	<b>1.01**</b> (0.27)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.03</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.20** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.33** (0.04)	0.31** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.46** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	1.39** (0.10)	2.88** (0.23)	2.94** (0.24)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A9 reports the results of our analysis when we include only the capabilities of the potential target's strongest single ally (page 18).

**Table A9: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Ally Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Ally</b>	<b>-0.43**</b> (0.04)	<b>-1.64**</b> (0.23)	<b>-1.65**</b> (0.24)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.88**</b> (0.22)	<b>-1.91**</b> (0.22)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>1.23**</b> (0.25)	<b>1.25**</b> (0.26)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.03</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.21** (0.04)	0.16** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.34** (0.04)	0.31** (0.04)	0.31** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.46** (0.05)	-0.44** (0.05)	-0.45** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Constant	1.29** (0.10)	3.03** (0.22)	3.10** (0.23)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.**

Table A10 reports the results of our analysis when we include the capabilities of the potential challenger's offensive allies (page 22 and footnote 15).

**Table A10: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Its Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Target's Defensive Allies plus Challenger's Offensive allies</b>	<b>-0.45**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.12**</b> (0.23)	<b>-1.12**</b> (0.23)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.36**</b> (0.22)	<b>-1.39**</b> (0.22)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.69**</b> (0.25)	<b>0.70**</b> (0.25)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.04*</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.11* (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.36** (0.04)	0.35** (0.04)	0.35** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.48** (0.05)	-0.48** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	1.35** (0.10)	2.60** (0.22)	2.66** (0.23)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A11 reports the results of our analysis when we use the natural log of the alliance's capabilities relative to the challenger's capabilities (footnote 15).

**Table A11: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>ln(Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies+1)</b>	<b>-0.72**</b> (0.07)	<b>-2.16**</b> (0.40)	<b>-2.18**</b> (0.41)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.70**</b> (0.28)	<b>-1.73**</b> (0.28)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>1.48**</b> (0.44)	<b>1.51**</b> (0.44)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.04*</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.21** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)	0.18** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.34** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)	0.33** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.47** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	1.41** (0.10)	2.97** (0.27)	3.04** (0.27)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.**

Table A12 reports the results of our analysis when we adjust the capabilities of the potential challenger and the potential target's allies by the distance from them to the potential target. The adjusted capabilities were calculated according to the formula below. The "miles per day" changes over time: 250 miles per day for the years 1816-1918, 375 miles per day for the years 1919-1945, and 500 miles per day after 1945 (Bueno de Mesquita 1981: 104-5) (page 18).

$$\text{Adjusted Capabilities} = \text{Composite Capabilities}^{\log_{10}[(\text{miles to potential target}/\text{miles per day})+(10+e)]}$$

**Table A12: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Adjusted Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.74**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.52**</b> (0.23)	<b>-1.54**</b> (0.23)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.48**</b> (0.22)	<b>-1.52**</b> (0.22)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.86**</b> (0.25)	<b>0.88**</b> (0.25)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.03</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.16** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.14** (0.05)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.29** (0.04)	0.27** (0.04)	0.28** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.38** (0.01)	-0.39** (0.01)	-0.38** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.44** (0.05)	-0.45** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	1.46** (0.10)	2.79** (0.22)	2.84** (0.22)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A13 reports the results of our analysis when we include only the similarity in alliance portfolios between the target and its allies for its strongest single alliance (page 20).

**Table A13: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.28**</b> (0.23)	<b>-1.29**</b> (0.24)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	<b>-0.71**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.47**</b> (0.23)	<b>-1.50**</b> (0.23)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.82**</b> (0.26)	<b>0.84**</b> (0.26)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.04*</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.24** (0.04)	0.16** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.40** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.52** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	1.63** (0.11)	2.73** (0.23)	2.80** (0.24)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.**

Table A14 reports the results of our analysis when we use the calculation of S using UN voting data. We follow the procedure described by Häge (2011: 299-300) using absolute distances (page 20 and 26).

**Table A14: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1946-2000**

	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.79**</b> (0.16)	<b>-0.78**</b> (0.17)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	<b>-0.36**</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.72**</b> (0.20)	<b>-0.64**</b> (0.21)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.35</b> (0.22)	<b>0.26</b> (0.23)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.07**</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.43** (0.04)	0.37** (0.04)	0.37** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.52** (0.01)	-0.52** (0.01)	-0.51** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-1.05** (0.07)	-1.00** (0.07)	-0.95** (0.07)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Constant	2.50** (0.14)	3.22** (0.20)	2.94** (0.22)
Observations	519,684	519,684	507,354

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A15 reports the results of our analysis when we use the foreign policy similarity measure of Häge (2011: 299), calculated by Cohen's  $\kappa$  formula with squared distances and valued alliance data (page 20 and 26).

**Table A15: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.52**</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.50**</b> (0.01)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	<b>-0.29**</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.34**</b> (0.10)	<b>-0.29**</b> (0.10)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.08</b> (0.12)	<b>0.02</b> (0.12)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	<b>-0.00</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.25** (0.04)	0.20** (0.04)	0.20** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.40** (0.04)	0.34** (0.04)	0.34** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.61** (0.05)	-0.56** (0.05)	-0.55** (0.06)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Constant	1.33** (0.10)	1.72** (0.13)	1.65** (0.13)
Observations	585,432	585,432	572,178

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ . Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.



Table A16 reports the results of our analysis when we utilize the level of peacetime military coordination for the potential target's strongest single alliance (page 22).

**Table A16: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.44** (0.25)</b>
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.71** (0.24)</b>
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>1.03** (0.27)</b>
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	<b>-0.09** (0.02)</b>	<b>-0.09** (0.02)</b>
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.28** (0.04)	0.18** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.41** (0.04)	0.33** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.52** (0.05)	-0.47** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Constant	1.08** (0.10)	3.00** (0.24)
Observations	572,172	572,172

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A17a reports the results of our analysis when we treat the level of peacetime military coordination variable as a factor variable. The level 1, the lowest level of peacetime military coordination, is the baseline (footnote 21).

**Table A17a: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	Model 4	Model 5
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.43**</b> (0.25)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-1.50**</b> (0.24)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.97**</b> (0.27)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance: Level 2</b>	<b>-0.35**</b> (0.04)	<b>-0.25**</b> (0.04)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance: Level 3</b>	<b>-0.22**</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.15**</b> (0.03)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.25** (0.04)	0.16** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.40** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.57** (0.05)	-0.49** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Constant	1.26** (0.10)	2.93** (0.24)
Observations	572,178	572,178

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A17b reports the predicted probability of dispute initiation with 95% confidence intervals for different levels of the peacetime military coordination variable. The predicted probabilities were generated using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) while holding all other continuous variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their modes. The predicted probabilities are based on the results in column 2 of Table A17a (Model 5). The column 1 of Table A17b shows the mean value of the predicted probabilities, and column 2 shows the 95% confidence intervals (footnote 21).

**Table A17b: Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Initiation**

	<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>95% Confidence Intervals</b>
Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's alliance: Level 1 (low)	0.00110	[0.00089, 0.00133]
Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's alliance: Level 2 (moderate)	0.00046	[0.00039, 0.00055]
Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's alliance: Level 3 (high)	0.00064	[0.00055, 0.00075]

Table A18a reports the results of our analysis when we use the interaction term and when we do not use the interaction term. The Akaike information criterion (AIC) indicates that the model with the interaction term outperforms the model without the interaction term. In other words, the smaller value of the AIC of the interaction model suggests that adding the interaction term improves the goodness of fit while overfitting due to the addition of the interaction term is of less concern (footnote 25).

**Table A18a: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	without interact	with interact
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.54**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.39**</b> (0.24)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	<b>-0.77**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.60**</b> (0.24)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	<b>0.95**</b> (0.27)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.18** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.32** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.47** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Constant	2.11** (0.11)	2.84** (0.23)
Observations	585,432	585,432
Akaike Information Criterion	12962.8	12952.5

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

Table A18b reports first and second differences in predicted probabilities for changes in our capability and credibility measures when we include the interaction term (Table 1, Model 3). The percentage changes of these first differences are reported on pages 25 and 26. The statistical significance of second differences suggests that the change in first differences at different levels of the other variable is substantially meaningful, meaning that one is significantly different from the other (footnote 27).

**Table A18b: First and Second Differences in Predicted Probabilities**

	First differences	Second differences
<b>First and second differences with regards to capability</b>		
Probability of winning changing from .74 to .91 when the average S-score is .76	-0.0004 [-0.0005, -0.0003]	0.0003 <sup>(1)</sup>
Probability of winning changing from .74 to .91 When the average S-score is 1	-0.0001 [-0.0002, -0.0001]	[0.0002, 0.0003]
<b>First and second differences with regards to credibility</b>		
An average S-score changing from .76 to .91 when the probability of winning is .74	-0.0005 [-0.0005, -0.0004]	0.0002 <sup>(2)</sup>
An average S-score changing from .76 to .91 when the probability of winning is .99	-0.0002 [-0.0003, -0.0002]	[0.0002, 0.0003]

One could argue that the evidence of the interaction in Table A18b is attributable to “compression” instead of “variable-specific interaction” (Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey 2010: 254). Table A18c reports first and second differences in predicted probabilities when we do not include the interaction term (Table A18a, column 1). The statistical significance of second differences in Table A18c suggests that compression is present in our model. However, the larger second differences in Table A18b and the statistical significance of the difference between (1) and (3) and the difference between (2) and (4) indicate that the interaction could not be attributed solely to compression from the probit specification (footnote 27).

**Table A18c: First and Second Differences in Predicted Probabilities**

	First differences	Second differences
<b>First and second differences with regards to capability</b>		
Probability of winning changing from .74 to .91 when the average S-score is .76	-0.0003 [-0.0004, -0.0002]	0.0001 <sup>(3)</sup>
Probability of winning changing from .74 to .91 When the average S-score is 1	-0.0002 [-0.0002, -0.0001]	[0.0001, 0.0002]
<b>First and second differences with regards to credibility</b>		
An average S-score changing from .76 to .91 when the probability of winning is .74	-0.0004 [-0.0004, -0.0003]	0.0001 <sup>(4)</sup>
An average S-score changing from .76 to .91 when the probability of winning is .99	-0.0002 [-0.0003, -0.0002]	[0.0001, 0.0002]

Table A19 reports the results of our analysis when we use a lower threshold for joint democracy (5 or higher on the Polity2 variable) (page 27).

**Table A19: Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation 1816-2000**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Capabilities of Target and Allies Compared to Challenger plus Target plus Allies</b>	<b>-0.49**</b> (0.05)	-	<b>-1.39**</b> (0.24)	-	<b>-1.40**</b> (0.24)
<b>Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Target and Allies</b>	-	<b>-0.73**</b> (0.05)	<b>-1.60**</b> (0.24)	-	<b>-1.62**</b> (0.24)
<b>Interaction between Capability and Similarity in Alliance Portfolios</b>	-	-	<b>0.94**</b> (0.27)	-	<b>0.95**</b> (0.27)
<b>Level of Peacetime Military Coordination in Target's Alliance</b>	-	-	-	<b>-0.04*</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.03</b> (0.02)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Offensive Alliance	0.20** (0.04)	0.24** (0.04)	0.16** (0.04)	0.27** (0.04)	0.17** (0.04)
Potential Challenger Has a Relevant Neutrality Pact	0.34** (0.04)	0.40** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)	0.41** (0.04)	0.32** (0.04)
Challenger-Target Distance	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.41** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)	-0.40** (0.01)
Similarity in Alliance Portfolios between Challenger and Target	-0.46** (0.05)	-0.52** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)	-0.51** (0.05)	-0.46** (0.05)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Constant	1.38** (0.10)	1.66** (0.11)	2.84** (0.23)	1.04** (0.11)	2.89** (0.24)
Observations	585,432	585,432	585,432	572,178	572,178

**Table Notes:** Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Two-tailed tests: \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Peace Years, (Peace Years)<sup>2</sup>, (Peace Years)<sup>3</sup> included in estimation but not reported.

**Figure A1: Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Initiation**




Figure Notes: This figure shows the predicted probability of dispute initiation with 95% confidence intervals for different values of our main independent variables. The predicted probabilities were generated using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) while holding all other continuous variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their modes. The top left panel and the top right panel are based on the results in column 1 of Table A18. The results in the bottom two panels are based on the results in column 3 of Table 1 (equivalent to column 2 of Table A18). In each case, one variable from the interaction term is held first at one standard deviation below its mean and then one standard deviation above its mean (footnote 25).

**Figure A2: Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Initiation (3D)**




Figure Notes: This figure shows the predicted probability of dispute initiation for different values of our main independent variables. The surface colored in light green (no grid on the surface) reports the predicted probability of dispute initiation based on the results in column 1 of Table A18 (without the interaction term). The surface colored in blue (grid on the surface) reports the predicted probability of dispute initiation based on the results in column 3 of Table 1 (equivalent to column 2 of Table A18) (footnote 26).



## Works Cited

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