To Concede or To Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances

Supplemental Material

Songying Fang
Rice University
sfang@rice.edu

Jesse C. Johnson
Kansas State University
jcjohnson@ksu.edu

Brett Ashley Leeds
Rice University
leeds@rice.edu

This document includes the proof of Proposition 4 and an example of emboldenment. It also includes a figure showing the distribution of our key independent variable and tables for all of the robustness checks mentioned in the text and footnotes. Before each table is a brief description of the robustness check. After each description in parentheses is the page number or footnote where the robustness check is mentioned in the article.

Proof of Proposition 4 (Restraint or Abandonment)

Proof. Suppose $\frac{c_a}{v_a} \geq q - p + \frac{k_a}{v_a}$. The condition implies that if the challenger demands $x > x^{(1)}$, then the ally will advise the target to accept it and will not join the target in the ensuing war when the target rejects the demand.

1. Suppose the challenger demands $x \leq x^{(3)}$. Then,
$Pr(x \leq x^{(2)})v_c x + Pr(x^{(2)} < x \leq x^{(1)})v_c x + Pr(x > x^{(1)})((1-p)v_c - c_c)$
$= Pr(x \leq x^{(1)})v_c x + Pr(x > x^{(1)})((1-p)v_c - c_c)$
$= Pr(c_t \geq (x+p-1)v_t - k_t)v_c x + Pr(c_t < (x+p-1)v_t - k_t)((1-p)v_c - c_c)$
$= \frac{\overline{T}-(x+p-1)v_t+k_t}{\Delta} v_c x + \frac{(x+p-1)v_t-k_t-\underline{T}}{\Delta}((1-p)v_c - c_c)$
The FOC is $\frac{\overline{T}-(x+p-1)v_t+k_t}{\Delta} v_c - \frac{v_t v_c x}{\Delta} + \frac{v_t}{\Delta}((1-p)v_c - c_c) = 0$, therefore, $x_2^* = \frac{\overline{T}}{2v_t} - \frac{p}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{k_t}{2v_t} + \frac{1}{2v_c}((1-p)v_c - c_c)$, or $x_2^* = 1 - \frac{p}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c}$. If x_2^* is an interior solution, then $x_2^* < x^{(3)}$, i.e., $1 - \frac{p}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c} < (1-q) + \frac{c_a}{v_a}$. Hence, the condition for x_2^* to be an optimal solution is $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q - \frac{p}{2}$.

2. Suppose the challenger demands $x > x^{(3)}$. Then,
$Pr(x \leq x^{(2)})v_c x + Pr(x^{(2)} < x \leq x^{(1)})((1-q)v_c - c_c) + Pr(x > x^{(1)})((1-p)v_c - c_c)$
$= Pr(c_t \geq (x+q-1)v_t + k_t)v_c x + Pr((x+p-1)v_t - k_t \leq c_t < (x+q-1)v_t + k_t)((1-q)v_c - c_c) + Pr(c_t < (x+p-1)v_t - k_t)((1-p)v_c - c_c)$
$= \frac{\overline{T}-(x+q-1)v_t-k_t}{\Delta} v_c x + \frac{(q-p)v_t+2k_t}{\Delta}((1-q)v_c - c_c) + \frac{(x+p-1)v_t-k_t-\underline{T}}{\Delta}((1-p)v_c - c_c)$.
The FOC is $\frac{\overline{T}-(x+q-1)v_t-k_t}{\Delta} v_c - \frac{v_t v_c x}{\Delta} + \frac{v_t}{\Delta}((1-p)v_c - c_c) = 0$, therefore, $x_2^{**} = \frac{\overline{T}}{2v_t} - \frac{q}{2} + \frac{1}{2} - \frac{k_t}{2v_t} + \frac{1}{2v_c}((1-p)v_c - c_c)$, or $x_2^{**} = 1 - \frac{q}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c} - \frac{k_t}{v_t}$. Again, if x_2^{**} is an interior solution, then $x_2^{**} > x^{(3)}$, i.e., $1 - \frac{q}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c} - \frac{k_t}{v_t} > 1 - q + \frac{c_a}{v_a}$. Thus, the condition for x_2^{**} to be an optimal solution is $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} + \frac{k_t}{v_t} < \frac{q}{2}$.

Note again the conditions found in 1 and 2 cannot hold simultaneously. Therefore we consider each case separately.

Suppose $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q - \frac{p}{2}$, then x_2^* is optimal for $x < x^{(3)}$, while there is no optimal interior solution for $x > x^{(3)}$. Since $x > x^{(3)}$ is half open and half closed, and $x = 1$ is never optimal, $x_2^* = 1 - \frac{p}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c}$ is optimal for all $x \in [0,1]$ for this case. Suppose $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} + \frac{k_t}{v_t} < \frac{q}{2}$, then x_2^{**} is optimal for $x > x^{(3)}$ and there is no optimal interior solution for $x < x^{(3)}$. Comparing the boundary point $x^{(3)}$ with x_2^{**}, it can be shown again that demanding $x^{(3)}$ gives C a higher payoff than demanding x_2^{**}. As in case 1, if neither $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q - \frac{p}{2}$ nor $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} + \frac{k_t}{v_t} < \frac{q}{2}$ holds, then the optimal solution is $x^{(3)}$. In sum, if $\frac{c_a}{v_a} + \frac{c_c}{2v_c} > q - \frac{p}{2}$, then C demands $x_2^* = 1 - \frac{p}{2} - \frac{c_c}{2v_c}$; otherwise C demands $x^{(3)}$.

In terms of the equilibrium outcome, if C's equilibrium demand, whether it is $x^{(3)}$ or x_2^*, is greater than $x^{(1)}$, then there is *bilateral war* between the target and the challenger (the ally will not aid the target after failing to restrain the target); otherwise, the equilibrium outcome is peace due the ally's restraining effect. □

Example of Emboldenment (Footnote 24)

Below is an example that illustrates the existence of the emboldening effect when $x^{(3)}$ is uncertain.

Let $p = 0.4, q = 0.7, \frac{k_t}{v_t} = 0.2, \frac{c_t}{v_t} = 0.25, \frac{c_c}{v_c} = 0.2, v_c = 1, v_a = 0.9$, and $k_a = 0.2$. Additionally, let c_a be uniformly distributed on (0, 0.63).

Given these values, $x^{(2)} = 1-q+\frac{c_t-k_t}{v_t} = 0.35, x^{(1)} = 1-p+\frac{k_t+c_t}{v_t} = 1.05$. Since $x^{(3)} = 1-q+\frac{c_a}{v_a}$, $x^{(3)}$ is uniformly distributed on (0.3, 1).

Now consider the challenger's possible demands. (1) If the challenger demands some $x \leq x^{(2)} = 0.35$, then it will be accepted and the challenger's highest payoff is $x^{(2)}v_c = 0.35$. (2) The challenger cannot demand $x > x^{(1)} = 1.05$ because $0 \leq x \leq 1$. (3) If the challenger demands some x such that $0.35 < x \leq 1$, then its expected payoff is:
$Pr(x^{(3)} \leq 0.35)(0.3 - 0.2) + Pr(0.35 < x^{(3)} \leq 1)[Pr(x < x^{(3)})x + Pr(x > x^{(3)})(0.3 - 0.2)]$
$= \frac{0.05}{0.7} \times 0.1 + \frac{0.65}{0.7}(\frac{1-x}{0.7}x + \frac{x-0.3}{0.7}0.1)$
$= \frac{0.05}{0.7} \times 0.1 + \frac{0.65}{0.7}(\frac{x-x^2+0.1x-0.03}{0.7})$
$= \frac{0.05}{0.7} \times 0.1 + \frac{0.65}{0.7}(\frac{1.1x-x^2-0.03}{0.7})$
Maximizing the above expected utility gives us the challenger's optimal demand in this range: $x^* = 0.55$. Then the highest payoff for the challenger from demanding $0.35 < x \leq 1$ is 0.37. Since this value is greater than 0.35 from case (1), the best overall demand that the challenger can make is 0.55. Such a demand can lead to war by an emboldening effect. For example, if the ally's cost of war is $c_a = 0.2$, then $x^{(3)} = 0.52 < 0.55$, and the ally would recommend "reject" to the target and the target would follow the advice.



Figure 1: Distribution of the Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance

Notes. This figure shows the distribution of our key independent variable, the target's cost of damaging its alliance. The mean of the variable is .77 and its standard deviation is .28.

Table 1 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting if one of its allies resists. This happens in four observations (footnote 45).

Table 1: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.38**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.27*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.44**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.19
	(.12)
Constant	1.61**
	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.57**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 2 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting only if it responds with a display or use of force (footnote 44).

Table 2: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.43**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.30*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.43**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.28*
	(.12)
Constant	1.59**
	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.59**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 3 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting only if it responds with a use of force (footnote 44).

Table 3: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.48**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.05
	(.74)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.63**
	(.13)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.30*
	(.12)
Constant	1.40**
	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.63**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 4 reports the results of our analysis when we code the target as resisting only if it responds with a use of force that results in war. The *Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact* variable drops out because there are no cases in our sample where the challenger had an applicable neutrality pact and the dispute escalated to war (footnotes 39 and 44).

Table 4: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−1.02**
	(.36)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.76**
	(.28)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.61
	(.10)
Constant	−1.04
	(.73)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.25
	(.21)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 5 reports the results of our analysis when we only include observations where the target had one bilateral alliance (footnotes 49 and 62).

Table 5: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.85**
	(.21)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.73**
	(.23)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.62**
	(.19)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.64**
	(.23)
Constant	2.06**
	(.28)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.59**
	(.08)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.61**
	(.07)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.26**
	(.07)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.42**
	(.02)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.24**
	(.09)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.42**
	(.16)
Constant	1.31**
	(.23)
Rho	−.77**
	(.15)
Observations	94,500
Uncensored Observations	264

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 6 reports the results of our analysis when we only include observations where the target's allies were all members of the same multilateral alliance (footnote 49).

Table 6: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.49**
	(.15)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.35*
	(.15)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.29*
	(.14)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.20
	(.14)
Constant	1.73**
	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.33**
	(.05)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.39**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.04
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.42**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.07
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	.01
	(.07)
Constant	.65**
	(.12)
Rho	−.61**
	(.08)
Observations	450,305
Uncensored Observations	790

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 7 reports the results of our analysis when we use only the target's strongest alliance to generate the *Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance* variable (footnote 49).

Table 7: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.40**
	(.13)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.27*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.44**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.22
	(.12)
Constant	1.61**
	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.58**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 8 reports the results of our analysis when we control for the raw capabilities of the target (pages 22 and 27).

Table 8: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.50**
	(.16)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.27
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.41**
	(.12)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.16
	(.12)
Target's Capabilities	−.89
	(.79)
Constant	1.72**
	(.22)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.52**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.56**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 9 reports the results of our analysis when we include the capabilities of the target's defensive allies and the capabilities of the targets offensive allies into the *Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War* variable (footnote 52).

Table 9: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.27*
	(.13)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.43**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.50**
	(.12)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.91**
	(.17)
Constant	1.36**
	(.19)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.52**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.57**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−1.32**
	(.05)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.45**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.13**
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.58**
	(.06)
Constant	1.80**
	(.11)
Rho	−.56**
	(.07)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 10 reports the results of our analysis when we use a two-step probit estimator instead of the censored probit model (footnote 54).

Table 10: Two-Step Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.46**
	(.16)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.31*
	(.15)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.50**
	(.13)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.25
	(.13)
Inverse Mill's Ratio	−.60**
	(.08)
Constant	1.87**
	(.29)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.04
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.52**
	(.05)
Constant	1.04**
	(.10)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 11 reports the results of our analysis when we use a probit model with the selection variables included in the outcome equation (footnote 54).

Table 11: Probit Analysis of Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.42*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.16
	(.16)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.30*
	(.13)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.20
	(.14)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.17**
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.30*
	(.14)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	.02
	(.19)
Constant	1.58**
	(.42)
Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses
Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in estimation

Table 12 reports the results of our analysis when we include the *Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance* variable in the outcome equation (footnote 55).

Table 12: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.38**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.27*
	(.13)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.45**
	(.12)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.21
	(.12)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	.02
	(.05)
Constant	1.56**
	(.26)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.62**
	(.12)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 13 reports the results of our analysis when we include the *Challenger-Target Joint Democracy* variable in the outcome equation (footnote 55).

Table 13: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.37**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.29*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.44**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.20
	(.12)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.24*
	(.12)
Constant	1.62**
	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.05
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.02**
	(.10)
Rho	−.57**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 14 reports the results of our analysis when we include the *Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests* variable in the outcome equation (footnote 55).

Table 14: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.43**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.26
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.43**
	(.12)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.22
	(.12)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	.14
	(.15)
Constant	1.50**
	(.25)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.52**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.56**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 15 reports the results of our analysis when we only include observations from the Cold War period (footnote 62).

Table 15: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1945-1990

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.46*
	(.21)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.32
	(.20)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.46**
	(.16)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.19
	(.16)
Constant	1.28**
	(.27)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.02
	(.73)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.57**
	(.05)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.05
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.50**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.10
	(.06)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.92**
	(.07)
Constant	2.10**
	(.14)
Rho	−.38**
	(.08)
Observations	406,757
Uncensored Observations	730

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 16 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude observations from the Cold War period (footnote 62).

Table 16: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-1944 & 1991-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.46**
	(.17)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.49**
	(.19)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.23
	(.17)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.37*
	(.17)
Constant	2.11**
	(.25)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.93**
	(.08)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.22**
	(.06)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.11
	(.06)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.31**
	(.02)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.01
	(.05)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.09
	(.09)
Constant	−.15
	(.16)
Rho	−.94**
	(.15)
Observations	178,710
Uncensored Observations	355

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 17 reports the results of our analysis when we control for the Cold War (footnote 62).

Table 17: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.48**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.26
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.45**
	(.12)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.24*
	(.12)
Cold War Period	.19**
	(.08)
Constant	1.52**
	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.27**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.41**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.05
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Cold War Period	.03
	(.02)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.57**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 18 reports the results of our analysis when we control for the number of allies the target has (footnote 62).

Table 18: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.45**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.26*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.45**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.25*
	(.12)
Target's Number of Allies	.01
	(.01)
Constant	1.63**
	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.02**
	(.10)
Rho	−.59**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 19 reports the results of our analysis when we drop observations where the target and challenger are members of a common defense pact (footnote 62).

Table 19: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.43**
	(.15)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.47**
	(.16)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.49**
	(.14)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.24
	(.13)
Constant	1.73**
	(.21)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.33**
	(.05)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.38**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.11**
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.41**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.16**
	(.05)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.61**
	(.06)
Constant	1.15**
	(.11)
Rho	−.63**
	(.08)
Observations	528,388
Uncensored Observations	796

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 20 reports the results of our analysis when we use a threshold of 5 or higher on the *polity2* variable to code our *Challenger-Target Joint Democracy* variable (page 26).

Table 20: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance	−.40**
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.27*
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.44**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.22
	(.12)
Constant	1.63**
	(.20)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.09**
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.58**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 21 reports the results of our analysis when we exclude the *Target's Cost of Damaging its Alliance* variable (page 27).

Table 21: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Target Resistance	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	−.22
	(.14)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	−.41**
	(.11)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	.08
	(.11)
Constant	1.29**
	(.18)
Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.53**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

$peaceyears$, $(peaceyears)^2$, $(peaceyears)^3$ included in dispute initiation estimation stage

Table 22 reports the results from the selection equation of Table 2 in the manuscript but also reports the coefficients and standard errors for the *peace years*, *peace years*^{2}, *peace years*^{3} variables (footnote 61).

Table 22: Censored Probit Analysis of Dispute Initiation and Target Resistance, 1816-2000

Dispute Initiation	
Challenger has an Applicable Offensive Alliance	.28**
	(.04)
Challenger has an Applicable Neutrality Pact	.41**
	(.04)
Challenger's Probability of Winning in Bilateral War	−.06
	(.03)
Challenger-Target Capital-to-Capital Distance	−.40**
	(.01)
Challenger-Target Joint Democracy	−.06
	(.04)
Challenger-Target Similarity of Interests	−.51**
	(.05)
Peace Years	−.04**
	(.002)
Peace Years^2	−.0007**
	(.00003)
Peace Years^3	−.000003**
	(.0000002)
Constant	1.03**
	(.10)
Rho	−.58**
	(.08)
Observations	585,467
Uncensored Observations	1,085

Standard errors in parentheses

Two-tailed tests: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05