A Call for Mutuality in Islamic Finance Corporate Form in Islamic Financial Intermediation

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Mutuality To Avoid Prohibitions Shari'a-Arbitrage And The Profit Motive Avoiding Gharar-Sales Avoiding Riba

Insurance Without *Gharar* : *Takāful* Remove The Profit Motive – Mutual Insurance

Islamic constraint:	Prohibition of <i>gharar</i> – (trading risk for-profit)
Consequence:	Jurists forbid conventional insurance
Juristic solution:	Make the contract non-commutative
Reality:	Stockholders own for-profit "Takaful" companies
Fiction:	Owners provide insurance as voluntary <i>tabarru</i> ⁶
Economic solution:	Align rhetoric with facts – <i>takāful</i> mutuals
Economic method:	Shift focus in risk intermediation from <i>contract</i> (<i>tabarru</i> ^c fiction) to <i>corporate form</i> (mutuality)

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Mutuality To Avoid Prohibitions Shari'a-Arbitrage And The Profit Motive Avoiding Gharar-Sale: Avoiding Riba

Credit Without *Ribā* (an extreme form of *gharar*): *I'timān* Remove The Profit Motive – Mutual Thrifts

Islamic constraint:	Prohibition of $riba$ – (trading credit for-profit)
Consequence:	Jurists forbid interest-based loans, deposits, bonds
Juristic solution:	Use other contracts to synthesize interest rate
Reality:	$Profits \Leftarrow synthetic-interest\ income - cost\ of\ funds$
Fiction:	Contract based – bank's business is trade, leasing
<i>Islamic</i> Economic solution:	<i>Also contract based</i> – equity-based intermediation
Economic method:	Shift focus in credit intermediation from <i>contract</i> (<i>bay</i> ^c fiction) to <i>corporate form</i> (mutuality) RICE
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Al-Qarāfi on Loans, Sales, Leases and *Ribā Anwā 'u Al-Burūqi fī Anwā 'i Al-Furūq* (Dār Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1998, vol.4) Difference #201 – between the Juristic Rules of *Qard* and *Bay*[']

• "Know that in the juristic rule of loans, three other juristic rules were violated: The rule of *ribā*...The reason for [allowing] those violations is the charitable (*ma* '*rūf*) component therein. If charity is absent, it would no longer be permitted

"(Question:) Simple loans (al-^cariya) are also charitable... but allowed for a known term with known compensation, even if no longer charitable.... (His answer:) When simple loans are compensated, they become leases, and **it is not** foreseen that $rib\bar{a}$ can exist in leases..., whereas a compensated loan is a sale"

- This logic fails if (as done currently in structured finance) leases are used to extend credit in a manner similar to loans
- Can one extend the analysis to say that the *credit component* should be *non-commutative* (minimal net interest income)?



Centrality of Corporate Profit Motive

- Focus on contracts inadequate to regulate financial intermediaries
 - This is equally true for Sharīʿa and secular regulations
 - Regulators protect the system, Sharī'a also protects individuals
- Profit motive + focus on contracts ⇒ Sharīʿa-arbitrage Religiously: may squander objectives of Sharīʿa Materially: Muslim customers pay more for less
- Advantages of mutual Islamic financial intermediaries:
 - Nonprofit ⇒ limited scope for Sharīʿa-arbitrage
 - Savers are in fact partners (match profit-sharing rhetoric with reality)
 - Pay higher returns to partners, charge lower rates to customers
 - Provide better "loss-ratios" to insured shareholders
 - Noncommutative *takāful* (match *takāful* rhetoric with reality)

